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Eric Louw, Jesper Stömbäck, and W. Lance Bennett call the trend in late-20th century 
political journalism “mediatisation”, where the televisualisation of Western elections 
favours episodic, dramatic, fragmented, and event-driven reporting. This “hype-ocracy” 
results in narrow and shallow frames that entertain rather than enlighten. This thesis, 
titled “Desperately Seeking Depth”, examines this trend in both international and local 
news about South African elections. 
 
While scholarship of Western elections on TV news is blossoming, analyses of news 
coverage of South African elections is sparse. There is particularly little analysis of the 
visual dimensions of TV news coverage, which remains a methodological challenge for 
media and communication scholars. This thesis draws together a comprehensive analysis 
of South Africa’s general elections on international and local television news over two 
decades. It develops an innovative, multimodal analysis method dedicated to television 
news and adds meaningful data to the overall study of South African media and politics, 
and international communication. It combines analysis of previous studies of each 
election with the original analysis of over 150 news broadcasts to uncover the news 
narratives about the South African general elections between 1994 and 2014. 
	
This thesis demonstrates the difference between global and local journalism about South 
African elections. Restricted by mediatised news values that favour episodic reporting, 
Western journalists present entangled, contradictory narratives over the years. The 
fixation on 1994’s violent-turned-miracle election narrative ignored the complexities of 
	 7 
the new democracy, while an increasingly detached approach in covering the 2009 and 
2014 ANC victories left journalists perplexed and unable to explore deeper narratives. 
Meanwhile, South African channels become progressively more hesitant to investigate 
controversial topics or criticise the ruling party. Avoidance of important issues such as 
the 1994 election violence, the AIDS crisis in 2004, and Zuma’s Nkandla fiasco in 2014 
results in narrow reporting that limits the substantive information available during the 
election periods. All channels to some extent seek narratives that attempt to explain and 
explore South Africa’s complex democracy, but these narratives are often contradictory. 
The decline in journalists’ engagement with political leaders and citizens means that the 
full picture of the elections is reduced to a few easily digestible frames that confirm 
neoliberal news values.  
 
This thesis offers a new model for the analysis of TV news coverage of elections that can 
provide the basis for future studies. “Desperately Seeking Depth” ultimately uncovers a 
picture of news industry that, both locally and globally, works as an echo chamber of 
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On the April 27th 1994, the new South Africa was born a democracy with universal 
suffrage. Having risen from the ashes like Phoenix out of a low scale civil war, the new 
democracy seemed a resplendent example of negotiation vanquishing conflict and peace 
victorious over violence. Nelson Mandela, the charismatic icon of the Struggle, straddled 
the traditional and the modern admirably, uniting South Africans under the Rainbow 
Nation umbrella. The world watched as Madiba smiled his way into the hearts of 
everyone. Global journalists walked along unending lines of millions of newly 
enfranchised black South Africans stood shivering in the autumn sunlight, ready to cast 
their first ballot no matter what the circumstance. After the bloodshed of the previous 
weeks’ bombing campaign and ethnic violence, this election seemed like the miracle 
panacea – perfect narratives to sooth a war-weary world. 
 
South Africa’s democracy turned 20 in 2014, a celebration of freedom, unity, victory over 
oppression, and culminated in the fifth free general election held on May 7th 2014. This 
election was auspicious for South Africa: it was simultaneously the 20th anniversary of 
democracy, the first election where young people born after the end of apartheid would 
be eligible to vote, and the first election after Nelson Mandela’s death. This poll also saw 
controversial Jacob Zuma resume the presidency for a second five-year term, much to 
the disillusionment of nearly 40% of the population who voted for the opposition. Zuma 
	 17 
followed two previous leaders, Thabo Mbeki and Nelson Mandela, to steer South Africa 
through a complex post-apartheid setting. Yet again, news cameras were on standby to 
capture the long queues as the electorate stood shivering in the early morning, waiting to 
cast their hard-earned ballot. These scenes mirrored those of 1994 and journalists 
frequently alluded to the first poll when comparing voting lines, political leaders, 
enthusiasm for the election, and political violence. Increased protest action against a 
government evidently failing to deliver on election promises led to bloody clashes with 
authorities across South Africa in the run-up to the fifth election. These dramatic scenes 
were not unlike those in the closing moments of apartheid, and enthusiastic news 
channels streamed these images across the globe. 
 
This project investigates the local and global broadcast news representation of the five 
democratic South African general elections, 1994-2014, analysing shifting and congruent 
narratives and journalism practices. This study goes beyond a discussion of the elections, 
but considers also the many factors that drive media narratives from both a global and 
local perspective. It also underlines the importance of the role of the media during the 
South African elections, from freedom and diversity of media to journalistic ethics and 
practices. 
 
1.1 South African democracy 
South Africa is the most modernised and industrialised African state (Fields, 2005; Van 
den Bosch, 2012) and has a unique history of apartheid that underpins the transition 
from the autocratic to the democratic. These traits make South Africa a prime example 
for a study about the narratives of transitional democratic elections. From the rainbow 
nationalism of Mandela’s presidency, to Mbeki’s elitist “African Renaissance” decade, 
	 18 
and ending in Zuma’s conservative traditionalist incumbency, South Africa’s 20-year 
democracy culminated in the 2014 general election. South African voters are divided, not 
just by race and economy, but also by geography and access to media and education. The 
ANC has strong loyalty in sections of the population who vote almost entirely based on 
identity politics (which is not unique to South Africa) and South African politics in 
increasingly a two-horse race (Mkhatshwa, 2014), with voters still aligning racial identity 
politics to their voting patterns, and I explore this further throughout Chapters 3 to 7 as 
background to each election year. 
 
Voting for a general election occurs every five years through a system of Proportional 
Representation, where the electorate (those South Africans or permanent residents aged 
18 or over) vote for a political party on a secret ballot. Voting usually takes place over 
two or more days, with the first day assigned for Special Votes (hospitals, prisons, and 
the elderly who need special assistance to cast ballots) and the general populace on the 
second day. The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) conducts voter education, 
registers citizens, runs the election, and counts the votes at the National Results 
Operations Centre (NROC). The last five elections have been deemed free and fair by 
both the IEC and international observers and monitors.1 
 
1.2 Election research 
Much literature already exists on analysing the political rhetoric of South Africa’s 
democracy (Holmes & Shoup, 2013; Grootes, 2013; McKeiser, 2014; Boraine, 2014), but 
none exists in the way of analysing and comparing all five South African elections 




specifically on broadcast news (despite the helpful research of Hubbard, 2010; Hungbo, 
2011; Vicente, 2013; and Duncan, 2014). Chapter 2, the literature review of election 
coverage, explores this paucity further. South African election research usually entails a 
view into the political side: voting, electorate, parties, and the feasibility of democracy 
(Reynolds, 1999; Gouws & De Beer, 2008; Southall & Daniel, 2009; Habib & 
Herzenberg, 2011; Terre’blanche, 2014; Prinsloo, 2014) rather than broadcast news 
analysis. With this thesis, I intend to contribute not only to South African election 
research but also to analyses of electorates, democracy, and government depictions on 
news media. 
 
 1.3 Why broadcast news? 
Louw (2006: 33) suggests that television is a political hype-maker’s dream because the 
visual-ness, movement, urgency, immediacy, and persuasiveness make for an information 
vehicle that is easily digestible and simplified. This “televisualisation” of politics is 
actually “mediatisation” (Strömbäck, 2008), where sound bites are forever shrinking 
(Hallin, 1992: 9; Lichter, Noyes, & Kaid, 1999: 5; Bucy & Grabe, 2007: 658) and political 
information is specifically designed for television audiences. Although much of the 
Western world is solidly in a political communication phase defined by Blumler and 
Kavanagh (1999: 213) as a multi-media hydra-headed beast, with media ubiquity and 
celerity, South Africa still relies heavily on television and radio for political 
communication. This study focuses on television broadcast news because, throughout 
the 20 year period of democracy in South Africa, television news was an emergent media 
and increasingly influential globally and locally. Yet, despite this influence, broadcast 
news is notoriously difficult to analyse. 
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Television news is multimodal. The combined visual and audio data makes it a 
semiotically rich but intricate platform, particularly when deciphering the narratives told 
through visual stories. Montgomery (2007: 97-8) suggests one method of studying 
television news is to analyse two simultaneous rules: the verbal track expression and the 
visual track referent. It is therefore important to realise when analysing television news 
broadcasts that the audio and visual tracks do not exist within a vacuum, but instead 
react with one another and are juxtaposed. It is this juxtaposition that is most interesting 
and challenging when researching news. Visual analysis can reveal agenda-setting ideals, 
bias, as well as framing techniques within television news. These methodological issues 




This study goes beyond a discussion of South African democracy and election narratives, 
although that is the first point of entry to the field. Instead, the first aim of this research 
involves an overarching investigation and conglomeration of narratives during all five 
elections and offers new original data about the shifting journalistic practices and 
approaches in and about South African elections. A second aim takes the form of a 
dedicated methodological approach for analysing television news. This method is 
outlined in detail in Chapter 2, as well as in Jones (2016) and makes this study relevant to 
the changing forms of journalism and contributes significantly to the existing literature 
on both television research methods as well as digital media. This study does not stop 
with the discussion of democracy narratives and semiotic representation on television 
news, but goes further with a contextualised investigation into the nature of political 
communication about South African elections, the evolution of journalistic practice 
	 21 
across the years, and what presumably drives the differences between local and global 
broadcast narratives. 
 
3 RESEARCH STATEMENT AND QUESTIONS 
 
This study is a multimodal analysis of the shifting and continuous narratives during the 
first five democratic South African general elections, represented on global and local 
broadcast news. My objective is to answer the following three questions: 
1. What were the stories told about South African democracy during the two 
decades of general elections: including political parties, surrounding events, and 
the voting day. 
2. Do the narratives differ in local and global coverage and between Western and 
non-Western coverage? 
3. What factors might be driving these media representations and narratives, and 
how do journalistic practices shift over time? 
This study also rests on two central hypotheses: firstly, Louw (2005), Strömbäck (2008), 
and Bennett (2012) suggest that global political journalism became increasingly 
mediatised in the 1990s and 2000s (see Chapter 2, the literature review, for an overview 
of this term), and so this thesis assumes media coverage of the South African elections 
will follow suit. Secondly, the international interest in South African elections will 
decrease substantially from 1994 to 2014 as democracy was further consolidated. Louw 
and Chitty (2000) suggest that South Africa effectively fell off the global radar post-1994 




4 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
	
This thesis begins with an overview of the literature in Chapter 1. The review joins two 
fields of study: media studies related to both election coverage and political 
communication theory. The review points out the knowledge base of global and local 
trends in framing elections predominantly as a horse race, where two sides compete for 
winning the election, as well as the mediatisation of political journalism, where 
personalised event-based coverage trumps political policy and issues. Gaps exist in this 
substantial field: research about South African and African media coverage of elections 
as a whole is lacking, and analysis of television news coverage is often collectively 
analysed with other forms of media. I argue that these constitute significant oversights 
for media scholars’ understanding, analysis, and conceptualisation of mediated elections. 
 
Chapter 2 outlines the dedicated multimodal methodology developed for this project. 
Unlike the existing awkward existing analysis technique of analysing television news, this 
new method does not rely solely on time or frequency and emphasises the importance of 
analysing the visual aspect of television news. I argue in this chapter for a more precise, 
dedicated method involving a combination of semiotic and discourse analysis, with a 
contextual acknowledgement of the media’s political economy. This chapter also sets out 
steps taken for data collection and analysis of this large data set. 
 
Chapters 3 to 7 tackle each election in turn. Chapter 3 details the thematic analysis of the 
1994 election year and, like all subsequent analysis chapters, starts with a background of 
key events, political parties, and issues. The analysis reveals significant differences 
between global broadcasts – and their overwhelmingly dramatized view of the election 
and emphasis on the negotiated settlement – and local broadcasts, which adopted a more 
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hesitant and cautious approach. Ultimately, entangled framing occurred because of a 
mediatised approach from global channels, driven by the switch to post-Cold War news 
frames. 
 
The 1999 election year is examined in Chapter 4. The low number of broadcasts available 
from global channels indicates just how far South Africa had fallen outside of the global 
spotlight. Nevertheless, narratives implied a general concern for ‘fit for purpose’ political 
leaders in South Africa. Nelson Mandela was criticised, albeit subtly, while Thabo Mbeki 
represented the new hope. Global coverage was cursory at best but South Africa 
attempted a comprehensive, if clumsy, view from the ground. 
 
Chapter 5 explores the shift of focus away on South Africa, symbolised in the lack of 
international broadcasts available for 2004. Despite this paucity, narratives from local 
channels still suggested a push towards global mediatised political communication. South 
African broadcasts glamorised the authorities while the single global broadcast presented 
a stark reminder of the divisions in post-apartheid South Africa. 
 
With an increased sample size because of improvements in digitisation as well as a 
reinvigorated election campaign attractive to media, Chapter 6 outlines how global 
broadcasters presented a tacit vote of no confidence in the new president Jacob Zuma in 
2009, giving more time and space to voicing opposition parties. This implicit judgement 
of his fitness for office suggested that regime change was necessary, primarily because of 
Zuma’s cult-like status. Global narratives were entangled and shallow, despite journalistic 
attempts to dig a little deeper. South African broadcasters meanwhile were increasingly 
hesitant to explore controversial frames. 
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The final analysis section, Chapter 7, represents the largest sample gathered in this study. 
Global broadcasters presented top-down, mediatised coverage of the 2014 election that 
excluded context and issues, favouring instead visualisation and mythologies that 
ultimately supported the status quo. Protest action and the liberation narrative formed 
key issues yet global broadcasters presented confusing accounts with hardly any voices 
from the ground. South African coverage, again, was distant, ignorant, and hesitant. 
 
The overall discussion in Chapter 8 outlines three overall narratives from the global and 
local representation of South Africa’s elections: firstly, narratives were driven by 
increased mediatised political communication. Secondly, local channels avoided 
controversial narratives in an attempt to normalise democracy, while global narratives 
were predominantly visualised and dramatic, but often confused and contradictory. 
Thirdly, journalists disengage with political leaders and citizen voices over time and 
increasingly rely on pundits, which increases the distance between the audience and 
politics. Ultimately, narratives were far more entertaining than enlightening, which is in 
line with the global trend of political communication. 
 
By way of a conclusion, the final section suggests implications and applications of this 
thesis. Using the dedicated method in future research would provide a deeper 
understanding of broadcast media narratives during election periods, while the findings 
add significant data to the paucity of research about South African election 
representation on television news. Recommendations range from advocating a better 
archival technique in South Africa’s broadcast news channels, a better analysis technique 
of broadcast data, and a recommendation for journalists to include more grassroots and 
political voices in election coverage. 
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The review joins the field of media studies that is related to both election coverage and 
political communication theory. In doing so, three main areas of literature are examined:	
international elections, African elections, and South African elections. Each section 
assesses both local and international media representations (where available), the 
methodology of research, and notable findings and conclusions. The structure of this 
review begins with a broad overview of global political journalism as a contextual base. 
The second section looks at research on international media coverage of North 
American, British, and South Korean elections, focusing on the general themes of 
coverage and methodologies. Critically, this review differentiates between global and 
local media coverage.2 Media framing of African elections is analysed in the third section 
of the review. Here, the complicating issues of postcolonialism and the Western gaze 
(Foucault, 1970; Said, 1978; Hunter-Gault, 2007; West, 2008; Khor, 2010; Göttsche, 
2013: 5) are considered as background theory to understanding media representations of 
African elections. Finally, the review ends with a section on the media framing of South 
African elections, which is separated into the five election years (1994 – 2014). 
 
This review identifies five areas of concern: firstly, the general increase of mediatisation 
of political communication on the media, with sound bites, PR-ised journalism, lack of 
																																																								
2 “Global” means media outside of the country under scrutiny (so, British media coverage of North 
American elections would class as “global” media) and is used interchangeably with “international”, 
whereas “local” means media from within the nation (so, North American media coverage of North 
American elections would class as “local”). 
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depth in reportage, and horse race journalism as common themes in media coverage of 
elections. Secondly, South African election coverage slipped off the global media radar 
after 1994, which Louw and Chitty (2000: 293) note is symptomatic of the assumed 
“normalisation” of South African democracy. Thirdly, production context (Woo, 1996) 
and narratives are neglected in favour of a quantitative airtime analysis. Fourthly, framing 
elections in Africa and South Africa are generally angled towards the global audience, 
with mediatised journalism, the horse race format, and Western media ethics influencing 
media coverage. Finally, the freedom of the media, particularly in South Africa 
(Tomaselli, Tomaselli, & Muller, 1987; Berger, 2002; Gouws & De Beer, 2008; Zegeye & 
Harris, 2013: 18; Malila, 2014), is a constant concern for researchers. 
 
1 GLOBAL RESEARCH ON ELECTION COVERAGE 
 1.1 Overview of global scholarship about election coverage 
Among the major characteristics of democracy, conducting regular, free, and fair 
elections is paramount. The electorate use mass media as their major tool in sourcing 
information about political leaders and, according to Strömbäck and Kaid, “election 
news coverage matters because it is a prerequisite for an informed electorate and because 
it contributes to how democracy works” (2008: 14). The media coverage of elections also 
gives a good indication to the degree of media freedom – of information, from 
interference, and from censorship – which can also be an indicator of the freedom and 
fairness of the elections themselves (Berger, 2002). It is also worth recalling the 
significance of elections as highly ritualised national media events, especially in the West 
(cf. Lauderbach, 2007: 316). Benoit (2004: 104) notes that global scholars have therefore 
invested considerable time and effort in understanding the news coverage of political 
campaigns, and robust debates about media coverage of elections exist in global 
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scholarship. Because of the intersection in disciplines (political science, media studies, 
anthropology, and even psychology), the focus of research is often very different. 
Researchers approach their analyses with dissimilar methodologies, conceptual 
frameworks, and terminology. Comparisons between results are therefore difficult, which 
Aalberg, Strömbäck, and De Vreese (2011) acknowledge in their own study on media 
framing of elections.  
 
Global scholarship on the role of the media in covering elections tends to approach 
research from a ‘top down’ style: how politicians and authorities use the media, rather 
than how the media represents the politicians. For example, these analyses focus on the 
political aspects of coverage, rather than the media in which they are represented: Norris 
(1997), Louw (2005), Bennett (2012), and Graber and Dunaway (2015) investigate 
campaign and electoral coverage in the media, while others look specifically at campaign 
coverage in television news (Kern, 1989; Hallin, 1992; Jamieson, Waldman, & Devitt, 
1998; Just, Crigler, & Buhr, 1999; Lichter, Noyes, & Kaid, 1999; Farnsworth & Lichter, 
2003; Druckman, 2005; Cross, 2010; Cushion, Thomas, & Ellis, 2015; Cushion & 
Sambrook, 2015), some at print news coverage (Benoit, Hansen, & Stein, 2004; Kiousis, 
2006), and more recently online or convergence media coverage (Iyengar & McGrady, 
2007; Druckman, Kifer, Parkin, 2009; Kushin & Yamamoto, 2010; Housholder & 
LaMarre, 2014; Glantz, 2016). Additionally, other studies analyse the narratives of the 
general election campaign (Klein & Maccoby, 1954; Graber, 1971, 1976; Russonello & 
Wolf, 1979; Robinson & Sheehan, 1983; Stempel & Windhauser, 1991; Mantler & 
Whiteman, 1995); coverage of presidential debates (Patterson, 1980; Kaid, McKinney, & 
Tedesco, 2000; Benoit & Currie, 2001); and the perceived media influence on voters 
(Benoit, 2007; Eargle, Esmail, & Sullivan, 2008).  
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While much of the research on media coverage of elections is of this ‘top down’ 
approach, a few notable examples exist where the media, rather than politicians, is the 
focus (Broh, 1980; Woo, 1996; Bucy & Grabe, 2007; Strömbäck, 2008; Cross, 2010; 
Aalberg, et al., 2011). These exceptions detail the narrative framing of candidates 
(Iyengar, 1991; Woo, 1996), discourse analysis of media framing (Scheithauer, 2007; 
Rose, 2014), and visual cues (Bucy & Grabe, 2007; Schieß, 2007), but do so with a 
methodology that often incorporates the length of time a politician is on screen (Grabe, 
1996; Norris, 1997; Druckman, 2005; Bucy & Grabe, 2007; Cushion & Sambrook, 2015; 
and Cushion, Thomas, & Ellis, 2015) and lack visual analysis or semiotic discussion. The 
emphasis is therefore on political science, rather than media studies. There is a paucity of 
political communication analyses that take into account visual studies and my own study 
attempts to add significant data to this scarcity, from a South African perspective.  
 
Scholastic research about African elections in general, and South African elections 
specifically, is lacking in both breadth and depth. Principal analyses of media coverage of 
elections come from North America and Europe: collectively, the global “West” or 
“North” (Huntington, 1996: 26). Research on Western media coverage of Western 
elections is in abundance, with fewer analyses available on Western media coverage of 
African elections. Even less research is available about African media coverage of 
African elections, and I have not found any significant data on the African media 
coverage of Western elections to date. Thus, this section is dedicated to the most 
important general literature on the media’s role in elections and, in particular, how local 
media cover Western and non-Western elections.3 
																																																								
3 Throughout this section, I refer to the “West” and “non-West” rather than “developed nations” or 
“developing nations” and so forth, for brevity and coherence. Previous research (Patterson, 1994; 
Lawrence, 2000; Esser & Angelo, 2006; Abate, 2013: 22) shows that there is little difference in how North 
American and most European media frame elections. Conversely, Abate (2013: 22) finds that the 
difference between Western and non-Western media coverage of elections is noticeable. 
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 1.2 Role of the media in covering the political process 
1.2.1 Television news and the hype-ocracy 
Of the little dedicated research and writing about the role of the media in elections, Eric 
Louw’s (2005) account of the media and the political process is one of the most 
noteworthy. Louw (2005: 50) echoes Coronel (2001: 6) in saying that the media’s role in a 
democracy is to ensure the maximised flow of information to create an informed 
citizenry in order to deepen democracy. In a cynical approach, Louw argues that mass 
media don’t create an informed citizenry but instead “serve as a vehicle for circulating 
hype required to deliver mass publics to mainstream political parties” (2005: 50) via spin-
doctors. Louw terms this a “hype-ocracy” (ibid.). Bucy and Grabe (2009: 74) push this 
idea further and consider how political journalism has turned into “image bite” politics – 
the visual nature of television has irrevocably changed how politicians are represented in 
the modern era of journalism. Candidates are shown but not heard for longer periods, 
yet these images are the least scrutinised and understood aspects of political news (ibid.).  
 
Louw argues that turning news into an entertaining spectacle has altered the journalism 
profession: public relation agents (or spin-doctors) often use journalists to “tame 
Western publics” (ibid.: 53) and distract, rather than inform. Louw identifies further 
challenges of global television newsrooms, including the juniorisation of staff, the spiral 
of silence generated by spin-doctors, and the push towards sensationalised adversarial 
watchdogism (ibid.: 71 – 83). Louw’s interpretation looks at both Western and African 
journalistic practices, but his main analysis rests on Western(ised) media coverage.4 He 
																																																								
4 For a good overview of the problems of PR-ised journalism in the African context, Nyamnjoh (2005: 47-
53) explains how public relations and brand journalism influences public service broadcasting, and 
ultimately harms democracy in recreating the American, “McDonaldised” programming for African 
audiences. Fast, shallow, and unsubstantial programmes do not perform an adequate role in 
democratization, Nyamnjoh observes. 
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also makes no suggestions about how audiences interpret these media messages or spin; 
instead his focus, similar to my own study, is on the media messages themselves. 
1.2.2 Government, spin, and news 
While his is not a dedicated television news critique, Bennett (2012) notes the crises of 
political journalism and newsroom politics in general and outlines the challenges political 
journalists face when reporting on elections and campaigns. He (2012: 3-6) suggests that 
without independent journalism, the lights go out on democracy. News is not what 
happens but “what newsmakers promote as timely, important, or interesting” (ibid.). He 
notes that there is therefore a fragile link between news and democracy, because news is 
largely a “freewheeling entity shaped by a combination of commercial forces” (ibid.: 20), 
sold and manufactured with few quality controls. Both Bennett and Louw have 
pessimistic opinions about the media coverage of the political process, but note that the 
packaging of politics for television is largely formed by economics. While the political 
economy of the media is only one part of newsroom management, many researchers 
across generations (Gans, 1979: 83; Gitlin, 1980; Bird & Dardenee, 2009: 210; Bucy & 
Grabe, 2009; McChesney, 2009; Van Dijk, 2009: 199; Voltmer, 2010: 6) suggest news 
coverage of elections and democracy is often, directly or implicitly, shaped and driven by 
external gatekeeping forces. In spite of government, political, or commercial 
intervention, the role of the media in elections cannot be underestimated, as Robert 
McChesney (2005) underlines: 
It is beyond debate that much of what government does is beyond the purview 
of the bulk of the citizenry. But through elections, citizens can control who gets 
to be in power and how long these people stay there… So, even if our media fail 
to provide analysis of the preponderance of what government does, they can, at 
	 31 
least, make it possible for citizens to effectively monitor the electoral campaigns 
on public officials. 
These pressures can affect the framing of elections, in terms of both narratives about the 
political process as well as style of reporting.  
1.2.3 Framing elections 
Entman describes the news frame as the “imprint of power” (1993: 55) whereby some 
aspects of a news item are emphasised over others in order to promote a causal 
interpretation, problem construction, or moral evaluation; yet Bucy and Grabe (2009: 
100, 203-211) argue that most discussions about framing are derived from the verbal 
aspects of media coverage, and neglect the visual. Narrative elements are usually 
considered the discourse or verbal track, but Bucy and Grabe (2009: 98-102) argue for 
editing, camera proxemics, and journalist mediation to be included in this visual framing 
analysis. For this thesis, “framing” will include not only the discourse but also the visual 
elements of the broadcast. 
 
Iyengar’s (1991) research is important to understand the media framing of elections and 
the political process, specifically in his identification of the episodic and thematic news 
framing. While the majority of modern news-as-spectacle political journalists seem to 
adhere to it, Bennett (2012: 44) suggests that framing elections as episodic news is 
inherently problematic. Episodic news, Iyengar (1991: 18) states, is shallow, personalised, 
dramatic, and fragmented, with a focus on social order and disorder. Thematic news, 
conversely, places political issues and events in context, and is less likely to consider 
individuals responsible for these events (ibid.). In a review of Iyengar’s episodic/thematic 
framing theory, Scott London (1993) states:  
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Since electoral accountability is the foundation of representative democracy, the 
public must be able to establish who is responsible for social problems, Iyengar 
argues. Yet the news media systematically filter the issues and deflect blame from 
the establishment by framing news as ‘only a passing parade of specific events, a 
context of no context’. 
Bennett (2012: 44) too suggests that episodic framing fragments news, which in turn 
dramatizes events and personalises problems, to the extent that news fails to offer a base 
for learning and generalising. While Iyengar’s news frame theory is a seminal work in the 
realm of the role of media in covering elections, there has been little research on 
developing the episodic/thematic frame since, as Scheufele (1999) suggests. The resultant 
news frames in episodic news are shallow, and policy is often overlooked in favour of 
personalisation.  
 
This thesis uses the terms “narrow” and “shallow” often. Shallowness of narratives 
means there is a diversity of stories but which were superficial or simplistic without 
exploring depth, contradictions, or context, and similar to Iyengar’s episodic news 
frames. Narrowness, conversely, means that journalists attempt to explore depth and 
context but narratives are restricted in the broadness or number of frames. The frames 
themselves may be thematic (Iyengar, 1991: 18), profound, and investigative, but the 
narrowness describes the lack of breadth in relation to other frames. For example, 
explaining the voting day in shallow frames could show multiple narratives of queues, 
poor organisation from authorities, pre-election violence, the act of voting, and so forth, 
but all frames would be superficial, relying on visually rich events, emotional reporting, 
and drama. Narrowness of frames in explaining the voting day would look at the queues 
only, interviewing citizens about their expectations, exploring how the ballot works, and 
giving leaders of political parties a chance to speak. This narrowness includes depth of 
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reporting but excludes other important or contextual frames (such as pre-election 
violence, or disorganised authorities) and focuses only on one or two narratives. 
 
 1.3 Research on Western media coverage of elections 
Research about the Western media coverage of elections is diverse in both approach and 
discipline, but some analyses have similarities in their findings. This section deals with 
two predominant themes in global reportage of elections, chiefly the “game frame”, or 
horse race journalism, and the increasingly dominant mediatisation of political reporting. 
1.3.1 The game frame 
Scholars across generations suggest that the “game frame” or “horse race” style of 
journalism is paramount (Broh, 1980; Patterson, 1980; Graber, 1988; Stempel & 
Windhauser, 1991; Hallin, 1992; Mantler & Whiteman, 1995; Domke, Fan, Fibison, Shah, 
Smith, & Watts, 1997; Lawrence, 2000; Aalberg, et al., 2011). Under this “horse race” 
frame, media present election campaigns in terms of a win-or-lose competition or battle. 
In one of the first pieces of research to use the term, Broh (1980) analysed the 1979 US 
elections and found that journalists framed the election as a sporting event, notably using 
the metaphor of betting on a horse race (ibid.: 516): one candidate “leading” ahead of the 
other, and the unpopular candidate “chasing” the leader. While Broh (ibid.: 527) 
acknowledges the benefits of such a framework in attracting audience interest, he 
concludes that distortion is possible and harmful to the electoral process.  
 
Aalberg et al. (2011: 173) conclude in much the same way: the game frame has the 
potential to boost public interest in politics but may also boost political cynicism, as 
evidenced in Cappella and Jamieson’s (1996) frame analysis of US political news. Aalberg 
et al. aimed for a clear definition of the game frame: news stories that portray politics as a 
	 34 
game and are centred on winning or losing (as a battle or a race); opinion polls dominate 
the story; approval from interest groups; and speculation about outcomes (ibid.: 172). 
Critically though, the authors echo Hahn and Iyengar (2002) and find that the reasons 
for the dominance of this frame in election coverage are mostly commercial: this frame 
allows journalists to more easily produce stories to a deadline as it demands fewer 
resources than complex policy debates (Aalberg et al., 2011: 164). 
 
While developing this coding scheme, Aalberg et al (ibid.: 171) found that very few 
previous studies show a linear trend for the media using the game frame to cover 
elections across time, although Benoit (2004: 105) notes in his own study that the “horse 
race” was the most common topic in US research. Aalberg et al. (2011: 171) acknowledge 
that the differences in methodology, conceptualisation of terminology, and geographical 
location makes comparisons across these types of studies very difficult.  
1.3.2 Mediatisation 
Another major debate about Western media coverage of elections is the “mediatisation” 
of politics, whereby political journalists use media-logic to present easily digestible 
information to television audiences.5 Cushion, Thomas, and Ellis (2015: 1530) found that 
the 2015 UK election on television news was characterised by three main styles of 
reporting: the game frame, conflict frame, and personalisation of politics. Both the game 
frame and personalisation of politics are part of Strömbäck’s “media logic” (Strömbäck, 
2008: 233; Cushion et al., 2015: 1 525).  
 
																																																								
5 It should be noted, though, that mediatisation is not limited to just political journalism. The “celebrity 
culture” of modern news is also mediatised. Mark Wheeler’s Celebrity Politics: Image and Identity in 
Contemporary Political Communications (2013) and Graeme Turner’s Reinventing the Media (2016) are both 
helpful in understanding the social functions of celebrity culture and the commodification of self.  
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Scholars often refer to either media logic or mediatisation, but the terms are roughly the 
same. Media logic refers to a reporting style where policy issues are marginalised in 
favour of personality and celebrity (Cushion & Sambrook, 2015). According to 
Strömbäck (2008: 233) and Altheide and Snow (1979, 1988, 1991), who originally coined 
the term, media logic involves both the process of information transmission (the 
organisation, technology, and aesthetic of the medium) as well as the format (symbolic 
rules for coding and decoding media messages). While Strömbäck (2008: 233) 
acknowledges that the definition is abstract, he defines it as  
the dominance in societal processes of the news values and the storytelling 
techniques the media make use of to take advantage of their own medium and its 
format, and to be competitive in the on-going struggle to capture people’s 
attention. These storytelling techniques include simplification, polarization, 
intensification, personalisation, visualisation and stereotypization, and the 
framing of politics as a strategic game or ‘horse race’. 
In news representation, media logic contrasts with political logic – which Strömbäck 
acknowledges as an even more ambiguous term. Politics is ultimately about “collective 
and authoritative decision-making as well as the implementation of political decisions” 
(ibid.), ergo representing active solution seeking through communication. Therefore, 
media logic would be similar to Iyengar’s (1991) episodic news, while political logic 
would be more focused on issue-based reporting. Cushion et al.’s (2015) study of the 
2015 UK elections highlights the concerns Broh raised in 1980: voters may be misled by 
the trivia of a campaign, especially when the election is presented as a sporting spectacle 
with no solutions, policy debates, or depth of context. Episodic news fragmentation 
(Iyengar, 1991) combined with this media logic framing (Strömbäck, 2008: 235) could be 
dangerous for democracy (Berger, 2002; Louw, 2005: 271; Benoit, 2007: 113; Bennett, 
2012: 44).  
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It is important to note that mediatisation of politics does not mean simply “mediated” 
politics (Strömbäck, 2008: 230), whereby the “media are the most important source of 
information and vehicle of communication between the governors and the governed” 
(ibid.). This is an old understanding of media effects and processes. Mediatisation is a 
“process-orientated concept” (ibid.: 231), which Schulz suggests “relates to changes 
associated with communication media and their development” (2004: 88). Mazzoleni and 
Schulz affirm, “mediatisation denotes problematic concomitants or consequences of the 
development of mass media” (1999: 249). Mediatisation therefore refers to the degree to 
which media constitute the most important source of information on politics, are 
independent from political institutions, and to which the media content as well as 
political actors are governed by political or media logic (Strömbäck 2008: 234). 
Therefore, a journalist using media logic to frame the elections would be a symptom of 
mediatisation. 
 
Key issues in the global coverage of elections are the concerns of the hype-ocracy: that is, 
the visualness of politics, the game frame, and mediatisation. PR-ised journalism means 
shallower frames and juniorisation of newsrooms, and researchers are concerned that 
this reportage damages democracy.  
 
 1.4 Research on non-Western media coverage of elections 
Hanitzsch notes that throughout various studies on political journalism in non-Western 
countries, a certain “Western bias” (2009: 422) is often present. In his criticism of 
Western researchers studying non-Western political journalism, Hanitzsch (2009: 422) 
notes they often fail to acknowledge that the normative expectations of political 
journalism have somewhat biased their interpretations. Further problems include the lack 
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of understanding or inclusion of developmental journalism, such as in Weaver (1998). 
Colonial history is an important factor to consider as mass media in many non-Western 
nations developed as derivatives of those in the West (Golding, 1977; Couldry, 2007: 
247); yet Hanitzsch claims few researchers looking at non-Western media coverage of 
elections acknowledge this. Ultimately, scholars avoid taking into account the local 
professionalism of journalism when analysing election representation on non-Western 
news. Wasserman (2010, 2013) and Nyamnjoh advocate a kind of “glocalisation” of 
media research that acknowledges the effect of colonialism, postcolonialism, and 
independence has on journalism in non-Western states, particularly Africa. 
 
De Nelson (2007: 174) and Cenite, Shing Yee, Teck Juan, Li Qin, & Xian Lin (2008) 
argue that the dominance of the “issue frame” (or political logic) in Brazil or Singapore 
election coverage is probably due to developmental journalism (Ogdan, 1980; De Beer, 
Wasserman, Malila, & Beckett, 2014), where journalists are pressured, often by the 
government or because of the political economy of the media, to ally with political 
forces. To view non-Western media coverage of non-Western elections through the lens 
of “Western bias”, where media freedom, objectivity, and non-partisanship is taken for 
granted, is therefore problematic.  
1.4.1 Objectivity 
In his study of the local media coverage of South Korean elections of 1987 and 1992 on 
television news, Woo (1996) raises a crucial point about media objectivity in non-
Western countries. He suggests that the Korean government strictly controls the media 
and that journalists strive for a different set of professional values. In South Korea, Woo 
says, “what is right for the people is what is right for the government” (1996: 66). Similar 
to the SABC board membership nomination in South Africa, Korea’s broadcasting 
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executives are chosen by the president. Woo looked at both visuals and discourse when 
analysing the broadcasts and found that South Korean media used three main frames to 
represent the elections: Stability vs. Disorder, Fair vs. Corrupt, and Festivity vs. War, 
with the government always framed on the positive side of the binary and the opposition 
on the negative. Woo’s analysis is significant in underlining the differences between 
Western and non-Western journalistic practice and context. His research tackles the 
theoretical concerns that Nyamnjoh (2005: 48), Hanitzsch (2009: 422), Waisbord (2009: 
372), and McNair (2009: 239) raise regarding objectivity in non-Western media. 
 
Despite many studies about the media coverage of elections and the political process in 
general, it appears that only a few analysts refer to content and context as paramount to 
analysing media messages of elections (such as Woo’s 1999 dedicated broadcast analysis 
and Nyamnjoh’s 2005 overview). Much of the aforementioned research focuses on the 
length of time any party or candidate is on air during television broadcasts (“airtime” or 
“sound/image bites”) or how often they appear in the newspaper (“space”). This length 
measurement ignores the content of the media message, as well as the context of 
production, such as partisanship, political economy of the media, and 
governmental/commercial influence. The specific methodological shortcomings in much 
of this previous literature are noted in the dedicated Chapter 2. 
 
2 RESEARCH ON AFRICAN ELECTION COVERAGE 
 2.1 Local media coverage 
Compared to the numerous studies of Western media coverage of Western elections 
there is little research about how the media cover African elections. Much of the 
available research looks at the use and effects of media during the elections: Bailard 
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(2012) investigates the Internet’s effect on the local electorate’s perception of fairness in 
the 2010 Tanzanian election; Mäkinen and Kuira (2008) and Moyo (2010) analyse social 
media use in the Kenyan and Zimbabwean 2008 elections respectively and find that 
social media encourages and enables citizen journalism and participation; Norris and 
Mattes (2003) look at the correlation between plurality of mass media and ethnic voting 
practices on the continent; and Eifert, Miguel, and Posner (2010) identify the effects of 
negative media stereotypes of Africa on voting patterns.  
 
Meanwhile, other researchers focus on the role of media during elections: some look at 
overarching debates about media ethics in Africa (Wasserman, 2010, 2013, 2014; 
Nyamnjoh, 2005; Wasserman & Rao, 2008; Christians, Glasser, McQuail, Nordenstren, 
& White, 2009; Berger, 2007), the role of the media in encouraging democracy (Frère, 
2011; Wasserman 2014) and also in post-election African conflicts (Kasoma, 1995; 
Wasserman, 2010; Frère, 2007; Kpaduwa, 2013: 21; Kellow & Steeves, 1998: 107; 
Goldstein & Rotich, 2008). Others focus on the partisanship of the media during 
elections (Josephi, 2009; Temin & Smith, 2002; Waldahl, 2000a, 2005b) and technicalities 
of democracy and elections in Africa (Evans & Bruce, 1999; Eatton, 1990; Hyden, Leslie, 
& Ogundimu, 2003; Moyo, 2010).  
 
Little research exists therefore about the type of media coverage of African elections 
(insofar as quantitative reports on content are favoured over semiotic data on narratives, 
tone, bias, or particular media framing) but despite this paucity, the role of the media in 
covering elections should not be ignored. Election coverage, as Frère (2011: 4) 
acknowledges, begins even pre-campaign or manifesto launch. The media’s role in 
covering elections is based on the overarching legislative and regulatory frameworks of 
the media (Frère, 2011: 2), and these frameworks in Africa are complicated by factors of 
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colonisation (Nyamnjoh, 2005: 38; Berger, 2007: 155; Frère, 2011: 8; Akoh & Ahjabenu, 
2013: 62) and the relationship between Western and African media ethics, which is 
widely discussed in Wasserman (2010, 2013, 2014) and Berger (2007). While the role of 
the media in Africa is thus important in understanding election coverage, and is widely 
covered (see Nyamnjoh, 2005, Frère, 2011, and Wasserman, 2014 for pertinent 
examples), there is a lack of actual semiotic analyses of African election coverage on the 
media in general and television news in particular. 
2.1.1 Partisanship 
Josephi (2009: 52) notes that African media is largely characterised by partisanship and is 
more closely aligned with the ideology of loyalty than objectivity, but these conclusions 
are problematic mostly because she homogenises the continent’s media. Conflating all 
African media as “partisan” neglects the very real paths blazed by opposition media in a 
convoluted and controlled “glocalised” (Wasserman & Rao, 2008) media system. Shaw 
(2009) observes that, far from “praise-singing”, as Bourgault (1995) suggests, the 
mainstream African press are often polarised along ethnic and party lines. While 
partisanship in the Global North appears linked to the political economy of the media 
(Waisbord, 2009: 72; Barnhurst & Nerone, 2009: 22; Ward, 2009: 299; D’Alessio & 
Allen, 2006; Zeldes, Fico, Carpenter, & Diddi, 2008; Hanitzsch, 2009: 420-421; Semetko, 
Blumler, Gurevitch, & Weaver, 2011),6 partisanship in Africa seems related to the 
development journalism framework (Wasserman, 2014: 126), and the relationship 
between media and government and access to technology. Chuma (2005, 2008), too, 
speaks of the governmental control of the media in Zimbabwe during the 2000 election, 
where the press became one of the most visible sites of struggles of control for the state. 
																																																								
6	The findings between these studies are often contradictory or clumsy – partisanship of the media is 
difficult to assess it seems, often due to the differences in methodology used and because researchers often 
conflate press with broadcast media. Out of these discordant debates, Hallin and Mancini’s 2004 seminal 
research is the most clear. Their meta-analysis across cultures holds a general view that partisan press in the 
West is on the decline.   
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For example, in his analysis of the media coverage of the 2000 Zimbabwean elections, 
Waldahl (2005a) surmises that, while pro-government media in Zimbabwe were 
uncritical of the election outcome, pro-opposition media promoted criticism of the 
government and attempted both technical (valid voting) and substantive (informed 
choice) information. Waldahl notes that opposition media lacked comparative analyses of 
political parties, but this was mostly due to the lack of information from the government, 
resulting in unclear technical/policy information.  
 
Temin and Smith (2002) evaluate the role of Ghana’s media in their 2000 election and 
also find that state- and private-owned print media approached the election differently. 
While Waldahl found that narratives changed in the partisan and independent media in 
Zimbabwe, for Temin and Smith, professionalism in the state- versus private-owned 
media was at stake in Ghana. The authors (2002: 595) suggest that a resource gap in 
broadcast media, as well as the relationship with the government, played a big role in the 
quality of election coverage in Ghana: where the private media had adequate funding, 
from state or NGOs, and a good relationship with government, coverage was clear and 
widespread (2002: 603). Similarly to Waldahl’s analysis, they found that content across 
both private- and state-owned media was superficial, topical, and lacked critical analysis. 
These studies speak back to the global trend of mediatisation of election coverage 
(Stömbäck, 2008), but also note that unequal funding and access to information hamper 
African media coverage of elections. Nyamnjoh too suggests that the journalism 
profession is often underpaid, job insecurity is rife, and in South Africa particularly elite 
black journalists are often pilfered by the business sector because of higher pay and 
better working conditions (2005: 74, 82). The poor professionalization of journalists 
across the continent further damages democracy when junior journalists seemingly 
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cannot criticise oligarchs or the government, while donor funding means the alternative 
press often flounders. 
2.1.2 Global/local media coverage 
Little research compares the differences and similarities of global and local media 
coverage of African elections. The 2008 post-election violence in Kenya is one of the 
few events covered by both African and global media and where that coverage was 
studied. Crucially, the difference between local media coverage of ethnic or post-election 
violence and that of the global media is stark: local media tend towards “peace” 
(Onyebadi & Oyediji, 2011: 219) journalism but content was overwhelmingly superficial 
due to technical reasons (Onyebadi & Oyediji, 2011: 226; Ndlela, 2011: 77; Waldahl, 
2005a, 2005b; Kpaduwa, 2013: 23), while European media often worked with episodic 
frames and as a “mayfly”, simplifying content and ignoring context, mostly due to the 
reliance on framing stereotypes of Africa (Somerville, 2009; Hall, 2015; Ndlela, 2005; 
Goval, 2016; Willems, 2005: 95-101; Franks, 2010: 74). Ultimately, the comparison 
between the global and local media coverage of these traumatic events showed that 
global media gave little depth and context to the crises, while local media were hampered 
because of access to funds and information.  
 
 2.2 Research on global media coverage of African elections 
There is also scant coverage of Africa in mainstream Western media overall (Golan, 
2008; Franks, 2010; De Beer, 2010). While some studies investigated the general coverage 
of Africa in global media (Levistky & Way, 2002, 2005; Willems, 2005; Danker-Dake, 
2008; Franks, 2010; Goval, 2016), few spoke directly to the narratives of African 
democracy and elections. Two themes emerged from the relevant research, however: the 
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impact of the end of the Cold War on global media coverage of African democracy, and 
reductionist coverage of African elections. 
2.2.1 Post-Cold War frames 
Since the end of the Cold War, democracy has emerged as the most favoured political 
system, with elections as the key component for legitimacy (Windrich, 1994: 18; Sisk, 
1994: 144; Hawk, 2002: 168; Ndlela, 2005: 87). In her analysis of the post-Cold War news 
era in America, Pippa Norris argues that the Cold War effectively divided the world into 
“friends” and “enemies” (1995: 359), based on American foreign policy. As Windrich 
(1994) explains, and Norris (1995: 359, 1997: 14) echoes elsewhere, the Cold War 
stereotypes of conflict and communism influenced story priority and worked as a 
framing narrative for the early to mid-1990s news representation of African elections. 
“The Cold War frame ran like a red thread through most coverage of international news 
in the past because it dominated American foreign policy”, Norris posits (1995: 359), and 
the “schema simplified and prioritised coverage of international news by providing 
certainties about friends and enemies”. After the Cold War, and without this frame 
through which to classify international stories, American news media changed the way 
stories were prioritised and classified: instead of focusing on war, civil unrest, and 
military rivalries, themes shifted towards international relations through economic 
cooperation, development of trade agreements, and security, rather than military 
investments (Norris, 1995: 366). 
2.2.2 Binaries and complexities 
Ndlela (2005) analysed the representation of the Zimbabwean election in 2000 in 
Norwegian mainstream print media using critical discourse analysis and found, in much 
the same vein as Waldahl (2005a), that a lack of context propelled a typical, negatively 
stereotyped African story that neglected context, critical analysis, or investigation. The 
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Norwegian media relied heavily on binarised representations of the elections in 2000 and 
2002, framing Zanu-PF as the unquestioned “villain” and the MDC as an opposition 
party that reflected ideal democratic values – that is, regime change as a panacea for all 
political and economic woes (Ndlela, 2005: 88). This reductionist framing left little room 
for neutrality and objectivity because the Norwegian media rallied behind the MDC 
without evaluation of the calibre of their policies, leadership, or programmes. Ndlela 
argues that the binary narrative of Zimbabwean elections undermines context and agency 
and perpetuates the “negative African story”. Hall’s (2015) report on the Burundian post-
election violence in 2015 notes that the global media “acted like a mayfly” and reported 
on the “crisis de jour”, taking little time to explore context or evaluate consequences. 
“Such traumas are covered by the world press with the type of breathless excitement of a 
boxing match shorn of context and personality, with anonymous combatants temporarily 
given names for the duration of an event”, Hall (ibid.) claims. While a pessimistic 
argument on the global media’s attention on African elections and crises, this statement 
is a reflection of global political journalism’s push towards mediatisation combined with 
a complicated history of colonialism in Africa. Nyamnjoh reiterates that Western news 
values are often entrenched in stories about Africa, both from local and global news 
media, which results in a “talking without listening” (2005: 57). 
 
Global media perspectives of African elections reflect the “failed state” binary, which 
Nay (2013: 7-8), Grinker, Lubkemann, and Steiner (2010: 587), and Spurr (1994: 19) refer 
to as a binary of progress: if an African state does not demonstrate Western democratic 
values such as regime change, then it automatically falls on the “failure” side of the 
binary. If democratic values are in place – even problematically – then the nation 
“progresses” correctly. By framing democracy as an “either-or” concept, the Western 
perspective thus ignores democracy’s “package deal” (West, 2008) – democracy is a 
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complex concept, and should not be reduced to election campaigns only. Binarising 
African experiences of democracy in this way trivialises issues and negates context. 
 
So, even though many African journalists seem to suffer a difficult relationship between 
the media and government, opposition media are still able to present significantly 
different narratives about the elections, even though the reach is not wide and the 
content is somewhat superficial. The push towards event-based, superficial media 
coverage of elections, and thus mediatisation of politics, is visible in the style of African 
media coverage of elections. Westernised media coverage of African elections apparently 
rests on a colonial understanding of governance on the continent, and is sometimes 
based on reductionist stereotypes and binaries. However, the paucity of actual narrative 
analysis of this media coverage shows that a qualitative understanding of the 
representation of elections on global and local media is an under-researched area.  
 
3 RESEARCH ON SOUTH AFRICAN ELECTION COVERAGE 
 
South Africa is a national broadcaster is a major player in Africa (Zegeye & Harris, 2003: 
11), and the unique history of apartheid complicates the narratives told about the 
country’s democracy. South Africa is the gateway to the rest of the continent (Guest, 
2005), both in terms of economic viability and of South Africa’s regional and continental 
hegemonic status (Zegeye & Harris, 2003: 11). 
 
The lead-up to the first democratic election in 1994 was no romance story, nor did it 
have a fairy-tale ending. Bird (2008: 59) states that the local media coverage of the 1994 
election emphasised the safety of voters and on-going violence throughout the voting 
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period. A negotiated settlement won out in the end but at a high cost to human life and, 
as Klein (2007: 208) argues, the ANC’s Freedom Charter ideals. Since 1994, the ANC 
government has consistently won over 60% of the popular vote but voting turnout has 
decreased since 2009. With protest action and conflict against the ruling party increasing 
over the last two decades (Demian, 2015), critical media coverage under threat of 
censorship (Reid, 2014; Louw, 2014; De Beer, Malila, Beckett, & Wasserman, 2016), and 
political strife tearing the ANC apart internally (Hamill, 2009: 3; Du Preez, 2013; Holmes 
& Shoup, 2013), political communication and the resultant election narratives in South 
African media is complicated. This section encompasses research categorised by election 
year. While there are some studies of global media coverage of South African elections, 
the majority of the focus is on local coverage, and so this review reflects the 
extensiveness of this scholarship. Literature on the 1994 election is almost exclusively 
angled toward narratives of global media; 1999 and 2004 had very little analysis of global 
or local media perspectives; while 2009 and 2014 literature was dedicated almost entirely 
to local perspectives.  
 
 3.1 Pre-1994 
As one of the few pre-democracy studies, Grabe’s (1996) study explores the SABC’s 
1987 and 1989 election coverage. With terminology replicated in Kress and Van 
Leeuwen (2006), Grabe details the visual bias of representing political candidates and 
parties through television news: she argues that shot length, camera angles, movement, 
and editing contribute to the representation bias (1996: 2–6). In terms of a visual analysis 
of election narratives on television news, Grabe’s research is the most thorough in a 
small pool of scholarship. Grabe concludes that the SABC favoured the ruling National 
Party over the opposition Conservative Party, with the latter having the highest negative 
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visual bias, but an explanation of the methodology used to measure this bias, including 
semiotic theory, is notably lacking.  
 
 3.2 1994 
3.2.1 The US perspective 
Peterson (1994), Anglin (1995), Guelke (1996) and Jacobs (2003) have analysed the 
mythologizing of the 1994 election in South Africa from a political science perspective, 
but few scholars look at the type and style of media coverage, and analyse the narratives 
therein. The authors mentioned below look at the United States (US) media perspectives 
of the 1994 election. The US was chosen as a site location for research because media 
coverage of elections is somewhat of a national pastime in North America, the end of 
apartheid reflected the nation’s own civil rights movement, the US was heavily invested 
in the South African story both economically and metaphorically, and there is little 
literature on the perspectives of other countries. In the literature about the US 
perspectives of the 1994 election, three main themes were present. The US media 
presented the election as a catharsis exercise for the US public, the negotiated settlement 
was highlighted, and democratic values shaped the way in which US media framed the 
political parties and events during the election. 
 
Timothy Sisk’s (1994) contemporary study of the United States press perspective of the 
1994 election is seminal and he argues that, for the North American media, telling the 
election story in the form of a great literary tale became a cathartic exercise for the US 
public. The anti-apartheid narrative mirrored the US’ own struggle with the civil rights 
movement and became a “reflection in American society’s mirror, a metaphor for the 
expunging of a racist evil” (ibid.: 157). Beverly Hawk agrees, noting that Nelson Mandela 
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was often called “South Africa’s Martin Luther King Jr” (2002: 171), while the civil rights 
movement comparison occurred primarily because of the lack of context afforded to 
African news stories, and the cultural and narrative similarities between the two countries 
(Hawk, 2002: 160, 173). Going further, Silke and Schrirer suggest US (but also South 
African) media prioritised the “razzmatazz” (1994: 140) of celebrity rather than 
investigate policy or issue debates.  
 
Rassool and Witz (1996: 339) note that Western media recoded South Africa as 
“acceptable” in the early 1990s, because conflicts could finally be resolved through 
negotiation. This type of negotiated settlement as conflict resolution was the ideal 
outcome for the Clinton administration and warranted the pro-democracy rhetoric in the 
post-Cold War period (Sisk, 1994: 149; Hawk, 2002: 158). Much of this rhetoric took the 
form of a “morality play” in which the American media played moral judger, where facts 
articulated and promoted normative agendas (Leman-Langlois & Shearing, 2013: 222), 
and where South Africa had finally “come to its senses” (Rassool & Witz, 1996: 339). 
The negotiated outcome of the election showed that South Africa was a stable ally for 
the Americans, thus fitting neatly into the power-sharing model that US policy-makers 
had long thought a viable means of conflict resolution in Africa. 
 
Reta (2000) conducted a frame and content analysis on North America print news during 
the 1994 election period and found that the American democratic values of dialogue and 
negotiation were inherent in the papers’ representation of the election. Emphasising the 
post-Cold War values of social order (Norris, 1995: 359, 1997: 14; Windrich, 1994: 22; 
Evans, 2014: 34) and framing the political parties based on the way in which they used 
democratic values underlines the US perception of the South African election. Reta 
argues that democracy trumped racialism in the way that the Zulu-ethnic Inkatha 
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Freedom Party (IFP) and the Afrikaans-ethnic Freedom Front (FF) were represented in 
the US newspapers. While both political parties campaigned for cultural and ethnic 
homelands, the framing of these issues could not be more different. Reta suggests that 
because the IFP used violence, intimidation, and refused to participate in the elections, 
both the Washington Post and the New York Times were harsh in their representation of 
Buthelezi and the IFP, using terms such as “destabilising behaviour”, “deliberately 
obstructionist”, “edgy”, “erstwhile”, and “playing the tribal card” (2000: 530). 
Conversely, she argues, the papers framed the Freedom Front almost sympathetically, 
because the Freedom Front applied democratic values (negotiation, joining the election, 
canvassing the electorate through media) to their campaign. 
 
Therefore, the North American reporting on the 1994 election, in newspapers and 
broadcast media, seemed to rely on already-known stereotypes of catharsis, communism, 
conflict, and event-based mediatised coverage of Westernised democracy (Sisk, 1994; 
Norris, 1997; Turkington, 1997; Reta, 2000; Hawk, 2002). The main focus of these 
studies is on newspapers, with only a passing mention of broadcast news. There is very 
little research on the perspective of British media, Eastern or Asian news, or even 
African reporting on the South African 1994 election. One exception is Turkington’s 
1997 dissertation on the 1994 election coverage in various papers including the English 
Times of London and the South African The Star. She noted that because of the sheer 
number of journalists covering the election, journalists presented distinct differences in 
bias and journalistic professionalism (1997: 39), making it difficult to compare papers. 
3.2.2 Local perspectives 
Despite a scarcity of literature about the local broadcast news coverage of this poll, 
important South African studies show that the role of free access to media and freedom 
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of expression in the elections cannot be underestimated. Further observations about 
media depictions of the first election include the use of a horse race frame and narratives 
that were angled towards global media. 
 
The primary concern with studies about the 1994 election coverage is the political 
economy and freedom of South African media, rather than narratives about the 
elections. Gouws and De Beer (2008: 273) argue that during the 1994 election, 
democratic, political, and media discourses in South Africa were still in their infancy and 
struggled with the legacy of apartheid. The SABC’s monopoly of local broadcast media is 
a main concern in literature of the time. The binarised structure of the press seemed to 
contribute to problematic local coverage of the election (Silke & Schrirer, 1994: 142; 
Berger, 2002: 5; Gouws & De Beer, 2008: 274). The SABC was also under a harsh 
spotlight from the United Nations Mission Observers in South Africa (UNMOSA) and 
the Independent Media Commission (IMC), which likely contributed to the national 
broadcaster’s balanced reporting of the election, suggest Silke and Schrirer (1994: 141), 
Anglin (1995: 540), and Sparks (2012: 208). 
 
Researchers also commented that South African media often framed the 1994 election as 
a “horse race” between the ANC and ruling NP, highlighting the “changes” either party 
had to make for the election (Silke & Schrirer, 1994: 140; Giliomee, 1994: 43; Bertelsen, 
1996; Gouws & De Beer, 2008: 279): the NP attempted to shed apartheid iconography, 
while the ANC transformed from an armed Struggle liberation movement to reliable 
government-in-waiting. Louw and Chitty argue that mediatisation of the election process 
increased as South African politicians themselves learnt how to “play the PR game” 
(2000: 285). Mandela, as the “shamanized leader” (Evans, 2014: 80) of the ANC, formed 
the lynchpin around which the local PR opera was scripted and was eager to play this 
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PR-ised game of politics, with sound-bite items designed for global journalists (Louw, 
2005: 181). While the “cacophony of … discordant voices became somewhat difficult to 
hear above the sound of gunfire” (Louw & Chitty, 2000: 290) during the political 
campaigning, two groups eventually emerged and the media machine ran with the 
resultant horse race.  
 
Louw and Chitty (2000: 291), echoing Sisk (1994: 144), conclude that most SABC 
coverage was designed for global audiences and presented a more positive view of South 
Africa: telling a great literary tale of the miracle transition, gearing the election to the US 
love of spectacle, and contributing to the morality play rhetoric (Rassool & Witz, 2013: 
339) of demonising villains – such as the IFP, Conservative Party, AZAPO, and 
homeland leaders – while sanctifying heroes who were pro-reform. Their findings 
confirm the studies of Reta (2000), Windrich (1994), and Ndlela (2005) who propose that 
democratic values drove US media narratives in African election coverage. Evans (2014: 
169) investigates the broadcasting of the transition period in South Africa, and also 
reports that the SABC borrowed journalism formats from the United States. Formats 
and narratives on local media during this first election seemed to be angled towards a 
global, or at least American, audience.  
 
 3.3 1999 and 2004 
Unlike the mythologised 1994 general election, the second and third polls received far 
less media coverage and this is reflected in the lack of dedicated research on the coverage 
itself. Researchers suggest this absence was because these elections were perceived as 
“boring” (Khosa, 1999: 97; Bird, 2008: 59), not a euphoric “uhuru” or liberation election, 
as in 1994, but more as an assessment of the ANC’s governing ability (Jacobs, 1999: 
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147). Louw and Chitty argue that the global media perceived that democracy had 
apparently become “normalized” (2000: 293) in South Africa and thus the event slid off 
the world’s news agenda. In this small pool of research, Jacobs (1999) provides the most 
insightful conclusions about the 1999 election. As with the 1994 literature and an 
overarching criticism of most South African election research however, the focus is often 
heavily on the press, which neglects broadcast media in general and television news in 
particular. For my own research, this neglect means that I will have to present original 
research for many of the years, as television news is a rarely analysed medium in this 
field. Much of the research of these following two elections is based on Jacob’s (1999) 
conclusions and Davis’ (2005) analysis, and includes themes of the horse race and press 
freedom as paramount.7 
 
Jacobs (1999: 148) argues that opinion polls dominated the 1999 coverage, and that 
issue-based coverage was abandoned in favour of vote-catch events such as rallies and 
marches. The Media Monitoring Africa (MMA) project (1999: 28) says that this event-
focused style of reporting resulted in fairly uncritical and narrow media coverage of the 
election. This horse race style of reporting continued in the 2004 election, as Gouws and 
De Beer (2008: 280) suggest. Jones and Lodge (1999: 324) argue that the trend towards 
event-based coverage and mediatisation at the SABC was due to inexperience, rather 
than prejudice, but it appears media logic, both globally and in South Africa, is driven by 
audience capture and ratings (Hawk, 2002: 169-171), regulation (Cushion et al., 2015: 
1525), a thirst to break the story first (Cushion & Sambrook, 2015; Beckett, 2016; 
Glasser, 2016), source availability (Silke & Schrirer, 1994: 140; Cross, 2010: 424, 428), 
																																																								
7	Despite their importance, these two arguments do not adequately take into account broadcast news. 
Some studies and reports briefly mention the SABC’s transformation policies over the years (Jacobs, 1999: 
147; MMA, 1999: 23; Jones & Lodge, 1999: 373; Davis, 2005: 233; Berger, 2002: 5; Nyamnjoh, 2005: 54), 
but a complex analysis of shifting narratives is mostly absent. Davis’ suggestion that a plurality in voices 
was achieved by the 2004 elections is somewhat flawed, mainly because his argument ignores television 
news context and content, relying only on Jacobs’ print analysis, of the same year.  
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agenda-setting choices (MMA, 1999: 28), and changes in reporting styles and ethics 
(Gouws & De Beer, 2008: 278; Cushion et al., 2015: 1525). Duncan (2009: 217) notes 
that this focus on events does not adequately inform voters about party policies. 
 
Davis (2005) argues that the biggest story of the 2004 election was the independence of 
the media. Gouws and De Beer (2008: 281) explain the tension in South Africa’s 2004 
election was mostly between the freedom of press and the ANC’s criticism of what 
constituted the national interest (see also Reid, 2014). ANC MPs often assumed the 
independent print media attacked the party personally, rather than simply upholding 
Fourth Estate media ethics (Gouws & De Beer, 2008: 281; Louw, 2014; Duncan, 2014). 
South African journalist Stephen Grootes opines that the ANC government tends to 
view any criticism of their party as “anti-majoritarian” and “anti-liberation” (2013: 29), 
while Malila analyses the ANC’s history of criticism of the media across the two decades 
of democracy, and concludes that the “paranoid self-awareness” (2014: 15) of South 
Africa’s journalists has grown along with the ANC’s control the media.  
 
3.4 2009 
Despite some rather large media events occurring around the election period that drew 
the global spotlight, there is a tremendous dearth of research about the 2009 election 
media coverage. Calland (2013) speaks at length about these events, including Jacob 
Zuma’s corruption trial, the xenophobic riots in South Africa, the country as upcoming 
host of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, and the political infighting between the incumbent 
Thabo Mbeki and his rival, Jacob Zuma; yet the lack of analysis of these events and the 
2009 election on broadcast media, both local and global, is astounding. This section 
contains only local media perspectives, as there were no significant studies about global 
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media coverage of the fourth election. Predominant media narratives included the “3.5 
horse race” game frame, citizen voices and issues on the SABC and eTV, and Jacob 
Zuma’s controversial background represented on conservative Afrikaans newspapers. 
 
Duncan’s (2009) analysis is the most thorough of the 2009 election on South African 
media. She bases much of her conclusions on the MMA’s 2009 report, as do many of the 
subsequent evaluations of general South African media coverage (such as Schulz-
Herzenberg, 2014b). Duncan suggests three concerns of the role of the media in 2009: 
the “3.5 horse race” (2009: 220) of the ANC, DA, and newly formed ANC break-away 
party, the Congress of the People (COPE), with the SABC’s airtime coverage slightly 
biased towards COPE; high personalisation of media content; and a difficult reporting 
environment due to political and economic pressures on South African newsrooms. My 
own study may differ from Duncan’s conclusions because I use a different methodology 
to the MMA report and include visual and semiotic data rather than relying solely on 
content analysis. 
 
With eTV’s rolling news channel eNCA (then named eNews) launched in 2008, South 
African audiences had more diversity of news choice than ever before. However, as 
Hubbard (2010) and the MMA (2009) report, the diversity of voices and content on 
these two channels were limited to mostly authority-elite sources, rather than reflecting 
citizen’s concerns, creating what Stephen Friedman terms the “view from the suburbs” 
(2011: 109). Friedman writes that South African media has traditionally been biased 
towards a middle-class, white understanding of the world. Here, he suggests that the 
evidence of this bias is “derived less from what the mainstream press writes, than what it 
ignores” (ibid. 110). The neglect of grassroots or citizen voices, issues of concern, or 
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events therefore points to a “view from the suburbs” rather than a “view from the 
ground”. 
 
This seems to be an on going concern, where the media do not reflect citizen issues but 
rather personality and campaign topics (Silke & Schrirer 1994: 140; Jacobs 1999; Gouws 
& De Beer 2008; MMA 2009; Duncan 2014). Via a critical discourse analysis method of 
news broadcasts, Hubbard finds that the SABC in 2009 was less likely to “rock the boat” 
(2010: 22), and presented a government-friendly narrative of the election coverage. 
Hubbard’s eTV news findings are less clear, but he notes that the channel gave less 
opportunity for citizens to speak than on the SABC, as citizens were usually re-voiced 
(2010: 12). A key problem with Hubbard’s research is that the tone of the broadcasts was 
marked homogenously as either negative, positive, or neutral: there was no distinction 
between topic and framing. Hubbard concluded therefore that the ANC received more 
negative tones than the DA because of topics such as Nkandla and the corruption trial, 
but his study significantly neglects framing and bias. 
 
In 2009, the local and global media scrutinised the charismatic, populist leader of the 
ANC,8 but academic analysis thereof is in short supply. One of the most thorough 
investigations of Zuma’s framing in South African media comes from Geersema-Sligh 
(2015) in her analysis of South African newspaper Die Burger. She found that the 
conservative Afrikaans newspaper highlighted and framed Zuma’s polygamous lifestyle 
through Western cultural perspectives. Through critical discourse analysis, Geersema-
Sligh concludes that Zuma was generally framed negatively (2015: 182), and the 
traditional polygamous marriage ceremony was often juxtaposed with Western wedding 
																																																								
8 see the Reuters blog tag of Zuma, for an example that outlines the leader’s biography 
http://blogs.reuters.com/global/tag/jacob-zuma/ 
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imagery, framing his lifestyle as a conflict and something of a “morality play” (2015: 184). 
Geersema-Sligh concludes that the conflict of modernity (framed as positive civility, 
development) and tradition (as offensive, backward) asked readers to consider the 
juxtaposition of a traditionally Zulu man in the role of a Western leader by “symbolically 
annihilating Zuma through its condemnation and trivialisation” (2015: 188) of polygamy.  
 
Just as Zuma’s portrayal in the media is overlooked, so too is the tussle between Jacob 
Zuma and Thabo Mbeki, despite being a critical political issue in the years and months 
leading up to the election. Only Hamill (2009: 4) mentions this “broedertwis” (meaning a 
fight between brothers in Afrikaans) as a key element to the 2009 election, because the 
infighting assisted oppositional politics within the country. Louw admits the failure of 
Thabo Mbeki as a “PR darling” (2005: 181) was ultimately because he refused to simplify 
issues to sound-bite solutions, a PR game preferred by journalists. Louw argues that this 
may be one of the reasons for Mbeki’s media image failure, but could not foresee (in 
2005) how far that image would fail – Mbeki was eventually ousted of the ANC in the 
“Zunami” of Polokwane (Southall & Daniel, 2009).9 Although this event is described in 
detail in observations by Calland (2013), Southall and Daniel (2009), and Du Preez 
(2013), there is hardly any significant analysis of this event on broadcast news. 
 
 3.5 2014 
By 2014, the South African electorate was the youngest, largest, and most urbanised in 
the country’s democratic history, but the fifth poll also held the lowest voter turnout 
since 1994 (Southall, 2014: 5; Schulz-Herzenberg, 2014a: 34; National vote turn out, 2014). 
																																																								
9 Although this event is described in detail in Calland (2013), Southall and Daniel (2009), and Du Preez 
(2013), there is hardly any significant analysis of this event on broadcast news. As discussed in Chapter 7 
and 8, the reason for the lacuna in analysis of this event is because journalists themselves ignored the 
scandalous ousting of Mbeki. In fact, Mbeki’s presidency was all but wiped out in the 2009 and 2014 
election coverage on both local and global news. 
	 57 
The election was also increasingly framed on local media as a battle between opposition 
and the ruling ANC (Southall, 2014: 5). Predominant themes of media coverage in 2014 
include the shallow and narrowness of local coverage and an on-going concern for the 
freedom of the media. 
 
Both Duncan (2014b) and Mattes (2014: 178) argue that the local media’s representation 
of the 2014 election was shallow, event-driven, did not depart from general trends of 
mediatisation and neutrality, and lacked in contextual analysis. Again, the lack of analysis 
of international media perspectives is disappointing: the majority of research looks at 
South African media, which is a big difference from the 1994 scholarship, wherein the 
majority of studies looked at global media coverage. Duncan (2014b) acknowledges that 
although local media had a generally good and fair performance of covering the five 
democratic elections, there was increasingly shallow content. She notes (2014: 153) that 
the newly-formed EFF received most of the airtime coverage on the SABC; however, 
this airtime bias did not translate into EFF’s performance at the polls and Duncan 
concludes, in much the same way that Jacobs did in 1999 and her earlier research in 
2009, that the media do not really set the agenda in South African elections. The MMA 
(2014: 3) report found much the same: the depth of local coverage was shallow and 
superficial, while the narratives were minimal, or narrow. 
 
Following with concerns raised in previous years, Duncan underlines the ANC’s pressure 
on the “feisty press”, under the guise of transformation (2014: 143). Consequently, The 
New Age, a new “government-friendly” and Gupta-owned paper, was launched in 2010. 
Although Duncan (2014: 143) finds no significant differences between South African 
newspapers, in 2015 and 2016 media freedom took an even greater turn for the worse 
with the ANC criticising “negative news” (Krüger, 2014) and demanding 70% “good 
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news” on the SABC, at the expense of covering citizen protests (Grootes & Essop, 2016; 
Shezi, 2016). Media freedom in South Africa is under increasing threat from government 
influence, political interference, and funding crises, and it is within this context of 




Overall, studies about the role of the local media during South African elections suggest 
that there has been a sharp decrease in the depth of political analysis on the media during 
the election years (Jacobs, 1999; Duncan, 2014; MMA, 2014), a widening gap between 
the citizen’s concerns and the media’s coverage of those issues (Jacobs, 1999), harsher 
political pressure on media freedom (Malila, 2014), and increasing tension between the 
media and government regarding political narratives, freedom, content, and ownership 
(Reid, 2014; Louw, 2014; De Beer et al., 2016). Finally, the international perspective of 
South Africa’s elections has sharply decreased since 1994, with 2004 and 2009 mostly 
unrepresented in global media research. 
 
Significant gaps in the literature identified are firstly the neglect of broadcast news in 
analysing media coverage of the elections, and secondly the lack of semiotic data when 
analysing broadcast news coverage. This study will contribute significant data to both of 
these oversights in both breadth of analysis of South African election media coverage 
and depth of analysis in semiotic data about television news coverage. Chapter 2 sets out 









This chapter specifies the broadcast sampling method, qualitative nature of the analysis, 
and the triadic instrumentation approach devised specifically for analysis of a large-scale 
television news data set. Rudestam and Newton (2007: 111) suggest data collection for 
qualitative research should focus on fidelity and structure, and I have attempted to 
ensure both through a method I have developed specifically for analysing the multimodal 
medium of television news. The sample was chosen purposefully rather than randomly to 
meet the theoretical needs of this study, and so multiple sources of data were obtained – 
many broadcasts from many channels located on numerous sources – in order to provide 
theoretical saturation and confirmation of my emerging model. Continuing with 
Rudestam and Newton’s (2007) suggested checklist for qualitative research methods, I 
completed an “audit trail” – that is, a meticulous record of processes. All raw data and 
their locations were catalogued, evidence of how the data was reduced, analysed, 
synthesised, and processed was kept in comprehensive notes. This chapter outlines the 
processes conducted in collecting, reducing, synthesising, and preparing to analyse the 




News broadcasts are the predominant subjects of analysis in this study, and so the 
sampling design focused on collecting, reducing, and preparing this data set for analysis. 
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This section deals with the analysis subject: the sample dates, channels, search engines, 
archive access and organisation, and limitations of this sample. 
 
1.1 Subject of analysis 
The election periods of analysis were 1994 (26 – 29 April), 1999 (2 June), 2004 (14 April), 
2009 (22 April), and 2014 (7 May), the five democratic general election dates in South 
Africa. The sample dates were chosen as the culmination of the election, where 
journalists would focus on the voting day(s) and events surrounding the election to 
ensure some kind of homogeneity to the topics covered. These sample dates do not 
ordinarily take into account the political campaigning or electioneering, and so most 
substantive election information will be missing from the sample. Selecting a wide 
sample time suggested a broader array of narratives throughout the sample years and 
“theoretical saturation” (suggested by Rudestam and Newton, 2007: 107, discussed later 
in this chapter) was reached during this sampling process: broadcasts were chosen from 
numerous channels until no new broadcasts, narratives, or themes were discovered 
during and about the voting days. The literature review contextualising each election year 
assisted in discovering the theoretical saturation point (ibid.) of the data collection. 
  
The type of narrative analysis used in this study is qualitative and based on grounded 
theory developed from a literature review and observation of empirical data. As 
Rudestam and Newton (2007: 107) suggest, such studies are inductive and the theory 
evolves as more data is collected and explored. As such, a precise sample is “neither 
possible nor advisable… [while] open sampling might be the most appropriate” (ibid.) in 
these situations. Further sampling is often required to saturate a concept to explore it 
comprehensively so that it becomes theoretically meaningful (ibid.). Such theoretical 
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saturation occurred during the second stage of sampling – which I term “coding for 
interest” – as described in sections 1.2 and 1.3. 
1.1.1 The channels  
This study originally began with a sample of nine news channels – Al Jazeera English 
(AJE); Sky News; BBC World; CNN International; SABC 1, 2, 3, and SABC online; and 
eNCA. However, as the study progressed, it appeared that very few broadcasts were 
available (either online or in offline paid-for archives) from these nine channels. For 
example, AJE only started broadcasting in 2008 and so the first three election periods 
were unavailable on this channel. Therefore, the sample of broadcasts was extended to a 
more nonspecific, purposive, and accessible style – the time period was of more 
importance than the channels, and so I collected as many broadcasts as possible from a 
range of possible channels during the timeframe. I used a variety of search and retrieval 
methods including search engines and news archives. 
1.1.2 Search engines 
Despite being the first point of entry into the field, single search engines were not the 
only data sampling methods because Google, and other web crawlers, have ranking 
systems that inherently delimit the number of results contained in any one search. In 
2005, Brophy and Bawden conducted a comparative study between the accuracy and 
efficiency of web-based search engines (Google, for instance) and traditional library-
based searching. They concluded that Google was vastly superior in coverage and 
accessibility, but acknowledged that the researcher’s skill in using the information 
technology could skew the repeatable results in searching via Google (2005: 510–511). 
While their study is out-dated, mostly because of the speed with which IT develops and 
the increased efficiency and breadth of Google algorithms in recent years, their 
conclusions remain valid. The researcher’s skill in searching Google with semantic 
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variations of keywords definitely affects the results. The University of Bristol’s document 
(Search Engines, 2015) on the use of search engines over traditional library searches 
reflects Brophy and Bawden’s concerns almost a decade earlier regarding the quantity 
and quality of sources. Many sources are hidden from search engines because they are 
old or outmoded (Search Engines, 2015), while researcher bias in choosing certain 
keywords over others may skew the delivered results. 
 
Boeker, Vach, and Motschaller (2013) conducted an investigation into the efficiency and 
quality of Google Scholar searches with regard to medical journal references. The study 
looked at referencing and citations, but the findings can be applied to the overall 
limitations for search engines as a sole method of data collecting. The authors argue that 
all sources are not guaranteed to be available at the time of doing the search, because the 
web crawler may miss certain sources: “Search results will change over time when 
indexing changes due to accessibility of source documents or databases” (2013). The 
authors explain that the Google search engine technology uses ranking algorithms that, 
“by [their] sheer size and technological power… are able to index everything which is 
accessible via the Internet, store it in large distributed databases and deliver results in 
milliseconds” (ibid.). These algorithms, however, do not make any claims to be 
“complete”, as stated in the legal disclaimer of Google – when resources are closed, for 
instance like the paid-for archives on Getty Images and the SABC, Google is unable to 
rank the documents or data. Therefore, the search engine is ultimately “dependent on the 
fundamental accessibility of scientific texts over the internet, of the will of the publishers 
and libraries to cooperate and open their repositories for indexing” (ibid.). I therefore 
acknowledge that the Internet is not a static repository of information and that certain 
inherent biases do exist in the archival techniques. 
 
	 63 
Therefore, in this study, I started using YouTube, Vimeo, ITN Source, and AP Archive 
to search for free broadcasts, but moved to paid-for access once these sources were 
expired. I contacted Getty Images, BBC Motion Gallery, and the SABC and eTV 
archives to gather broadcasts during the sample periods. Media Tenor and Media 
Monitoring Africa were unhelpful in this regard despite numerous contact attempts to 
gather data. 
1.1.3 Archive organisation 
South African digital news archives are difficult to access, available only through 
dedicated paid-for search teams. While some archives are well maintained yet expensive, 
others are disorganised but affordable. Both mainstream and independent South African 
news channels have recently used free-to-access digital video upload websites such as 
YouTube to catalogue the archives. However, in the case of the SABC and eTV/eNCA, 
these archives do not stretch back further than 2011. Archivist Carmen Whitcher at eTV 
was particularly helpful in negotiating an affordable price for 10 eTV/eNCA broadcasts. 
Given extra time and money, further broadcasts could be sought, but at the time funding 
only allowed the use of 10. The SABC provided 29 suitable broadcasts for a much 
smaller fee.10 The 2014 election sample was greatly bolstered by the digitisation of the 
archives from these mainstream broadcasters post-2011. 
 
Global archives were much easier to access – Getty Images teamed up with the BBC 
Motion Gallery in 2014, allowing for a more convenient search. Getty does not 
necessitate paid-for archival searching, as viewing of low-res broadcasts is free. CBC, 
																																																								
10	The SABC provided basic overviews and transcripts of the broadcasts available, and I requested the 
broadcast title for retrieval by the archivist. When the DVDs arrived, however, some of the broadcasts 
were not as per the transcript (two were Nguni news, three had 2016 cricket matches recorded over the 
end of the broadcasts, and some contained raw footage that was unsuitable for this analysis). Archival 
techniques at the SABC left a lot to be desired, although the hard work of Duma-Sandile Mboni and Sias 
Scott at the SABC lessened much of the frustration.	
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ITN Source, and AP Archive were further free-to-access television news archives. 
Ultimately, the digitisation of news has improved access, allowing researchers to view 
and analyse historical broadcasts with ease. Convergence journalism in recent years 
means that channels now frequently upload directly to dedicated websites (Sky News, 
AJE, EWN, and EuroNews catalogue broadcasts by year and by type). Therefore, the 
jump in broadcast availability was significant post-2009.11 Of course, “ease of access” 
depends on the scholar’s location. This research was conducted at the University of Cape 
Town in South Africa between 2014 and 2017, and so internet access, speed, and cost 
were less of a problem than for, say, a scholar in a less digitally connected part of the 
world. Streaming live broadcasts is extremely data-heavy, while delivery of archival 
material from eNCA via encrypted download relied on a stable and high-speed internet 
connection. Unlike print news, broadcasts are necessarily large files that need to be 
stored, delivered, and re-watched using up-to-date technology. The digital divide may 
therefore limit the repeated analysis of this data set in future research. 
1.1.4 Limitations 
Focusing on the sample time rather than the channels ensured that theoretical saturation 
was reached across a number of local and global news channels. However, a range of 
factors limits this methodology, from the sample medium and dates and language of the 
study, to the content actually analysed. First, this sample contains only those broadcasts 
available online or through paid-for archival companies, with the 2014 broadcasts being 
the exception – these broadcasts were sampled at the time, via a personal video recorder 
and by screen capturing the broadcasts live onto the computer. As such, the number of 
broadcasts in 2014 is far in excess of the previous years, which may skew the results of 
																																																								
11 The total broadcasts analysed for this study numbered 153, and the entire data set has been donated to 
the Centre for Film and Media Studies at the University of Cape Town post submission of this thesis. See 
Appendix 1 for a brief description of all channels sampled in this study. 
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this study. The data sets for each year are uneven, which affects the conclusions able to 
be drawn about the election coverage.  
 
Second, the digitisation of the 2009 and 2014 election periods again distorts the number 
of broadcasts available. Barring the 2014 elections, all broadcasts were collected and 
analysed in retrospect, and thus the data collection relied on external sources to upload 
and archive broadcasts. There may have been reasons why certain broadcasts were not 
included in their archives (perceived as uninteresting, censorship, access to digitisation 
techniques, and so forth).  
 
Third, I sampled only English-language broadcasts that had been archived and digitalised 
– this neglects non-Western non-English perceptions of South African democracy, as 
well as those broadcasters who do not have access to digitisation equipment. This bias 
was unavoidable due to time and funding constraints of this study. Further development 
of this research project could take into account the language barriers by employing 
translators as well as finding access to non-digitalised broadcasts.  
 
Fourth, this methodology is limited in the context of the analysis – it is only the encoding 
of media messages into the text and only the text itself that forms the basis of this study, 
rather than any type of perception or decoding on the part of the audience. This study 
only evaluates content, and so can only speculate as to the reasons behind particular 
frames and narratives and their effects. 
 
Finally, this sample takes into account only the election years and voting week of South 
Africa’s democracy, rather than an overarching view of the country’s experience with 
democracy. A few notable example broadcasts are included outside of the sample time 
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(see the next section on broadcasts for a description of this), but overall this study only 
looks at a narrow timeframe of the elections. As such, the findings from this sample 
cannot be generalised to the entirety of South Africa’s experience of democracy because 
that is much more than just the elections. Each chapter will include a historical 
discussion that will attempt to address this limitation and contextualise the 
(dis)engagement of democracy in the country. 
 
1.2 Sample 1: All broadcasts 
The sample of this study is based on a two-step sampling design. The first sample 
included all known broadcasts obtained through an accessible or purposive design: 
keywords were typed into multiple search engines and downloaded onto a computer for 
later analysis. Search engines included the Google Videos search, DMOZ12 topic search, 
Wolfram Alpha, Vimeo, and YouTube. Archival companies that provided both free and 
paid-for broadcasts included Getty Images (which houses the BBC Motion Gallery and 
the Sky News archive) and archives from AP, ITN, Internet TV, the SABC, and eTV. 
 
During the data collection, I contacted SABC Digital Archives, eTV, Media Tenor, and 
Media Monitoring Africa for assistance in gathering footage. While SABC Digital 
Archives and eTV provided 30 broadcasts and 10 broadcasts respectively at cost, both 
Media Tenor and Media Monitoring Africa were not forthcoming with broadcasts or 
assistance. Keywords used within the search engines included various permutations of 
the following: [Year] South African election / [Year] South Africa / South African 
election / -voting / -democracy / -president / Jacob Zuma / Thabo Mbeki / Nelson 
Mandela. All broadcasts that related to democracy, the elections, any of the presidential 
																																																								
12	DMOZ stands for Directory Mozilla search engine, which closed in March 2017	
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candidates or political parties, political campaigns, the electorate, the democratic process, 
or any of the issues in the various election manifestos were selected and downloaded, 
regardless of length, channel, reporter, or location.  
 
This sample took place predominantly between February and August 2014, but new data 
appeared continuously until February 2015 when theoretical saturation was achieved. 
Data collection relied heavily on access to broadcasts via the Internet due to geographical 
location (many broadcast archives are only available in South Africa via an internet 
connection), time, funding, and space.13 Gathering broadcasts for academic study 
through paid-for archives comes at great cost, and many broadcasters are unwilling to 
allow temporary access. However, some companies offer a preview of larger broadcasts 
(such as Getty Images and BBC Motion Gallery), which meant I could watch the 
watermarked and pixelated broadcasts without needing to pay for the full-sized 
broadcast. Paid-for archival footage from both the SABC and eTV archives were 
accessed at considerable cost, co-funded through the National Research Foundation 
Innovation scholarship, the Centre for Film and Media Studies, and Next Generation 
Social Sciences in Africa fellowship sponsored by the Carnegie Foundation. 
1.2.1 Theoretical saturation 
Sampling continued until there was theoretical saturation of the narratives – I noted 
themes and narratives of each year until no new relevant narratives emerged from 
analysis of the available local and global broadcasts. Rudestam and Newton (2007: 108) 
suggest that real saturation never really occurs because the data, in this case each 
broadcast, has something unique to contribute to the study. “It is usually the researcher 
																																																								
13 Because of the reliance on ease of access and digitsation of broadcasts, the sample of channels selected 
for this study is not all encompassing. Missing from this list are, notably, Fox News from America, RT 
from Russia, any African channels barring the South African SABC, eTV, AfricaNews, and AmandlaTV, 
or Kenya’s NTV, and any regional channels such as ITV 3 in the UK. With greater resources and more 
time, the sample could be increased and further narratives discovered. 
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who becomes saturated,” they suggest, and that “it is important to collect sufficient data 
to represent the breadth and depth of the phenomenon without becoming overwhelmed. 
The longer, more detailed, and intensive the transcripts, the fewer the number of 
[broadcasts]” are needed (ibid.). The detailed transcript and analysis process conducted in 
this study is described later in this chapter and in Jones (2016).  
 
Sampling was halted in February 2015 because theoretical saturation occurred, but with 
better digitisation processes and techniques and increased time and funding, more news 
broadcasts prior to 2009 may be accessible and add to the findings presented in this 
study. I watched the total number of broadcasts for a first time (referred to as “the first 
pass”) and noted narratives and important events. This first sample resulted in 366 
broadcasts across five election years. Not all broadcasts were suitable for final analysis, 
however, and the final number had to be reduced to match the research questions, 
discussed in the next section. 
 
1.3 Sample 2: Coding for interest 
Because of the initial size of this study, it was not feasible to semiotically analyse each 
news spot that was broadcast during the sample time periods and I therefore 
implemented rules for selection and rejection from the final sample. This study analyses 
the shifting and continuous narratives of the South African elections, focusing on the 
stories told by local and global television news channels. Therefore, the principals for 
inclusion and exclusion were based on the research questions and predominantly focused 
on framing and mediation. In order to reduce the 366 broadcasts to a relevant and 
manageable sample for discourse and semiotic analyses, I employed a method of “coding 
for interest”. Sample 2 took place between December 2014 and August 2015. 
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1.3.1 Selection and rejection 
I watched all broadcasts again (which I termed the “second pass”), and selected any 
broadcast narrative that related to democracy, voting, voters, the South African election 
legacy, presidential candidates, campaigns, the electorate, any of the issues in the election 
manifestos, or any broadcast/package that gave important background information to 
these themes. Additionally, the “coded for interest” list included any broadcast that was a 
package, insert, documentary-style programme, journalist direct-to-camera address, 
outside broadcast, vox pop compilation, or news spot, so long as mediation was present 
in the form of editing and narration. 
 
Conversely, broadcasts that had minimal framing by journalists and mediation from the 
broadcasters were disregarded because it is mediation and juxtaposition of audio and 
visual that creates the framing narratives of interest to this study. The only broadcasts 
relevant were those that represented South African election processes, democracy, and so 
forth, with news values. Content analysis is not the only method of this study – 
quantifying the number of broadcasts dedicated to South Africa during each election year 
does not reveal the narratives about the elections, and so the principals for exclusion 
focused on content and context, rather than simply quantity. I therefore disregarded any 
broadcasts that consisted of only speeches from leaders with no input or mediation from 
reporters; that didn’t have audio input from journalists (such as raw packages as found in 
the AP and SABC archives); that were unaired or non-finalised broadcasts (such as the 
many hours of raw broadcast data provided by the SABC archives); that didn’t have 
visual input (such as the podcasts from multiple radio archives); that didn’t represent the 
South African democratic process (such as CCTV’s Zimbabwean package from 1999, 
which mentioned Nelson Mandela but centred on China’s involvement in Zimbabwean 
politics); or that were simply clips of people voting or speeches from candidates without 
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significant input from journalists. None of these broadcasts reflected the narratives of 
mediation from broadcasters, and had no active framing of news values, and were thus 
disregarded. 
 
Finally, I included some broadcasts that were outside the sample timeframe (such as the 
Born Free discussion on CNN in January 2009 – Inside South Africa: South African youth 
vote, CNN, 2009) or that were not entirely related to democracy (such as the BBC’s 
gangland investigation in April 2009 – Grassy Park, CNN, 2009), because these packages 
are important to understand the context of the elections as represented both locally and 
globally, such as electoral issues (crime/corruption) and electorate (the Born Frees/gangs 
in the Western Cape), or journalistic practices when reporting on South African 
democracy (The Big Story, CNN, 1994; World Insight, CCTV, 2009). 
1.3.2 Coded for interest excel sheet 
Through the above process, the total 366 broadcasts were reduced to a final total of 153 
“coded for interest” broadcasts across the five years (see Graph 2.1 for a breakdown per 
year). I created a separate excel sheet entitled “[Year] Coded for Interest”, which was 
placed within the respective year’s computer file along with the year’s broadcasts. This 
excel sheet had seven columns, including 1) Number of Broadcast, 2) Title of Broadcast, 
3) Channel, 4) Journalist, 5) Themes, 6) Events, 7) Parties. This excel sheet formed the 
major analysis document. I then reduced this master list into separate sheets for each 
channel, and repeated the columns. It was therefore possible to have a quick overview of 
the number of broadcasts per channel, theme type, political party depicted on each 
broadcast, and so forth. This was repeated across each election year. 
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1.4 Final tally 
Of the 153 broadcasts on 24 channels selected for analysis, the majority centred on the 
2014 election as seen in Graph 2.1. The sudden jump in broadcasts from 2009 onwards 
could be because of increased digitisation and improved archival techniques over the 
years. The paucity of broadcasts available in both 1999 and 2004 represented two things: 
firstly, the gap across 1999 and 2004 broadcasts is a finding in itself, explored throughout 
this thesis in Chapters 4, 5, and 8, and secondly, the scarcity of broadcasts means that the 
sample was uneven, making it difficult to analyse these two years with the same amount 
of detail devoted to other years. Despite attempts to increase the sample size for both 




Despite a problematic archiving process at the broadcaster, the SABC provided the most 
broadcasts for each sample year, with a total of 29 over the five sample dates. As seen in 
Graph 2.2, the range of channels for this project is diverse. Channels were divided into 
geographic regions (Graphs 2.3 – 2.6) to investigate any narrative differences that may 
occur due to location. At the start of each analysis section in Chapters 3 through 7, I 















A total of 51 broadcasts were available from the African channels, 33 from North 
American channels, 44 from European channels, and 25 from Asian and Middle Eastern 
channels. As seen in the above graphs, the major contributors to broadcasts were 
mainstream news channels: the SABC, CNN, the BBC and Sky News, and AJE, but were 
complemented by newswires (AP, AFP, and Reuters) as well as non-mainstream 
channels in later years (PressTV, NTDTV, AfricaNews, and AmandlaTV). 
 
Each broadcast was viewed a third time, and a brief outline of the narrative (the story 
narrative, vox pops and journalist discourse, campaign/election issues, visuals, and 
juxtapositions) was noted in the seventh column, including any supplementary 
information such as my own reactions or reflections on this information. Conducting 
this third pass of the sample ensured cognizance with the broadcasts, themes, and the 
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This study of television news broadcasts analysed the data with an instrument of my own 
adaption and design. The triadic multimodal methodology of analysis has been published 
elsewhere (Jones, 2016), and I detail the qualitative instrument in full below, starting with 
the characteristics of the data, including its visualness and rhetoric, and then moving to 
the characteristics of the instrument itself, including discourse analysis, semiotics, and 
acknowledging the production context of the broadcasts. 
 
2.1 Characteristics of the data 
2.1.1 The visual-ness of television 
While scholars tend to focus on the ‘top down’ analysis of media coverage of elections 
(that is, from a political science perspective, rather than visual or cultural studies), many 
studies identify key terms and concepts within the television coverage. For example, 
Bucy and Grabe (2007) identify the “lip flap” (2007: 662), where the candidate is shot in 
a medium close-up in formal speech stance but is not heard; instead, the journalist 
conducts a voice-over. This term is similar to their later discussion on “image bites” 
(Grabe & Bucy, 2009), but includes the ‘re-voicing’ by a journalist. Bucy and Grabe argue 
that this is unflattering and discouraged. The authors also identify “visual primacy” 
(2007: 656), whereby the audience more readily remembers visuals than content. This ties 
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into the arguments of Louw (2005: 33), Strömbäck (2008: 231), and Bennett (2012: 2) 
where television alters the way political information is packaged.  
 
Most research about television news sorely lacks grounding in semiotic theory (Grabe, 
1996; Norris, 1997; Druckman, 2005; Bucy & Grabe, 2007; Cushion & Strömbäck, 2015; 
Cushion, Thomas, & Ellis, 2015), which would significantly enhance the visual analysis. 
Schieß (2007) considers the semiotics of television coverage of the election night, in 
terms of graphics, editing styles, and studio sets, but he too criticises previous television 
researchers: “Both media analysts and critical discourse analysts seem to have closed 
their eyes to visual analysis” (2007: 277), and this is despite the ground-breaking visual 
work of the Glasgow University Media Group (1976, 1980, 1982) and the constant 
reminders of the importance of the visual (Fiske & Hartley, 1978: 15; Montgomery, 2007; 
Bucy & Grabe, 2007: 653). Only recently have researchers started acknowledging tele-
vision (Schieß, 2007: 277). Kress and Van Leeuwen (1996, 1998, 2001) and Scollon (2004) 
have stated that multimodal analysis methods emphasise the interconnections between 
the varieties of communication methods on television news. 
 
In much of the recent scholarship dedicated to television coverage of elections (Eargle, 
Esmail, & Sullivan, 2008; Strömbäck, 2008; Cushion, Thomas, & Ellis, 2015; Holtz-
Bacha, 2016), election narratives, biased coverage, and themes of representation are often 
measured in the length of time participants appear on the screen. Context and visual 
analysis is significantly overlooked. Even research that is supposedly dedicated to the 
visual (Grabe, 1996; Bucy & Grabe, 2007; Schieß, 2007) and discourse content 
(Hubbard, 2010; Rose, 2014) gets caught up in the quantitative length measurement 
while at the same time espousing the necessity of visual analysis of election and campaign 
portrayal on television news. Of course, taking into account only the length of time a 
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political party is on air when considering bias and favourability of media is extraordinarily 
limiting – Grabe argues that “a stop watch cannot entirely measure matters of 
judgement, and counting words omits nuance” (1996: 7).15 
2.1.2 Multi-layered rhetoric 
Because television news is a multi-layered rhetoric inclusive of audio (discourse, 
language, speech acts), visual (semiotics, visual rhetoric, gestures), and the context of 
production (media ownership, financial structures, political economy), using one research 
methodology on such a medium would be limiting and would negate much of what 
makes television news an intricate meaning-making vehicle. Therefore, I wanted the 
instrumentation of analysing these broadcasts to meet the following criteria: it should 
allow for both audio and visual denotative and connotative values; it should allow for 
these two tracks’ oppositions or juxtapositions to one another; it should consider the 
context of production of the broadcasts; and it should be coherent, efficient, systematic, 
and detailed. This study is primarily qualitative in nature, with some basic quantification 
to highlight narrative frequency within the broadcasts, and as such makes no real claims 
of validity or reliability. Still, it considers efficiency and organisation a priority. Thus, the 
accurate transcribing of each broadcast along with the subsequent analysis thereof leads 
to an enhanced trustworthiness of both the data and the discussion, as the analysis is 
empirically grounded in those broadcasts that are the focus of the study. Accurate and 
straightforward transcriptions of broadcasts allow for consistency in decoding the latent 
																																																								
15 There may be a common-sense reason for this focus. Strom (2007: 2) suggests that a political party’s 
access to the media is often regarded in three levels: Proportional Access, whereby the larger the party’s 
support base, the greater the coverage dedicated to that party; Positively Biased, whereby the smaller the 
party, the greater the access to airtime; and finally Equal Access, where all parties have the same amount of 
airtime and newspaper space. Perhaps these levels, in particular the latter, dictate why television news 
researchers are so focused on the length measurement as an indicator of media bias – the more airtime 
given to one political party, the more ‘biased’ the newspaper or broadcaster. 
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and manifest meanings, while the analysis that follows draws heavily on these 
transcriptions and readings of oppositions or juxtapositions. 
 
 2.2 Characteristics of the instrument 
I adapted various sources of multimodal analysis to design an original instrument of 
analysis. I drew on Sandra Dueck’s (1995) Master’s thesis on the rhetoric of television 
news provided the model of transcription, while Montgomery (2007) and Chandler 
(1994c) provided the knowledge to unite the visual with the audio transcriptions. The 
inherent rhetoric of a television news broadcast is multi-layered with three potential 
levels to the broadcast: the audio, the visual, and decisions made in the production. Each 
level was examined with a separate research approach. News broadcasts are also 
polysemic. The visual track combines and juxtaposes with the audio to create this multi-
layered text. The linguistic and visual syntagms, symbolism, cultural allusions, and tropes 
may shed light on news values and agenda setting, framing, and bias in much the same 
way as discourse analysis helps us to understand print or semiotic analysis unpacks 
photojournalism or film.  
2.2.1 Encoding and decoding 
This method deals predominantly with the encoding (Hall, 1973) of messages into a 
medium, rather than the decoding or audience engagement with the text, but 
acknowledges the inevitable gap between the encoding and decoding of the news media 
text. This methodology lies between the structural and post-structural application of 
news media analysis. While the method draws on structural semiotics and discourse 
analyses, further development is needed to close the ‘decoding gap’ between the author’s 
encoding of meaning into the text and the audience’s involvement in and engagement 
with a plurality of meanings, which is outside the scope of this study. 
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While post-structuralists may argue that a single meaning is ultimately uncertain (Pope, 
1998: 127), primarily because of the cultural location and the prioritisation of decoder 
over encoder (Fourie, 2007:173), this methodology does not speak to that argument. 
Television news broadcasts are, by their very nature, polysemic and so one certain 
meaning is naturally impossible to locate. Using social semiotics and a limited critical 
discourse analysis method for the visual and audio tracks allows the researcher to subject 
the text to paradigmatic substitutions without implying one certain priori meaning, but 
rather infer the multitude of juxtaposed and interacting meanings within the text.  
 
To this respect, semiotics and discourse analysis are useful tools to pick apart the 
interwoven layers of meaning in a television news broadcast in order to suggest a 
preferred reading of the text, while political economy theory of the media can be 
operationalized to investigate the external influences on production of meaning within 
the text. While political economy of the media is not a method, per se, but rather a 
theory, the categorisation process of this method allows for and anticipates the 
application of this theory at a later stage, when analysing the themes within each channel 
and election year for example. 
 
I present here what I term the triadic multimodal approach to analysing news broadcasts. 
The triadic approach starts with the discourse, moves on to the semiotic analysis of 
visuals, looks for juxtapositions between the two, and then considers the external 
pressures of media production on the news texts. I outline each method in turn. 
2.2.2 Discourse 
Wodak (2011: 40) suggests critical discourse analysis does not necessarily have a fixed 
method but begins with the research topic, is informed via theory, and further refined to 
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construct the objects of the specified research. In this way, discourse analysis takes its 
form from the research problem rather than a deductive methodology. Discourse 
analysis often overlaps with visual rhetoric in both semantics and syntactics. While the 
visual rhetoric perspective analyses the symbolic signification in meaning creation, 
discourse analysis looks at the words, metaphor creation, phrases, and allusion. 
Paradigmatic and syntagmatic analyses are present within discourse analysis, and as such 
should be analysed in a similar qualitative fashion. Machin and Mayr (2012) alight upon 
this overlap too, and discuss the semiotic choices within analysing discourse, allowing for 
an in-depth critical analysis of speech and language choices. However, when analysing 
television news, it is important to remember that the juxtapositions between the semiotic 
visuals and the discourse speech are important, rather than focussing too heavily on one 
aspect or the other. When researching television news, it is not necessary or advisable to 
delve too far into critical discourse analysis. Doing so would make the analysis large and 
unmanageable. The objective with this methodology was to find juxtapositions and 
oppositions between the image plus the audio, as this opposition between tracks provides 
the most significant meanings. A deep textual analysis on either the visual or the audio 
may negate the focus on the juxtapositions. 
 
Before any discourse analysis can take place, accurate transcriptions should reflect both 
the audio and the visual tracks to decipher juxtapositions. Dueck’s (1995) Master’s thesis 
on the rhetoric of television news was extremely helpful here. Montgomery (2007), too, 
gives a detailed discussion of transcription guides, but Dueck has a more straightforward 
style that incorporated the juxtapositions between visual and audio. Her transcriptions 
illustrated the line-by-line discourse of the speakers with a brief description of the images 
alongside. The spoken and written word anchors the images to a preferred reading 
(Bignell, 2002: 42; Van Heerden, 2008: 216) and is a key aspect to news analysis. Such in-
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depth transcriptions made it far easier to analyse the overall tone of the broadcast as well 
as to discover the latent and manifest focus of individual stories. 
 
For this study, Dueck’s structure was adapted with additional columns to locate specific 
televisual elements and juxtapositions in line with a combination of semiotic and 
discourse methodologies. The transcription method is explained in depth in my article, 
Jones (2016), and Table 2.1 gives a short example. Column 1 separates the discourse into 
“paragraphs” – each change in the visual, the event, or the speaker separates the 
paragraphs. Column 2 details the speaker (journalist, vox pop, interviewee, and so forth). 
Column 3 lists arbitrarily split lines, making specific discourse analysis at a linguistic or 
word-item level easier. Column 4 details the words or audio in the broadcast. Column 5 
is the time code for the broadcast, helpful to locate the specific scene for the author, 
reader, or future scholars. Column 6 lists a brief description of the images on screen, 
using filmic terminology, for future semiotic analysis and reference. Finally, column 7 
holds space for any remarks or reflections from the researcher. This careful transcription 
method makes discourse analysis easier and allows for the simultaneous semiotic analysis 
on the visual track to occur without additional transcriptions. All “coded for interest” 
broadcasts were transcribed thus.  
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Table 2.1: Example transcription16 
2.2.3 Semiotics 
Considering only the audio of news broadcasts and ignoring the visual would be 
extraordinarily limiting, as television news is a visual and culturally located product. Thus, 
to gauge the various meanings of such a medium, visual semiotics must be analysed 
similarly. Two types of semiotic theory were considered for this study – traditional, based 
on Barthes’ research, and social semiotics, taking into account Kress and Van Leeuwen’s 
analysis technique. 
 
The traditional semiotic method of Barthes’ (1968) three levels of meaning – 
connotation/signification, denotation, and ideology/myth – is a logical point from which 
to depart in semiotic analysis of the media, but the scale of study involved in this project 
																																																								
16 Transcript excerpt from Emma Hurd, ANC’s Jacob Zuma divides South Africa, Sky News, 2009 
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complicated the use of this method. With over 150 broadcasts of about 3–5 minutes 
each, three levels of meaning applied to the visual in such a close textual analysis was 
inappropriate. Barthes’ method of analysis appears suitable for a smaller analysis of 
imagery – such as still photography or frame analysis. Thus, the semiotic theory of visual 
analysis was investigated further to encompass this data set. 
 
All three segments of traditional semiotic theory are located in news broadcasts: 
semantics in the denotation of words, images, phrases, signs, and symbols; syntactics 
regarding the paradigmatic and syntagmatic elements within the texts; and pragmatics in 
the investigation of the connotative value of the texts and context. Paradigmatic levels of 
signification assist in identifying latent or obscured meanings within the texts, or 
elucidate manifest meanings, while paradigmatic substitution illustrates additional latent 
meanings, and thus this section of traditional semiotic theory was widely used 
throughout the analysis of these news broadcasts. When discussing paradigmatic analysis, 
Daniel Chandler (1994a) suggests, 
analysing textual absences can help to reveal whose interests are served by their 
omission. Such analysis pays particular attention to the issue of which questions 
are left unasked… The analysis of paradigmatic relations helps to define the 
‘value’ of specific items in the text. 
Gestures, imagery, symbolism, framing, and photography can be analysed according to 
the paradigmatic, syntagmatic, and different levels of signification to discover themes of 
representation within news broadcasts. Entman (1991: 6–7) explains that news framing 
consists of symbols and signification, metaphors, and visual imagery. These combine, 
repeat, and become a news narrative. Frames can often be detected by probing for words 
and imagery that appear consistently and convey semiotic meaning. Hence, traditional 
semiotic theory that stems from linguistics is useful and necessary in understanding news 
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narratives. However, traditional structuralist semiotics can be limiting when analysing 
news broadcasts because the theory does not allow for contextual analysis of media 
production or cultural studies. These external pressures on the meaning-making process 
of news broadcasts must be considered, otherwise a large section of what makes 
television news important would be neglected. Thus, social semiotics and visual rhetoric 
form part of this multimodal approach. 
 
In terms of social semiotics, Kress and Van Leeuwen (2005) present useful terminology 
designed to analyse images. While predominantly designed for analysis of static imagery 
(such as print advertising or photojournalism), their research is still helpful when 
analysing moving images, because camera shots, angles, participant positioning, and 
vectors still occur in news broadcasts with frequency. Using this terminology for analysis 
of a complex text such as broadcast news enables an easier interpretation of the text’s 
symbolic meaning.  
 
In reference to the binaries often found within news texts, Berger (2004: 22) says, 
“discerning meaning without finding polar oppositions is like listening to the sound of 
one hand clapping.” He sets out a step-by-step guide for analysing television items 
semiotically, in line with Chandler’s (1994b) Grammar of Film and Television. The first step, 
Berger (2004: 35–36) suggests, is to isolate and analyse the important signs and signifiers 
within the text, and second to identify the paradigmatic structure, including oppositions. 
Third, find the syntagmatic elements and structure of the text. Fourth, echoing 
McLuhan’s (1967) call to consider the medium of the message, Berger suggests that the 
medium of television could affect the text, and so elements such as shot scale, angles, 
editing, and mise-en-scene considerations should be discussed. Both Berger and Chandler 
developed guides that are powerful multimodal analytical tools. While semiotic analyses 
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are inherently limited by their subjective nature – as well as by the post-structural struggle 
that exists with the nature of meaning – Berger and Chandler’s step-by-step guides assist 
in expedient coherence when researching a complicated sign vehicle like television news. 
 
With close textual analysis using both semiotics and discourse analysis, the television 
news broadcasts in this data set were, for the most part, efficiently and effectively 
analysed to discover latent and manifest meanings, but one layer of meaning still lay 
hidden: that of the encoder or author, and the context within which the broadcast was 
produced. Media studies does not exist within a vacuum and so the possible external 
influences and pressures on the meaning-making process were analysed in conjunction 
with the visual and audio. 
2.2.4 Production context and juxtapositions 
Authors of media texts are not only journalists and participants, but gatekeepers and 
editors and owners too. Eduardo Galeano once posited that “never have so many been 
held incommunicado by so few” (cited in Christiansen & Koeman, 2015: 66), a 
pessimistic view that suggests an oligopoly of expression and communication represses 
the mass communication structures. While these levels of control are not necessarily 
repressive, the gatekeeping structures certainly affect the encoding process of media 
texts. The interplay between economic and symbolic dimensions of communication is 
the object of study in this layer, while the impact of economic organisation on cultural 
industries (such as television news sources) on the meaning production and circulation 
provide a deeper understanding on the overall preferred reading of the text. Whether the 
text authors are able to secure this preferred reading amongst their target audience is a 
subject best tackled in a separate, dedicated study, as this is not the focus here. Political 
economy of the media asks questions about the access to and production of news media, 
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and is rooted in the social sciences including economics, political science, and sociology. 
While political economy of the media is a wide and diverse field of thought, this 
methodology focuses on the context of the news item or channel in question, rather than 
the field at large. The aim of this style of study is efficiency and coherence, with a focus 
on the juxtapositions between the multimodal levels of meaning creation, and delving 
into the wide field of political economy theory would only complicate the objectives. 
 
Moreover, newsroom politics change over time and the analysis of broadcasts from a 
range of years (1994 to 2014) requires acknowledgement of this shift. While inferences of 
media production processes are not possible from within the bounds of this study, as it is 
primarily a semiotic and qualitative content analysis, it is important to acknowledge the 
production context of each broadcast and each election year. The external influences on 
the meaning construction process are, according to McQuail (1987: 203) and Chandler 
(1994c), a key issue that separates news media from other forms, such as films or fiction 
television. Additionally, all news texts are numerously authored, from the cameraperson 
and journalist to editors, schedulers, scriptwriters, and news owners and funders. Each 
contributor to the news broadcast infers a certain amount of gatekeeping in the message 
construction, and so their influence should be acknowledged when analysing the message 
and medium. This methodology acknowledges the influence, using Fiske (1987), Zellizer 
(1990), and Chandler (1994c) as a basis for identification of the author. Because the focus 
of this study is the juxtaposition between various elements within the broadcasts, the 
inference of newsroom culture and political economy of the media serves as a contextual 
exercise to the juxtapositions. 
 
A final step in this triadic multimodal methodology is the most important: drawing 
meaning from juxtaposition and difference, framed against the context of media 
	 86 
production. Through a method of paradigmatic substitution (Chandler, 1994a), some of 
the numerous possible visible and hidden meanings of the news broadcast can be 
inferred. Differences between the audio and the visual narratives may show ideological 
meanings: for example, a journalist speaking of the government’s plan for economic 
stability post-apartheid and showing the Marikana massacre at the same time (What issues 
face the ANC after South African elections, BBC, 2014) creates a brutal juxtaposition that 
frames the government unsympathetically and suggests the ANC represses protests for 
the control of the economy. Contrasts between audio and visual cannot be overstated for 
importance. 
 
Juxtaposition also took place at a second level of data analysis: the channel, year, 
journalist, and participant. Channels reporting on the same event (the car bombing in 
1994, for example) could evaluate the events differently, presumably based on the 
assumed ideology of that channel. Possible perspectives of the channel are informed 
partly through the literature review as well as through investigation into the channel’s 
political economy. The juxtaposition between channel and event (CNN’s Bloody Sunday at 
High Noon reporting of the car bomb in 1994 versus Sky News’s reporting on the same 
car bombing Sky News Sunrise is very different), year and participant (Thabo Mbeki’s 
profile as candidate in 1999 versus his glorification as president in 2004), and journalist 
and event (Emma Hurd’s Zuma profile on Sky News’s ANC’s Jacob Zuma divides South 
Africa versus Nkepile Mabuse’s Zuma profile on CNN’s Inside Africa: South African election, 




3 DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Multiple phased data analysis started at the broad observation of themes to focusing 
down on individual words and signs. Overarching themes and narratives of the election 
broadcasts per year comprised the broad, top level of investigation; juxtapositions 
between discourse and audio, and between variables such as years, Western/non-
Western channels, global/local channels, were noted at the middle level; and individual 
discourse and semiotic data, such as words and signs, were noted at the micro level. 
 
For example, the broad analysis of the 2009 election narrative on Sky News included a 
tendency to mythologise political candidates and the election process in the country 
through themes of conflict, corruption, and a breaking of democracy. At the middle 
level, Sky News conducted most of the mythologizing through the juxtapositions used 
during their broadcasts, particularly in relation to the political leaders – Sky News 
mocked Jacob Zuma as corrupt, controversial, and clumsy, falling into a crowd of people 
and singing off-key at a rally (ANC’s Jacob Zuma divides South Africa, Sky News, 2009). At 
the narrowest level, the individual data analysis, Sky News’s representation of Jacob 
Zuma during the 2009 election campaign is most exemplified by Hurd’s description of 
Zuma: “He has no formal education and still practises a polygamous lifestyle. He’s also 
overcome allegations of rape and corruption that might have felled his political career” 
(Hurd, ANC’s Jacob Zuma divides South Africa, Sky News, 2009). On the word “felled”, 
Zuma overbalances in his dance moves and falls backwards into the crowd, shield and 
shoes flailing into the air. 
 
While this data analysis is predominantly qualitative and thematic, a brief content analysis 
was also conducted to analyse frequency. Political parties, events, speakers, and policy 
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issues17 were counted across each election year sample and visualised through pie charts 
and bar graphs, separated into regions or channels as appropriate, and compared. Doing 
so gave a useful overview of which channels referred to which political parties, events, 
and issues. Additionally, the “speakers” during the sample showed which channel gave 
airtime to the type of voices: political leaders, citizens, protesters, or political analysts. 
While these frequency findings are interesting, the time and frequency measurement 
alone does not adequately show how these themes and issues were depicted in the 
broadcasts. For example, even though the ANC was mentioned far more often, across all 
channels, than the opposition in 2009, the narrative analysis showed how the journalists 
viewed not only the ANC, but also the future of democracy in South Africa. 
 
Each chapter that follows comprises of a historical background discussion of events 
leading up to the election period, political participants in the election years, and any other 
important information that would contextualise the sample. The broadcasts contained in 
each election year were analysed using the triadic multimodal analysis method, as 






17 “Political parties” included any broadcast that showed parties including regalia, commentary about the 
party, spokespeople from the party, leaders voting, and so forth. “Events” include incidents reported on 
other than the voting day such as the car bomb in Johannesburg in 1994 or the protest action in the 
Western Cape in 2014, additional story topics such as references to the Struggle in 1994 or the housing 
crisis in the Western Cape in 2014, and locations for journalists to base their story from such as the long 
queues forming the backdrop in 1994, 2004, and 2014. “Themes” were observed patterns in the broadcasts 
that were prominent and interesting to show how journalists portrayed the elections. 
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Three research questions directed the investigation for each election year: how did global 
and local news represent South Africa’s election during the voting days; was there a 
difference between local and global or Western and non-Western channels; and finally 
what, if any, were the factors driving this representation? This chapter presents the 
findings from a multimodal analysis method of 25 television news broadcasts from the 
1994 election week.18 To contextualise these findings, a brief background of the context 
and political parties opens the chapter. The findings section starts with a quantitative 
analysis of the frequency of event and political party coverage, followed by a qualitative 
analysis of the themes. A discussion of the frames used in the sample weaves together 
the narratives and an overall summary ends this chapter. Each subsequent analysis 
chapter follows a similar structure.  
 
This chapter posits that the Anglo-American, hereafter also termed “global”, coverage of 
the 1994 election was overwhelmingly dramatized with a heavy focus on the visualisation 
of violence, leading to a horse race between binaries. Local SABC broadcasts were more 
cautious and hesitant in the dearth of broadcasts available. The negotiated settlement – 
between white and black South Africans, between the ANC and the NP, and the IFP and 
the ANC – was highlighted as a triumph of logic and reason, but this emphasis neglected 
context and explanation of South Africa’s complicated first election. Finally, global 
																																																								
18 The sample for the 1994 election year was unevenly heavy in favour of the global broadcasts. The SABC 
provided only three broadcasts suitable for analysis and was the only broadcaster in the country at the time. 
Hence, part of the reason global narratives are more prominent in this analysis is because of this paucity. 
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channels presented contradicting narratives that seemed symptomatic of the shift 
towards a more mediatised political communication style in the early 1990s.  
 
1 BACKGROUND TO 1994 
 
“An election of similar proportions in a developing country would normally take between 18 months and 
two years to arrange. But in South Africa, we do it our normal way, at the last minute and on a wing 
and a prayer.” 
(Harris, 2010: 50) 
 
1.1 Getting to this point 
Long queues of shivering people snake into the distance, the rising sun providing some 
warmth to the voters who queue in single file for many hours. Mielies braai on open 
trashcan fires and singing spontaneously erupts amongst the multi-race crowds. On dusty 
roads, on manicured lawns, inside well-kept schools, inside flimsy tarpaulin tents, out in 
the freezing morning air, South Africans of all races stand patiently and, without fear, 
wait for the voting booths to open at 7am. “The queues assume their own hierarchy,” 
Peter Harris remembers, “with the elderly and infirm being pushed to the front, followed 
by women with babies… the atmosphere is almost one of devotion” (2010: 209). 
 
These scenes in April 1994 signified South Africa’s first democratic general election. 
Reaching this point had not been easy – for the politicians, many sleepless worrisome 
nights were spent around the negotiating table. For the citizens, fear of the low-level civil 
war brewing in the townships and in the city centres caused widespread panic. But over 
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four days in late April, 86% of the South African voting age population turned out to 
cast their ballots in a chaotic, clumsy, crisis-ridden first election. 
 
In the weeks and months before the election date, South Africa was under siege. 
Widespread violence between warring factions – spurred by political unrest, 
brinkmanship, a deeply unequal society, and systemic racism – led politicians, journalists, 
and ordinary South Africans to think that a democratic election would never come to 
pass. In December 1991 and again in May 1992, political parties and leaders, including 
then president FW De Klerk of the ruling National Party and recently released African 
National Congress president Nelson Mandela, attempted a negotiated settlement to end 
apartheid: the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) laid the path for 
multi-racial discussions. CODESA II attempted further negotiation, only to fail in a 
deadlock after the opposing ANC could not agree with the NP on the constitution and 
governing process.  
 
With political parties failing a vital compromise, civil society exploded in anger and 
frustration. Groups of young men aligning to the various factions, particularly along 
ethnic lines, took to the streets with homemade bombs and weapons, chanting slogans 
and Struggle songs. Zulu men residing in townships attacked Xhosa families. Xhosa 
youth fought a guerrilla war within the alleyways of Thokoza township in Johannesburg. 
Families lost their children to bloody gunfights. Schools were burnt, homes demolished, 
caches of weapons and ammunitions found in buried locations across the country. Ill-
trained and racist police could not keep up with the violence, and some accounts put the 
death toll at over 20,000 people in the decade before 1994 (Jeffery, 2009). In the weeks 
and days prior to the election, bombs exploded in Ventersdorp at the NP offices, in 
Johannesburg outside the ANC headquarters, and at a taxi rank. Rich Mkhondo recalls 
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that, “mass mobilization had become a permanent, structurally ingrained feature of 
South African political life” (1993: 5). 
 
1.2 It would have been a miracle 
Against this backdrop of a low-level civil war, the very idea of having a free and fair, 
peaceful election seemed far-fetched. The subsequent transition from autocratic racist 
rule to multi-racial democracy appeared, on the surface at least, like a miracle. Deborah 
Posel (2013: 29) reiterates the problems with classifying the transition of South Africa as 
a “miracle”: 
A conviction of living in miraculous times provided an enabling way of thinking, 
a structure of belief. The idea of a miracle effaces process, and renders discussion 
and analysis thereof unnecessary. A miracle simply is, and is compelling and 
captivating for that revelatory certitude. 
If one assumes the transition is like a “miracle”, the process no longer requires 
discussion. Tensions between ethnicities, races, and political parties divided South 
African society in the years running up to the first democratic election, and it took 
considerable negotiations and compromises to quell the unrest. A miracle, this was not. 
 
Not only was South Africa deeply divided because of racial categorisation, the divisions 
reached to the infrastructure available to races too – rural, predominantly black people 
lived without running water, electricity, or other basic amenities afforded to the urban, 
predominantly white populace. Holding an election in areas where there was no census 
data, no electoral register, no telephone system, no electricity, and where illiteracy ran at 
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65%19, “where whole swathes of the country are simply not in a position to run a bath, 
never mind an election” (Harris, 2010: 55), the IEC had their hands full attempting to 
orchestrate this difficult process. Despite some glitches in the system, the IEC pulled off 
the monumental task with relatively little upheaval. Crucial to this process was the 
harmonising ability of the ANC’s presidential candidate, Nelson Mandela. 
 
1.3 Qunu cattle herder to freedom fighter 
Rolihlahla Mandela was born in July 1918 in a small village in Mvezo, in what is now the 
Eastern Cape. His chieftain father bestowed upon him the name that translates roughly 
as “troublemaker”, but Mandela (1995: 3) denies any prophesising on his father’s part. 
After a few formative years as a cattle herder, instilling in the future president a sense of 
belonging, humility, and respect for ancient Xhosa traditions, Mandela was removed 
from the village to the Great Place, Mqhekezweni, after his father died. It was here that he 
was schooled in British culture, tradition, and language and where he gained the English 
name “Nelson”. At age 16, he underwent the traditional initiation process, the 
circumcision transforming him from a boy to a man, and conferring a third name, 
“Dalibunga”. At the Great Place, he was introduced to what he calls the “purest form” 
(Mandela, 1995: 22) of democracy, where people openly criticised Chief Jongintaba 
Dalinyebo in an informal setting. Mandela took his Xhosa traditionalism to 
Johannesburg, where he spent years as an advocate, and was introduced first to the 
Communist Party and later the African National Congress. He (1995: 95) notes that there 
was no defining moment in which he became politicised. 
																																																								
19	Prinsloo and Robins acknowledge that literacy statistics in the early 1990s are not particularly reputable, 
but suggest that 15 million people out of the total population of 23 million had less than 5 years schooling. 
(1996: 35-36).	
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I had no epiphany, no singular revelation, no moment of truth, but a steady 
accumulation of a thousand slights, a thousand indignities, a thousand 
unremembered moments, produced in me an anger, a rebelliousness, a desire to 
fight the system that imprisoned my people. 
When the National Party won the 1948 election, Mandela’s life was turned upside down. 
“I was more certain in those days of what I was against than what I was for”, he 
proclaims (1995: 119). As the National Party became more zealous in its implementation 
of racial purity and separation, the young advocate threw himself into the resistance 
movement, sacrificing his marriage to Evelyn for his strength of belief.  
 
He was active in the ANC’s long-running Defiance Campaign and strongly disagreed 
with the party’s multiracial policy and non-violent protest methods. Mandela later 
regretted his pugnaciousness, noting that he “was a young man who attempted to make 
up his ignorance with militancy” (1994: 159). As Mandela matured, his views softened 
but the Africanist ideal of an “African government for Africans run by Africans” still 
held sway among many – in 1957, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) was born under 
the leadership of Robert Sobukwe. The PAC rejected multiculturalism and communism 
outright, which made the movement an unlikely ally with both the NP and the Western 
press, which “hailed its birth as a dagger to the heart of the African left” (Mandela, 1994: 
229). The PAC was a driving force in mobilising sections of the black population, 
particularly around resistance to pass laws and the Bantu Education Act. The PAC 
organised a peaceful demonstration in the Sharpeville Township in Johannesburg in 
1960, which ended in one of South Africa’s bloodiest massacres. Sharpeville was a 
turning point in the country’s history, and thrust the apartheid state into the minds of 
global audiences. There are not many more harrowing images than that of Mbuyisa 
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Makhubo, carrying the fatally wounded Hector Pieterson, followed by Hector’s 
distraught sister Antoinette Sithole.  
 
By 1960, South Africa was under a state of emergency, with the military in control of 
structures of governance. Here, Mandela, Sisulu, and 100 other ANC members were 
arrested under various pretences – high treason and conspiracy to overthrow the 
government being paramount. In an atmosphere of increasing paranoia, under a racist 
government petrified of loss of control, Mandela was eventually sentenced to life 
imprisonment on Robben Island at the end of the Rivonia Trials in 1963. He was to 
remain imprisoned until 1990, when he emerged a changed man walking into a radically 
different South Africa. 
 
 1.4 The first all race election 
The 1994 election was South Africa’s first all-race election, and a total 19 parties 
competed, with the IFP joining the process one week before the voting day. The main 
parties in the 1994 election were the National Party (NP), the African National Congress 
(ANC), the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), and the Democratic Party (DP). 
 
The NP had been in control of the country since 1948 and was of conservative Afrikaner 
politics. By the early 1990s the ruling party was riddled with paranoia, secret societies, 
and corruption (Mkhondo, 1993: 10). PW Botha led the NP from 1978 to 1989 until a 
debilitating stroke meant younger, cautious centrist FW De Klerk took over and led the 
party until his resignation in 1996. Mkhondo (1993: 5) suggests that it was ultimately De 
Klerk’s pragmatism that ended apartheid as he saw the continuation of the system as a 
cul-de-sac for the nation. The NP’s campaign leading up to the 1994 election consisted 
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of successes (freedom and the end of apartheid assured, a free and fair secret ballot), 
warnings (of the ANC as a dangerous party, of the ANC’s policy costs, and of black 
squatters in coloured houses), and promises (reconciliation through job creation, home 
building, universal healthcare, and free enterprise) (Giliomee, 1994: 60). 
 
Oliver Tambo led the ANC until 1991, when the recently released Nelson Mandela took 
over. The ANC’s 1994 campaign almost exclusively used Mandela’s smiling face as 
iconography on posters (Bertelsen, 1996: 231),20 and the party divided their campaign 
strategy between “hearing” at people’s forums and “telling” at mass rallies (Lodge, 1994: 
24). The ANC’s core message of the 1994 campaign centred on hopes and aspirations of 
the party to provide a “better life for all”, manifested through job creation, land 
redistribution, low cost housing, and better living standards. Lodge (1994: 25) says that 
the ANC’s campaign manifesto was not particularly radical, but easily plausible. 
  
The IFP, led by its originator Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi since its inception as a 
nationalist movement,21 is the ethnic and political home of the Zulu nation. Mkhondo 
calls the charismatic leader a “juxtaposition of pin-striped suits and animal skins, political 
posing and bloody praise singing” (1993: 63). Initially, the IFP refused the negotiation 
process and bilateral agreements in 1992, concerned that Zulu national interests would 
not be protected in the negotiations (Hamilton & Marè, 1994: 79). Eventually, with a 
week left before the election, the IFP formally joined the process.  
																																																								
20	While the majority of South Africa and the world treated Mandela as a saviour, as Moses, and as a myth, 
(Mkhondo, 1993; Bertelsen, 1996: 230; Evans, 2014: 233), the white neo-Nazis and far right in South 
Africa and the UK chanted “Hang Mandela” (Reed, 1990; Borger, 2013) and said that De Klerk had 
betrayed them.	
21	“Inkatha” means “crown” in isiZulu. Buthelezi began the Inkatha National Cultural Liberation 
Movement in 1975, but based the structure of the movement on the earlier Inkatha cultural organisation, 
started in 1920 by Zulu King Solomon kaDinuzulu. The movement laid claim to the Zulu region with 
traditional power structures in loyalty to tribal chiefs, Buthelezi, King Goodwill Zwelethini kaBhekuzulu, 
and was ethnically exclusive, limited to Zulu people (Hamilton & Marè, 1994: 74). 
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The DP was formed in 1959 as the Progressive Party, when their parent United Party 
refused to repudiate racial discrimination, and was a major player in the negotiation 
process. The party’s 1994 campaign focused on promoting liberal democratic values 
among a new electorate, adopting the moniker “true liberal conscience” (Welsh, 1994: 
108). The DP’s poor showing in the first poll (at only 1.73% of the national vote) was 
probably due to its failure to secure the black and coloured vote nationally. The party 
found it hard to shake off the “urban, English, white, middle class” (ibid.: 114) image of 
liberalism. 
 
The White Right, so named because of the racial and ideological composition of the 
parties, consisted of three political parties22: the Conservative Party (CP), as the official 
opposition to the National Party from 1982 to 1994, led by Andries Treurnicht; the 
Afrikaner Volksfront (AVF), founded amidst the violence and tension after Chris Hani’s 
assassination in 1993 and consisted of 21 right-wing groups; and the Freedom Front, a 
breakaway party from the AVF, headed by General Constand Viljoen. While the political 
frames of the parties were diverse, the drive for racial separation and a Volkstad23 for 
Afrikaners, based on racial purity, linked them all.  
 
Ultimately, only two parties competed with any significance for the position of 
government in the 1994 election: the ruling NP and the ANC, the leading liberation 
party. Hamilton and Marè suggest the fact that 90% of the IFP’s national assembly 
representation in 1994 came from KwaZulu indicates “that despite its national thrust, 
supposedly separate from the claims made by the king and Buthelezi, to represent the 
																																																								
22	The separatist neo-Nazi Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), was headed by former Special Guard 
Warrant Officer Eugene Terre'blanche, and is often linked with the White Right, even though it did not 
participate in the negotiation process.	
23	The Volkstad, or People’s State, describes proposals to establish an Afrikaner homeland or land based 
on federal principals for self-determination. For a detailed explanation of what the Volkstad means to far-
right Afrikaners, Du Toit (1991) and Schönteich & Boschoff (2003) are recommended.	
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ethnic component of Zulu nationalism, the party has little hope of representing in the 
national assembly on any basis than its regional strength” (1994: 86). Harris (2010) 
reveals that there was a major computer error or hacking conspiracy during the 1994 
counting process, so the true numbers of voters who chose the IFP in KwaZulu and 
nationally may never be known. Table 3.1 reveals the percentage of votes won by each 
major party in the first poll, out of a total of 19.5 million votes cast. 
 ANC NP IFP FF DP TOTAL 
Percentage 62.65 20.39 10.54 2.17 1.73 19.5 mil 




For the 1994 election year, 24 broadcasts across eight channels were available. Four 
channels originated from the United States (CNN, CBS, ABC, AP), three in the United 
Kingdom (ITN, Sky News, BBC), and the only South African news channel at the time 
(SABC). The majority of broadcasts, 13, came from the US, 8 broadcasts from the UK, 
and three from South Africa (see Graph 3.1 – 3.2). 
 
																																																								
24	Statistics gathered from Reynolds (1994: 182).  
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Graph 3.1    Graph 3.2 
Each broadcast was analysed with the triadic multimodal methodology to observe the 
themes and narratives, and note the frequency of political party and event coverage 
across the broadcasts, in order to investigate how, if at all, the three regions differ in the 
coverage. 
 
 2.1 Frequency analysis 
  2.1.1 Events 
The frequency of event coverage was identified across the sample broadcasts, with every 
topical event shown or spoken about in the broadcasts noted (see Graph 3.3 for the total 
spread of events, and Graph 3.4 – 3.6 for the region spread). Many broadcasts covered 
more than one topic at a time. A total of 14 events were observed: the bombings in 
Johannesburg, the voting days, the flag hoisting ceremonies, references to the Struggle 
(including visits to Robben Island, video footage of protest action during apartheid, and 
the Rivonia Trial), the IFP joining the election process, voter education, the run-up to 
the voting day, visits to the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, the political party rallies, 
deaths at IFP and ANC rallies or marches, allegations of election sabotage, and land 
	 100 
conflict (particularly poor rural black people forced off ancestral land or the tension 
between white farmers and black farm workers).  
 
Graph 3.3  
  




The most frequently covered event in the US channels was the bombings, but this 
rivalled the discussion of the IFP joining the campaign at such a late stage, as well as 
references to the Struggle. Conversely, in the UK sample, broadcasters seemed more 
interested in the bombings (at 63% of the coverage) than the voting day itself (queues, 
vox pops, and the election process, at 23%), while the voting day vied for attention with 
an irate Nelson Mandela reprimanding the government for the shoddy organisation and 
alleged sabotage (Mandela alleges election sabotage, ITN). Interestingly, the SABC was 
obvious in their omission of any reference to violent events, including the bombings, and 
instead dedicated most of their three broadcasts to the lowering of the old flag, and the 
manufacture and hoisting of the new. Of course, the sample provided by the SABC 
included only the voting day broadcasts, and so the channel’s limited focus could be due 
to a limited sample rather than ideology.25 
  2.1.2 Political parties 
Graph 3.7 depicts the number of broadcasts where political parties were mentioned in 
total, in the UK channels, the US channels, and the South African channel. 
																																																								
25 In subsequent election years, however, South African broadcasters were noticeable in their ignorance of 
the framing or issues that other global broadcasters highlighted. 
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The ANC received the lion’s share of coverage in all channels. The party also dominated 
the SABC broadcasts, which was a surprise given that the SABC was still perceived to be 
an apartheid mouthpiece at the time (Evans, 2014: 237).26 
 
Graph 3.7  
The AWB’s coverage on the UK channels was particularly interesting, given that the 
movement was not a legitimate political party and did not run in the elections. The 
broadcasters referred to the AWB as a “party”, however, and its neo-Nazi iconography 
seemed to appeal to these broadcasters. Given that half of the UK broadcasts depicted 
the movement, yet the AWB was neither a political party nor in the running for the 
election, overinflates the sense of it’s following and power. Despite having 5—7% of the 
white South African support under apartheid (Battersby, 1988), the movement lost 
significant support by 1994.27 
																																																								
26 There were significant staffing changes to the national broadcaster from 1993 onwards and governed by 
an ANC-NP alliance – see Evans (2014: 165) and Louw and Chitty (2000: 291).	
27 Part of the reason for the AWB’s plummeting membership include the Bophuthatswana coup in March 
1994, which proved to be a PR disaster for the movement, as well as De Klerk’s announcement that 
apartheid would end. The Volkstad idea was no longer viable, and AWB membership shed rapidly. (See 
Arthur Kemp’s 2012 definitive eyewitness account of the AWB.) 
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2.1.3 Who speaks in the coverage 
Cross (2010: 417) analysed the political sources that speak in Canadian political news 
during elections, and found that the type of source reliance has shifted from political 
leader voxes to punditry from analysts, echoing Louw’s earlier discussion on 
“punditocracy” (2005: 80). She argues that pundits give the impression of objectivity on 
the behalf of the broadcaster, while still employing framing and news values, and Louw 
suggests that an increase in “smooth talkers” offer “cultural fast-food – pre-digested and 
pre-thought” (2005: 81). Cross argues that this shift indicates an increased media-centric 
style of political communication. She describes Knowns as people who are politicians, 
officials, or the elite, (2010: 417) and argues that Knowns make up four fifths of 
Canadian television news sources during elections. Unknowns, conversely, are the 
general public, protesters, victims, participants, or voters. Ultimately, the trend of 
speakers throughout the five election years shows a swing towards using political pundits 
as Known speakers but in this sample, Unknowns spoke slightly more than the Knowns 






As seen in Graph 3.9, out of the 42 Knowns that spoke during the sample, political 
leaders were the most prominent: Mandela spoke in 21% of the broadcasts, President De 
Klerk in 17%, and Buthelezi 14%. Global broadcasters presented most of the speakers in 
this sample, as the SABC showed only four Unknown speakers and one Known speaker 
in all three broadcasts. Knowns were almost always political leaders or party 
spokespeople. 
 
As noted in Graph 3.1, only 13% of the 1994 sample broadcasts came from the SABC, 
the only broadcaster in the country at the time. This lack of South African perspective 
meant that the themes of coverage were primarily focused on the global perspective 
instead. The four main themes of representation observed in the 1994 coverage played 
out mostly on global channels. Journalists depicted the election through poetic and 
dramatized language and imagery, represented the ethnic and political violence that 
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bookended the election, played prophet as to the type of changes the transition to 
democracy might bring to the country, and binarised rural South Africans through 
simplistic racial narratives. 
 
 2.2 The election 
Broadcasters presented the election as the start of South Africa’s new democracy, 
heralding the dawn of a new era of dignity and the end to 300 years of white rule. The 
overriding sense was that democracy was achieved if free and fair elections could be held 
on the set date, an inference that is typical of literature on elections (Windrich, 1994: 18; 
Sisk, 1994: 144; Hawk, 2002: 168; Ndlela, 2005: 87). Windrich argues elections are often 
perceived in Western countries as “synonymous with democracy” (1994: 19).28 
Throughout the 1994 coverage, global journalists depicted poignant voting scenes and 
meandering queues filled with newly enfranchised black people, who turned out to vote 
despite problems in hosting the election and violence that bookended the election. Some 
broadcasters framed the 1994 election as a kind of cure-all for South Africa’s ills 
including ethnic violence and structural poverty, and assumed it would bring immediate 
dignity and development. Finally, the lack of South African perspectives is a common 
finding throughout this thesis, and begins with the ignorance of important topics and 
frames in 1994 so prevalent on international channels. 
  2.2.1 A poignant voting day 
South Africa’s budding democracy was illustrated through a combination of images. Pre-
election, political parties campaigned and negotiated, while a noisy black electorate 
attended chaotic mass rallies, and journalists visited the wary white minority on the eve 
																																																								
28 This type of framing is problematic: democracy does not simply occur if elections are held. The reality is 
far more complex than that, but for ease of categorisation, this study uses a broad albeit reductive sense of 
democracy as synonymous with elections for explanation, but does not ascribe to this idea. 
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of the country’s first all-race election. On the voting day, peaceful, patient queues of 
newly enfranchised black voters stretched far into the distance (see Images 3.1 and 3.2), a 
dramatic visualisation of South Africa’s commitment to universal suffrage. All global 
broadcasts depicted the voting day through these poignant scenes. 
 
Image 3.1: Vote, the beloved country, AP, 1994. “Queues stretch into the distance” 
	
Image 3.2: Vote, the beloved country, AP, 1994. “Queues stretch into the distance” 
 
Journalists describe these scenes at voting stations poetically: “At this moment in South 
Africa’s newly-born democracy, its most revered architect made sure it’s recorded for 
posterity, a fulfilment of his lifetime struggle” (South Africa elections, ITN) says journalist 
Michael Nicholson, as the tall statesman Mandela lowers his first vote into the ballot box. 
As a young black man pushes a thinner, older version of himself in a wheelbarrow, 
journalist Mark Austin admits, “for thousands here in Soweto, this is their biggest day… 
but it was the day the blacks of this country took to any means possible to cast their 
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votes that will change South Africa forever” (South Africa – election voting, ITN). On the 
US channels the view was not so different: ABC’s anchor on South Africa’s first free elections 
primes the broadcast with “for black South Africans, it is the moment to reclaim their 
forefather’s dignity”, while Jim Laurie later describes the scenes: “They had waited a 
lifetime for this day, a father carried to and from the voting station on his son’s back. A 
mother arrived by wheelbarrow. An emotional day for all.” For global broadcasters, the 
voting day was a culmination of years of suffering and heralded the dawn of a new era.  
 
Sisk claims that US print media framed the 1994 election as a great literary tale, a 
cathartic exercise for the US public where David finally bested Goliath and expunged a 
racist evil (1994: 157). The poetic, emotive reporting about the snaking queues at dawn 
and physical exertion South Africans endured to simply cast their ballot played into this 
tale. However, not all journalists romanticised the election as the voting day progressed. 
2.2.2 The host 
Despite the similarities in the Anglo-American depiction of the poignant voting day, 
there were also differences in how the US and UK channels viewed South Africa as host. 
Global channels ultimately portrayed the election as poorly organised, chaotic, and 
unconventional, but with slight differences across the two regions. ITN reported on the 
technicalities of the election, showing understaffed polling stations without ballots, 
chaotic and violent campaign rallies, and spoke of sabotage and election officials who 
“simply couldn’t cope” (Austin, Mandela alleges election sabotage, ITN). Polling stations 
“with no ballot papers and no officials, [where] three thousand [voters] are fighting for 
transport to voting centres that are working” (ibid.). Despite these problems at voting 
stations, ITN reported that voters turned out “despite” the bomb blasts and terror 
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threats in the days before the election. For ITN, South Africa seemed an enthusiastic but 
disorganised host of this first election.  
 
On the US channel CNN, meanwhile, journalists proclaimed that South Africans treated 
this first election as “something like a shiny new toy” (Hanna, Bernard Shaw and Mike 
Hanna discuss election, CNN), that voter education was “providing some of the day’s 
entertainment” (Sadler, The Big Story, CNN), or that rural populations simply “played 
politics”29 as they “played football” (Mattingly, Earth Matters, CNN). While ITN focused 
on the technical problems of holding a Westernised election, CNN suggested South 
Africa simply “played” with the election, undermining the real struggles South Africans 
took to gain suffrage for all. 
  2.2.3 Election violence 
A second difference between the US and the UK regional channels was the 
representation of violence surrounding the election. These channels focused on the 
violent context to the election, especially the bombings on the Sunday and Tuesday 
before voting, but the narrative differed slightly between regions. US journalists implied 
that the bombing campaign on the eve of the election and the factional violence directly 
threatened the election. Joe Oliver reports, “if the last few weeks are any indication, 
[democracy] will come with more violence, in the homelands, in the cities, and in the 
townships” (Earth Matters, CNN). Black people run across a field in low angle, police fire 
at protesters, and the aftermath of the bomb blasts fill the screen (see Images 3.3 – 3.6). 
Mark Watts admits that “mass action has often been used to settle disputes in South 
Africa” (Update, CNN), while protesters clash with police on screen.  
																																																								
29	The phrase “playing politics” is usually used to refer to a situation that is used for political gain rather 
than principle, but in this instance the phrase combines the two: “That’s because they’re more pre-
occupied with the modern way of life and that includes playing football or playing politics”, indicating the 
subjects play with or at politics, as a game, rather than taking it seriously.	
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Image 3.3: CBS Evening news, CBS, 1994. “Johannesburg car bomb aftermath” 
 
Image 3.4: Bloody Sunday, CNN, 1994. “Casualties of the car bomb” 
 
Image 3.5: Earth Matters, CNN, 1994. “Police clash with protesters in sepia” 
 
Image 3.6: Electing the Future spot, CNN, 1994. “Police clash with protesters” 
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In a short spot for CNN’s Electing the future, an ominous voice-over questions, “South 
Africa’s violent road to democracy. As the nation gets ready for a history-making 
election, which will prevail? The bullet or the ballot box?” while white police officers fire 
deafeningly at unseen targets; protesters spear Mandela’s face; and white police assault 
black protesters with sticks and leather straps. The segment ends as Mandela and De 
Klerk shake hands and walk across a stage to a podium. The seemingly unending 
violence of two opposing sides (the spears of the IFP and the ANC’s Mandela, and white 
police and black protesters) juxtaposes the hope of peace through negotiation. This is an 
“all or nothing” approach to democracy, where factional and ethnic violence directly 
threaten the election. 
 
The UK broadcasts also mention the bombing campaign and faction violence, but treat it 
differently. Journalists focused more on the bombing campaign than ethnic violence: 
“Nine people were killed yesterday… With tension mounting in the last few hours before 
the elections, four members of the ANC were shot” (Werge, South Africa report, BBC). 
“This attack marks the deliberate change of tactics by the terrorists, with this strike at an 
international target… But millions of blacks were up at sunrise, queuing at the polls, 
undeterred by the spate of bombings, and relishing the opportunity to vote for change” 
(Austin, South Africa Elections bombing, ITN). Both ITN and the BBC foreground the 
bombing but mention the election will happen “regardless” of the violence. The violence 
appears to exist in the same space and time as the election, but does not directly threaten 
it. Rather, the actual threat to democracy for the UK channels is South Africa’s technical 
incapability as host; a concept ties into Evans and Glenn’s (2010: 14, 15) idea that 
Afropessimism often involves the belief that Africans simply cannot handle democracy. 
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  2.2.4 The miracle panacea 
When the car bomb exploded in downtown Johannesburg on the Sunday before voting, 
journalists scrambled to report how this violence disrupted what was going to be a 
“peaceful end” to 300 years of white rule (Alan Pizzey, Evening News, CBS). The violence 
seemed unending, not just because of the terror attacks in the bomb blasts, but also 
because of the IFP’s bloodthirsty warrior signification. On CBS’ Evening News, ANC 
spokesperson Carl Niehaus states that the “best way to deal with this kind of political 
thuggery is to make sure democracy wins against intimidation and violence”, and on the 
words “intimidation and violence”, the scene cuts to a high angle of black hands raised, 
each holding weapons including spears, knobkerries, axes, and guns. The editing here 
implies that the IFP are behind this violence, an assumption that was incorrect – the 
Johannesburg car bombs were carried out by AWB members, although the AWB leader 
Eugene Terre’blanche distanced himself from the events. Later in the broadcast, a khaki-
clad soldier holds a gun as a large group of black men march and dance behind him, and 
the warrior group move quickly towards the camera, hands raised clutching spears, sticks, 
and shields. Bill Whitacker provokes, “When you see this, it’s hard to believe that this 
week South Africa is to undergo a revolution. Not through the power of weapons, but 
through the power of the vote” (Evening News, CBS). Finally, on the voting day, as 
Nelson Mandela drops his ballot into the box, Michael Nicholson (ibid.) says that his act 
of voting is in “fulfilment of his lifetime struggle”. 
 
The election, then, may act as a calming palliative to this discordant society, the 
revolution of democracy quelling intimidation and fear of ethnic violence. Indeed, as the 
voting occurred and citizens turned out in their millions, civic pride and the enthusiasm 
for the election brought to an abrupt end much of the violence in KwaZulu and the 
Transvaal. On the first voting day, ITN’s Michael Nicholson (South Africa Elections) 
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reports, “most welcome considering the bombings elsewhere is the discipline, especially 
among the people in the black townships”. He walks towards the camera, past a queue of 
black voters in an open field, and explains, 
A week ago this simply would not have been possible. This piece of open ground 
was then no-man’s land and to be seen here was to invite sniper fire from both 
sides. And yet this morning, here they are standing peacefully, queuing, waiting to 
vote. So our report this morning is that from KwaZulu, so far, so good. 
The election appears to have calmed deep-seated IFP/ANC tensions, and these citizens 
now stand on a no-man’s land because it. The reality was more complex, with IEC 
observers risking their lives in areas of KwaZulu to educate residents under the 
suspicious scrutiny of IFP members, and the ANC/IFP/NP negotiation process brought 
to a halt much of the intimidation and violence. Nicholson’s report mentions none of 
this, but rather emphasises the event-based nature of the election, rather than the 
process. Hawk explains that when journalists focus on elections “as events rather than 
democracy as a process, the news obstructs our view of African life and the focus for 
change in it” (2002: 169), and Nicholson’s report flattens the tremendous effort taken by 
various sides to bring about a relatively calm, free, and fair election as a “surprise” or a 
miracle. 
 
CNN’s Sharon Collins echoes this sentiment when she opens Earth Matters, standing 
amidst a tin-shack township: “Slums inside of a city’s shining spires. Few places are as 
infamous as South Africa for dramatic differences between the haves and have-nots. In 
two weeks much of that will start to change”. Mike Hanna (The Big Story, CNN) 
interviews Johnson Anthony, a gravedigger in the Eastern Cape: “[He] dug many of the 
graves for the victims of political conflict. And he hopes that the man he votes for next 
week will ensure that he’ll not dig any more”. These journalists thus imply that the 
	 113 
election could solve deep-seated violence, structural poverty and inequality, quickly and 
effortlessly. This simplistic perspective of South African society plays into the myth of 
1994 as a “miracle” (Guelke, 1996) election. Although the election did indeed appear to 
“solve” ethnic violence, the structural divisions of South African society were not wiped 
away simply because the electorate were able to vote, but because of the ANC’s winning 
of hearts and minds in KwaZulu (Southall, 1999: 1) and dedicated ANC policy to 
alleviate the impoverished circumstances in the townships (Gevisser, 2007: 699). 
 
When describing the voting, some journalists also framed this election event as an 
assumed cure-all for South Africa’s divided, violent, unequal society, reflecting Ndlela’s 
(2005: 88) findings that the international papers often presented the regime change in 
Zimbabwe in 2000 as a panacea for all political and economic woes. Mutua (2002: 12) 
also describes the Othering process that creates clones of Westernised democracies in 
Africa: so-called “savage” cultures are often seen as outside the realm of political 
democracy and need “saving” by a Western benefactor. Thus, Mutua suggests, 
democracy is often seen as a panacea to cure Africa’s ills.30 Mutua’s “savage-victim-
savour” (2014: 12) metaphor plays out in the international footage of the IFP’s seemingly 
inherent savagery and the apparent cure-all that democracy will bring to the violence and 
inequality. The problem is not that journalist suggest the election will bring calm, but that 
the event-based reporting style ignores the complicated process behind this seemingly 
sudden calmness, and that decades of structural inequality and racist policy will 
immediately change once the election takes place.31 
																																																								
30 Lamb (1983: 58) and Wiarda (2014: 54) rightly argue though that there are other, more pressing needs 
that “Africa” faces other than good governance and fair and free elections, but Wiarda (ibid.) suggests that 
democracy is a step in the right direction. 
31 Of course, 20 years post-democracy, South Africa still suffers from deep-seated and race-based 
inequality because of the legacy of apartheid, while much of this inequality actually worsened in the decade 
after 1994. See Marais, 2011: 210 and StatsSA, 2002, 2008, and the background to 2004 in Chapter 5. 
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  2.2.5 South African perspective 
Silke and Schrirer (1994: 140) argue that American media prioritised the razzmatazz of 
the 1994 election at the expense of policy discussions and political analyses, which 
resulted in shallow narratives that removed any sense of context. Louw and Chitty 
meanwhile note that the “cacophony of … discordant voices became somewhat difficult 
to hear above the sound of gunfire” (2000: 290). My own study confirms both 
statements as we saw more evidence of violence threatening the election than political 
issues. The SABC, however, did not produce the same drama present in the Anglo-
American news broadcasts; instead, journalists stood at polling booths in the early 
morning, reported on flag manufacturing and the historical aspect of the flag, and 
provided brief mentions of the voter turnout. These stories did not adequately 
contextualise the election insofar as the pre-election violence and transition to democracy 
was mostly skimmed over. Additionally, the studio piece was technically clumsy, as live 
crossings failed, audio tracks were mixed up, and the anchors Penny Smythe and Tim 
Modise fluffed lines routinely, which is in start contrast to the slick narrative journalism 
seen on international coverage. 
 
SABC reporters stood shivering in the cold morning and described the Soweto queue in 
direct address to the camera as “very long, but the cold weather doesn’t deter them”. 
Live crossings to polling stations were often technically clumsy and formulaic. Reporters 
at the flag lowering ceremonies described it as “poignant”, “sombre”, “a time to say 
goodbye”, while the hoisting was a “party”, filled with “resounding optimism”, and the 
“dawn of a new day” (Flag lowering ceremonies, SABC). The SABC journalists appeared 
apprehensive to show any kind of opinion or bias, which fits with the research (Silke & 
Schrirer, 1994: 141; Anglin, 1995: 540; Jacobs, 1999: 154; Berger, 2002: 5; Sparks, 2009: 
208). At the time of broadcasting, the SABC was under a harsh international spotlight 
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from UNMOSA and IMC, which may have contributed to the apparent neutrality of the 
SABC broadcasts in this sample. Temin and Smith (2002) and Waldahl (2005a), analysing 
the Ghanaian and Zimbabwean election coverage respectively, suggest state media is 
often topical, superficial, and lacks critical analysis. Most of the news coverage of African 
elections by African media is superficial and hampered by funding, legislation, access to 
information, as well as professionalization of journalism (Waldahl, 2005a, 2005b; 
Onyebadi & Oyediji, 2011: 226; Ndlela, 2005: 77; Kpaduwa, 2013: 23; Akoh & Ahjabenu, 
2013: 63) and so perhaps the SABC suffered the same fate. The sample was, however, 
limited to three broadcasts during the voting day, and so perhaps additional footage if 
available may present different frames. 
 
In summary of the depiction of the first election, then, Anglo-American broadcasts to 
some extent neglected critical analysis and investigation of the causes, symptoms, and 
ramifications of problems during the election period. Instead, reflecting Ndlela (2005) 
and Waldahl (2005a), news coverage was often simplistic and dramatized, fixated on the 
violent imagery during the election. There were differences between regional depictions 
of the election, however. The US coverage framed the election as a knife-edge, all-or-
nothing, where “hope runs neck and neck with danger” (Rather, FF and IFP have common 
ideals, CBS). Factional and tribal violence threated to derail the election at any moment. 
The UK, conversely, was far more critical of the technicalities of hosting a free election, 
but still did not adequately explore causes or consequences. For the UK channels, South 
Africa’s ineptitude was a greater threat to democracy than violence. Finally, the South 
African perspective was far narrower and did not reflect the violence or the negotiation 
process – but this is likely due to the uneven sample available from the SABC. 
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 2.3 Violence 
A second prominent theme in the 1994 media coverage was the depiction of violence. 
Two thirds of all broadcasts depicted violence in the form of bloodshed, civil war, 
terrorism, bombing campaigns, tensions between police and protesters, and factional or 
ethnic fighting. Other significations of violence included threats of violent action 
(weapons drawn, intimidating marching, camera movements to suggest violence is 
imminent), the aftermath (debris, injuries, blood, traumatised people), and direct 
discourse (through commentary or vox pops). Violence in the 1994 coverage was split 
into two types of depictions: ethnic violence where the IFP were perpetrators and ANC 
the victims, and the military presented as in control of this violence. This theme was only 
seen on global news channels as the SABC ignored the context of violence so prominent 
in other channels. The only two instances of violence were latent and implied on Election 
94: a reporter wore a prominent flak jacket at the voting queue in Vosloorus (see Image 
3.7) without any discussion of the reasons, and a Ciskei reporter mentioning that the 
previous area of unrest now had a “calm, relaxed atmosphere”, referring to earlier 
factional bloodshed at Bisho.32 
 
Image 3.7: Election 94, SABC, 1994. “Reporter in prominent flak jacket in Vosloorus” 
																																																								
32	Vosloorus was one of the most prolific areas for township violence in the run-up to the 1994 election. 
In one year, over 1800 people were killed in Vosloorus and neighbouring Thokoza townships, and the 
ANC had declared the area a National Disaster Zone (Carlin, 1994). Bisho in the Transkei was the scene of 
a bloody massacre when the Ciskei Defence Force killed 29 people and injured 200 on 7 September 1992.	
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  2.3.1 Ethnic violence 
Through creative camera techniques and dramatic framing, global broadcasts, particularly 
from US channels, depicted the IFP as inherently savage and perpetrators of much of the 
pre-election violence, while binaries of democracy versus savagery played out in the 
representation of the IFP and the ANC. 
 
The IFP, synonymous with the Zulu nation, were almost entirely framed on global 
broadcasts33 as bloodthirsty, violent, exoticized, unthinking savages who have improbable 
designs on politics through their war-loving leader, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi. Global 
broadcasters frequently implied that IFP members, and Zulus in general, are rule-
breakers, belligerent, and thrive on drama and the theatre of war. Dramatic and creative 
visual footage about the IFP members presented the group as threatening and 
intimidating through low angle shots of dominating Zulu men, loud impi marches and 
chanting, and spears pointed to the sky accompanying loud Struggle songs and drowned 
out journalist dialogue (see Images 3.8 – 3.10).  
 
Image 3.8: Profile of a Zulu Nation, CNN, 1994. “Prominent spears in the crowd” 
																																																								
33 The SABC did not refer to the IFP in this sample at all. 
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Image 3.9: Profile of a Zulu Nation, CNN, 1994. “Armed IFP members” 
 
Image 3.10: Profile of a Zulu Nation, CNN, 1994. “Brett Sadler drowned out” 
 
In CNN’s Profile of a Zulu nation, the IFP are framed in deep low angles as the impi march, 
through the loud chants of Zulu men as they crush dusty roads beneath their feet, in 
fish-eye lenses to accentuate sharp spears and staring white eyes of the IFP members, 
and in the traditional dress of Zulu women (see Images 3.11 – 3.13). This broadcast in 
particular highlights the exoticism of the Zulu nation, while creative camera techniques 
such as low angles, fish eye lenses, and the “hands up” framing suggest an intimidating 
and aggressive group. As with Sisk’s (1994: 146) findings of the US press, the majority of 
global channels in my own sample used emotive reporting when presenting the IFP.  
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Image 3.11: Profile of a Zulu Nation, CNN, 1994. “Fisheye on a large IFP crowd” 
 
Image 3.12: Profile of a Zulu Nation, CNN, 1994. “Silhouette on Zulu dancers” 
 
Image 3.13: Profile of a Zulu Nation, CNN, 1994. “Fisheye on Zulu dancers” 
The exoticism and seemingly inherent savagery of the Zulu nation was not the only 
element highlighted on global broadcasts: the IFP’s belligerency was presented as a 
problem for democracy. Standing on a ridge, as a large group of black men34 march 
behind him, journalist Brett Sadler (Image 3.10) shouts above the chanting that a “ban 
																																																								
34	Consistent with Fair and Astroff’s (1991) earlier analysis, the Zulu nation comprised almost entirely of 
young black men. Women were depicted as mourners, cooks, dancers, and occasionally illiterate voters, but 
the men are intimidating “tribal regiments” and warriors.	
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on traditional Zulu weapons has no impact on the ground. Clubs, knives, spears, 
handguns, and automatic rifles, they’re all here in open disregard of the new emergency 
regulations” (Profile of a Zulu Nation, CNN). Sky News also frames the IFP negatively – 
Sarah Crowe notes all South Africans were called on to put down their weapons but in 
the accompanying images, IFP banners flutter in the wind above spears, knobkerries, and 
shields, suggesting they ignored this call entirely (Sky News Report on South Africa, Sky 
News). Linking the discussion of the IFP’s disregard for the law with images of weapons 
highlights that this movement are deemed the “perpetrators” of the ethnic violence. 
 
While the IFP were seen as perpetrators, the ANC were conversely democratic and loyal 
to the negotiation process. Their posters line the roads (at times ripped off by IFP 
members), members sombrely mourn the death of their community leaders, and the 
ANC headquarters in Johannesburg was the “target” for IFP-led violence. Mike Hanna 
in CNN’s The Big Story foregrounds the ANC’s involvement in the Struggle and shows 
ANC members visiting Robben Island prison. He speaks from a graveyard: “50 miles 
away, the township of KwaNebuhle, and the graves of the hundreds who died in the 
forefront of the Struggle… just some of the people of the Eastern Cape who died in the 
struggle for freedom” (The Big Story, CNN).  
 
In contrast to these ANC’s deaths as “freedom fighters”, later in the same broadcast 
Brett Sadler describes Buthelezi as the leader of a war-hungry impi, without the freedom 
fighter connotation. He calls IFP support a “throng” of “Zulu power on the march”, 
“tribal regiments”, “tribal loyalists”, and that “illegal weapons are beyond the control of 
the government” in KwaZulu. Buthelezi waves to IFP supporters from a vehicle, 
amongst piercingly loud ululations. The enormous crowd of Zulu men storm through 
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the roads in “hands up”35 mode, the group extending far into the distance (Images 3.14 – 
3.15). In this one broadcast, the IFP and ANC are starkly different from one another: the 
ANC are seen as victims of ethnic violence, Struggle heroes, and the government-in-
waiting, representing the “democracy” side of a binary. The IFP, however, are presented 
as tribal, ethnic, violent perpetrators, uncontrollable, and intimidating, and represented 
“savagery”. 
 
Image 3.14: Profile of a Zulu Nation, CNN, 1994. “Hands up” 
 
Image 3.15: Profile of a Zulu Nation, CNN, 1994. “Hands up” 
In opposition to Fair and Astroff’s (1991) discussion of the US media coverage of 
apartheid-era violence, it seems these US news broadcasts take care to differentiate 
between the IFP and the ANC. Fair and Astroff note that the US news media tended to 
																																																								
35 “Hands up” is a visual term of my own description. Broadcasters often framed IFP members in a crowd 
formation, with a focus on their hands in the air holding weapons or forming a fist, silhouetted against the 
sky. The crowd’s faces are not the focus; instead it is their raised hands, prominent spears, or the expansive 
crowd that are highlighted. The effect is intimidating. Sometimes shot in low angle, the framing 
disempowers the viewer and projects the aggressive participant looming over the camera, with only 
weapons and sky visible in the frame. 
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“reduce the violence to race, and that race is black” (1991: 59). Rather than 
homogeneously describing “black-on-black” (ibid.: 58) violence within this sample, the 
Anglo-American news channels differentiated between the IFP and ANC, even when 
speaking of factional violence under apartheid. The IFP were positioned as bloodthirsty 
warriors, while the ANC were heroic politicians. None of the reporters across any 
channels referred to “black-on-black”, “tribal”, or “factional” (ibid.: 63) violence 
outright. Violence in this sample was chiefly perpetrated by a specific group of black 
people – usually the IFP – although the motivation behind such violence was unclear. 
Perhaps the broadcasters were more invested in differentiating the ethnic and political 
groups involved in the violence because of the election: the political campaigning 
separated the once “undifferentiated mass” (ibid.: 66) into ideological factions. For all the 
desire to differentiate between the IFP and the ANC, global broadcasts, in particular 
Profile of a Zulu Nation and Sky News Report on South Africa, depicted a horse race between 
democracy – the moderate, government-in-waiting ANC – and the savagery threatening 
to derail the election – the aggressive and bloodthirsty IFP masses that perpetrated 
ethnic violence throughout the election run-up. 
  2.3.2 Military in control 
Pre-election, the ethnic and factional violence in South Africa drove the country to the 
brink of disaster. US reporters highlight this tension through discourse – “Zulu power on 
the march, massing in tribal regiments” (Sadler, The Big Story, CNN), “Hope runs neck 
and neck with danger” (Rather, FF and IFP have common ideals, CBS), “Which will prevail, 
the bullet or the ballot box” (Electing the Future, CNN) – and through visuals (Images 3.16 
– 3.21) The military was often portrayed in control of this violence, either through might 
or through mercy. Global journalists were there to frame the military as they rolled in to 
“trouble spots” (Aslett, South Africa voter education, ITN). Smiling white soldiers in army 
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tanks rumble down a dusty road “rolling into KwaZulu” as a “hammerhead sent in to 
crack down on violence in the embattled province of Natal” (Sadler, Profile of a Zulu 
nation, CNN). Low angles of tanks and wide shots of smiling soldiers emphasise the 
military might sent in to save the day (Images 13.16 – 3.18). The mercy of the military 
was also under the spotlight: children jump joyously around and wave to passing army 
trucks as CNN’s Peter Arnett narrates: “the South African Defence Forces rode in to the 
rescue to the evident relief of the residents” (The Big Story, CNN) (Image 3.18). In global 
1994 coverage, the military was a peacekeeping force to ensure that democracy was 
achieved at all costs. 
 
Image 3.16: Profile of a Zulu Nation, CNN, 1994. “Tanks roll in to KwaZulu” 
 
Image 3.17: Profile of a Zulu Nation, CNN, 1994. “Low angle tanks to keep the peace” 
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Image 3.18: Big Story, CNN, 1994. “SANDF rode in to the rescue to the evident relief” 
 
Apartheid-era protests were shown too, and the violence was excruciatingly noticeable. 
Visuals of the “all guns, full ammo” approach to peacekeeping in the 1980s and early 
1990s dominated coverage – police charge at groups of protesters in wide shots, fire live 
rounds into crowds, whip protesters with sjamboks and leather straps, and deploy stun 
grenades into scattering crowds. Despite the brutality of these images, at no point were 
the authorities reprimanded either in visuals or discourse (as the IFP were, seen above). 
At this stage the broadcasters seemed to present violence and “dodging bullets” as “a 
way of surviving” (Oliver, Earth Matters, CNN), while the police and authorities aid 
“survival” rather than add to the “violence”.  
 
With a title evocative of Alan Paton’s classic South African novel that highlighted 
poverty and pain under apartheid, AP’s long form Vote, the beloved country explores the 
bloody pre-election era. There are 47 out of the 128 sections of the broadcast that 
portray violence, intimidation, marches, death, blood, bodies, carnage, or fighting. Out of 
these 47 sections, the police or the army were shown 12 times, 10 as an “observer” to the 
violence (watching the marches, standing along the road, and in a long shot with hands 
on the trigger of automatic weapons – see Image 3.19 – 3.20) in du Plooy’s “subjective 
camera angle” (2009: 171), once chasing black protesters, and once arresting a black man. 
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In this broadcast, and overall in the sample (Images 3.19 – 3.20), the authorities were 
viewed as right, just, and neutral in their actions against distant black people, who were 
conversely framed as threatening, savage, and violent. Camera proxemics kept viewer and 
protester apart, often mediated through the police and military placed in mid-foreground 
between the camera and black people. 
 
Image 3.19: Vote, the beloved country, AP, 1994. “Subjective angle as an observer” 
 
Image 3.20: Earth Matters, CNN, 1994. “Subjective angle as an observer” 
 
Image 3.21: Bloody Sunday, CNN, 1994. “Subjective angle as an observer” 
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Fair and Astroff (1991: 60) suggest that this type of framing, particularly during the 
apartheid era, undermined the agency of unrest and positioned the white/authoritative 
government as “bringers of law and order” (ibid.: 58). This signifying practice equates 
white-on-black violence with “control”, and black-on-black violence with “chaos”. My 
own study confirms these conclusions too – the military were almost always white, 
almost always in “control”, while protesters and perpetrators of violence, such as the 
IFP, were almost always black and almost always framed as “chaotic”. 
 
 2.4 Transition and contradictions 
Change occurred in South Africa when apartheid gave way to democracy and white 
minority rule to black majority rule. Global broadcasters36 viewed this transition through 
a number of binaries and stereotypes, centred on how the election will bring about 
change to South Africans’ immediate lives. Firstly, the traditions and culture of rural 
black South Africans were stereotyped and reduced to shallow depictions of poverty and 
strangeness, where the change to democracy may finally offer these people a chance to 
be lifted out of their impoverished, backwards existence. Secondly, journalists pitted the 
black majority’s indistinct hopes against clear white minority fears, emphasising 
neoliberal concerns of economy and tourism. Thirdly, the idea of land ownership and 
belonging was split between black and white people, observing farming in South Africa 
and the recent Zimbabwean independence where “nothing had changed”. In attempting 
to explain the complexities of South African society, journalists seemingly could not 
adequately explore these depths because of shallow frames. The result was contradictory, 
confusing, entangled narratives that did not explain, but rather entertained.  
																																																								
36 SABC narratives were again narrow in the three packages available: no broadcast referred to the 
transition in any significance, instead focusing on the “change” from the old apartheid flag to the new 
multi-coloured flag in ceremonies. The first package looked at how the new flag was stitched together, and 
the second package was a montage of flag-hoisting ceremonies around the country, presented matter-of-
factly without much mediation from the journalist in either editing or discourse. 
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In order to explore why change is required, journalists travel to the homelands of the 
Eastern Transvaal and Venda to observe the ancient traditions and existence of rural 
black South Africans. In doing so, however, journalists fall into the traps of using 
already-known and racist stereotypes to depict rural South Africans and emphasise the 
benefits of democracy. 
  2.4.1 Rural people play at politics 
CNN’s long-form broadcast Earth Matters spent very little time discussing the election 
itself, focused instead on the protection of wildlife under the new government, the rural 
South African existence in homelands, and the migration of tribes to urban centres under 
the apartheid government. As David Mattingly ventures into a rural village, he frames 
rural black South Africans in the rolling hills of the Eastern Transvaal homelands:  
In the shade we pass adolescent males loitering and gambling for pocket change. 
All the while we can hear the beating of drums. Echoes of an older way of life. 
These traditional dances have lost a lot of their meaning in modern day, and 
that’s part of the problem here in the homelands. If you notice, there aren’t many 
young adult males participating. That’s because they’re more pre-occupied with 
the modern way of life and that includes playing football or playing politics… 
Some stay, spending their time fighting political battles with graffiti and mocking 
the white government. 
The framing of these young men is problematic. Firstly, the words “playing politics” 
undermines the black population’s struggle from independence, for equality, and for 
basic human rights. Secondly, Mattingly’s framing disconnects culture with 
modernisation, assuming that the two cannot coexist comfortably and that rural black 
South Africans must forgo culture, traditions, and rituals for development, politics, and 
democracy. Mattingly makes no attempt to explain which culture he observes – instead, 
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he assumes some kind of immemorial homogeneous black culture, and falls into the trap 
that Fair and Astroff (1991: 65) caution against. 
 
These rural people now suddenly face democracy and are seemingly “scared of voting” 
and “illiterate” (Whitaker, Evening news, CBS). Saths Cooper (1994: 118) notes in his 
analysis of the 1994 commentary that media tended to foreground the voter illiteracy of 
the rural population, and these “do-gooders” (ibid.) tend to mistake a lack of education 
for the inability to choose between parties and understand policy relevance. ITN framed 
rural people this way: “[Akanani, the voter educators, are] at first treated with some 
scepticism. Most of the people are illiterate and wary of outsiders. It’s also the first time 
any of them have come across a ballot paper. For the educators, it’s an uphill battle” 
(Aslett, South Africa voter education, ITN). Not only are rural people afraid of outsiders, 
they are also dependent on old rituals (ibid.):  
Back in the lush hills of Venda, making predictions comes a little easier. Here, 
one of South Africa’s most respected witch doctors rolls the bones to see what 
the future will bring. He predicts that the country will go through a period of 
conflict but eventually it will prosper. 
Aslett’s framing of the rural Venda people is not unlike Mattingly’s problematic 
description on CNN’s Earth Matters. These rural people seemingly have no place in 
sophisticated, Westernised democracy and this assumption is, as reiterated in Saths 
Cooper’s (1994: 118) criticism of global commentary at the time and Spurr’s binaries 
(1994: 19), poorly reductionist. Framing rural people in this fashion undermines their 
agency in selecting leaders in a democratic poll – equating illiteracy with incapability 
borders on racist framing (Prinsloo & Robins, 1996).  
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  2.4.2 Black hopes and white fears 
Global broadcasters explore the change that the new era of democracy could herald for 
South Africa by outlining the hopes and dreams of the black populace as well as the fears 
of the white minority. What exactly these black hopes constitute is indistinctly explored, 
however. Very few black people were interviewed about their desires for post-apartheid 
South Africa: Solly Mahule (Earth Matters, CNN) desires ancestral land returned to his 
family, Trophus Dlamini (South Africa’s youngest voters, CNN) wants better education, and 
Musa Zondi and Lokswayo (Earth Matters, CNN) pray for better living conditions, while 
other unnamed vox pops want “change”, that “I must be free” (South Africa – election 
voting, ITN), or simply “to vote” (Evening news, CBS). Because of the lack of citizen voices 
on these broadcasts, global journalists are forced to make assumptions on behalf of the 
black majority in explaining these desires: a change in government signals alleviation of 
poverty (Laurie, South Africa’s first free election, ABC; Mattingly, Earth Matters, CNN; 
Rather, Mugabe reassures white South Africans, CBS; Crowe, Sky News report on South Africa, 
Sky News), better education (Arnett, The Big Story, CNN; Vote the beloved country, AP; 
Maites, South Africa’s youngest voters, CNN), and modernisation (Mattingly, Earth matters, 
CNN), all of which are expected to occur overnight with the election. Despite visiting 
rural enclaves of South Africa, journalists rarely interview villagers themselves and 
instead use the binaries of the modern and traditional to show how change is so 
obviously required (as in Earth Matters, CNN). 
 
Although the “change” that black people assumedly desire is undefined in both quantity 
and time scale in this sample, that desire is presented as something to fear. James Maites 
suggests, “South Africa’s blacks are demanding reform. There’s clearly apprehension 
about just how much the blacks will want” (South Africa’s youngest voters, CNN). Dan 
Rather says something similar when speaking about Zimbabwe’s democracy: “What has 
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happened in Zimbabwe is this: neither black hopes nor white fears have been fully 
realised. For blacks, who were expecting, hoping, for dramatic change, poverty remains a 
common experience” (Mugabe reassures white South Africans, CBS). The fears of white 
people are more clearly outlined: a destruction of civil liberties (Rather, Mugabe reassures 
white South Africans, CBS), of minority rights and Afrikaner culture (Rather, FF and IFP 
have similar ideals, CBS), the faltering economy under black rule, and an escalation of on-
going violence. 
2.4.3 Change in Zimbabwe 
In order to reassure white South Africans that transition is possible, peaceful, and their 
civil liberties will remain intact, Dan Rather (Mugabe reassures white South Africans, CBS) 
interviews Zimbabwean citizens and leaders about their “peaceful” transition to 
democracy. Rather highlights how the country thrives and that capital still exist in white 
hands. The broadcast might seem ironic now, but at the time Zimbabwe was prosperous, 
although only for the white minority. 
 
Rather states that the key to Zimbabwe’s success is in preserving the natural and mineral 
wealth in the form of tourism and mining, rather than giving over to a bloody revolution. 
He interviews President Mugabe, who reiterates, “Have no cause to fear at all. Be at 
peace… The whites are here. They still are in control of the economy. They have most 
of the land in the country.” Rather then shows two white Zimbabweans, one a farmer 
and the other a boules player, who agree that peace exists in post-independence 
Zimbabwe and that change has not occurred. He says that “those who have stayed would 
tell their neighbours in South Africa how little has changed compared to how much 
more has stayed the same”. That which had “stayed the same” centres on the poor black 
majority: rural villagers are still without electricity and water, black women look after 
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white children, black gardeners still toil in the sun while their bosses relax in the shade, 
and, crucially, the capital and the land still exists in the hands of the white minority. 
 
Rather’s broadcast framed this status quo as “reassurance”, that white people were still in 
their natural place – in control of the land, the wealth, and the power – and perhaps 
therefore the rural black population were also in theirs, toiling in the midday sun. South 
Africa, therefore, despite the indeterminate desires of the newly enfranchised black 
population, could be assured of white capital protection post-election. Connie Chung, at 
the start of the broadcast, says exactly that over images of Mandela visiting the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange: “Nelson Mandela went to the stock exchange to assure 
investors that he is committed to economic stability”, thus priming the broadcast for an 
economic frame.  
 
As an explanation of why Zimbabwe’s society remains the same, Rather says that “real 
change occurs across generations”. Judy Aslett from ITN agrees: “Even after the country 
has a black government, real change for people here will take time” (South Africa voter 
education, ITN). Jim Laurie from ABC explains that even though the black population 
turned out in droves to vote for change, “three days is just not enough to change 
history” (South Africa’s first free elections, ABC). Laurie (ABC), Maites (CNN), Rather (CBS), 
and Aslett (ITN) argue that a transition – from poverty, racism, autocracy, and violence – 
might not occur overnight. Framing the elections through this “transition” theme is 
contradictory to the broadcaster’s images of democracy: in the first analysis section, I 
posited that broadcasters depicted democracy as a panacea for South Africa’s ills, 
reflecting Guelke (1996), Ndlela (2005), and Waldahl (2005a), and that these problems 
would somehow start to disappear immediately post-election. However, the same 
broadcasters suggest that “change occurs across decades” and one election cannot simply 
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wipe away hundreds of years of oppression. These narratives are contradictory and 
confusing, entangled in two conflicting arguments at the same time. Part of the reason 
for such a difficult narrative is the use of simplistic and binarised frames to depict a deep 
and contradictory topic. Without giving clear context to the problem of the transition to 
democracy in South Africa, it is no wonder journalists end up contradicting themselves 
and falling into unhelpful stereotypes. 
  2.4.4 Land ownership 
Black, rural people are framed throughout this sample as ethnic, traditional, culturally 
homogeneous, and often exoticized. White people, including Afrikaner farmers or boers, 
are not treated in the same way. Instead, white people are seen as landowners, managers, 
businesspeople, and belong on their farms as much as black people have rights to their 
ancestral land. The white fear of loss of the land and black desires for land redistribution 
was seen in Rather’s broadcast above (Mugabe reassures white South Africans, CBS), as well as 
in CNN’s Earth Matters: David Mattingly follows two farmers who compete over what 
seems to be the same rights to the land.  
 
Mattingly explains that white commercial farmer Carl Webber “benefitted from the 
apartheid system where white settlers assumed ownership of tribal land. Even though 
that was generations ago, Webber still enjoys all the benefits that good land and cheap 
labour provides” (Earth Matters, CNN). We are taken through Webber’s Cape Dutch 
house filled with antique furniture, set in rolling green gardens serviced by toiling black 
servants. The white farmer’s lifestyle is then intercut with close-up shots of subsistence 
farmer Lokswayo’s tatty bible in his mud-floored hut, a “prized possession” (Mattingly, 
Earth Matters, CNN) placed next to a candle in a holder and an empty tube of Colgate 
toothpaste (see Images 3.22 – 3.23). Both the white commercial farmer and the black 
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impoverished subsistence farmer appear to have “rights” to same land: Mattingly says 
that Lokswayo “prays to return to the land where his father is buried. A land now owned 
by whites” but Carl says, “the land is special to us because it was bought through hard 
work”. CBS’s Dan Rather frames white land owners in much the same way: “This rich 
land has been prized and fought over by South Africans for centuries” (FF and IFP have 
common ideals, CBS). Freedom Front leader Constand Viljoen walks the fields at his farm, 
cows amongst the bush and green hills extending into the distance. “I love this land, I’ll 
defend this land with every little bit of blood I have within myself,” he says (FF and IFP 
have common ideals, CBS). CBS’ framing of Viljoen, and indeed Afrikanerdom, in this 
broadcast is sympathetic. 
 
Image 3.22: Earth Matters, CNN, 1994. “Juxtaposition of white and black farmers” 
 
Image 3.23: Earth Matters, CNN, 1994. “Juxtaposition of white and black farmers” 
As with CBS’ Mugabe reassures white South Africans, the idea of “belonging” on the land is 
entangled. The black desires of land reformation and expropriation are contrasted with 
the white farmer’s ancestry and heritage, while both seem to have equal rights to the 
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same contrasting desire. Consistent with Fair and Astroff’s (1991: 71) argument, the 
“moderate” Afrikaners in this sample are legitimised through elements of their own 
discourse: we hear their desires in their own voices, unlike the indistinct black desires. 
Afrikaner and boer ancestry is implicitly connected with the land and their rights to own 
it; the Afrikaners attempt to validate their rightful place in South Africa, on the land, and 
in cultural capital, and are given space to do so.37 The neglect of black voices in this 
sample is telling of Friedman’s “view from the suburbs” (2011: 109) - the bias towards 
white voices informs the audience of only some realities. 
 
Entanglement occurred in the global journalists’ exploration of land ownership in South 
Africa not because the journalists presented the inherent contradictions of land rights, 
but because they did not acknowledge these contradictions as such. Had the journalists 
said something akin to, “both farmers feel they have equal rights to the land, blacks 
because of ancestry and whites because of purchase”, or that “land ownership in South 
Africa is complicated because of the history of apartheid and colonisation”, the 
broadcasts might not have been so confusing. These broadcasts might then have gone 
some way to explain the difficult issue, rather than relying on juxtaposing Webber’s 
“rich” lifestyle with Lokswayo’s “poverty”, which was an unhelpful stereotype. Instead, 
Rather and Mattingly show both white and black farmers as having equal rights to the 
																																																								
37	What is the reason for this type of framing of white Afrikaners? Could it be because the Americans have 
a vested interest in legitimising the “White Tribe of Africa” (Harrison, 1982)? Louw identifies the 
foregrounding of Europeans in non-Western stories as the “voice of the Anglos” (2009: 170), reflecting  
Myer et al.’s (1996: 34) suggestion that Western news relies on Western sources and voices when 
representing non-Western issues and problems. Westernised culture is often deemed “valid and 
incontestable” (Louw, 2009: 157), and anything that falls outside those bounds is symbolically wrong and 
odd. Perhaps the moderate Afrikaner boer was, to the international broadcasters, more similar to the 
“Anglo voice” than black politics in 1994. It could also partly be because the Freedom Front adhered to 
the Western ideal of democracy (Windrich, 1994; Reta, 2000) and are treated with sympathy by a US media 
that single-mindedly promoted Westernised democracy. More likely, however, is the cathartic nature of the 
1994 narrative in US news (Sisk, 1994) and the rhetoric of post-Cold War news frames (Norris, 1995: 359, 
1997: 14). Negotiated settlement as conflict resolution was the ideal outcome for the Clinton 
administration (Sisk, 1994: 149; Hawk, 2002: 158), and allowing this peculiar White Tribe of Africa its place 
in the sun was perhaps part of this negotiation.  
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same space, without exploring the causes, consequences, and realities experienced by 
both. Neoliberal concerns of ownership, business, capital, and individual rights are 
foregrounded more often in these broadcasts, while the African realities of ancestral 
rights, traditional cultures, and subsistence farming are framed as backward, 
impoverished, and strange. In this respect, instead of giving equal explanation to both 
white and black desires for land ownership, US channels tended to instead contradict 
their own narratives, resulting in flattened and confusing broadcasts reliant on binarised 
stories of rich and poor, traditional and modern. 
 
Overall, global narratives in 1994 became muddled because of the desire to highlight the 
negotiated settlement, and thus neoliberal news frames, seemingly at all costs. The lack of 
proper context and investigation into the election and complexities of South African 
society resulted in flattened, binarised themes focused on the dramatic and the violent. 
Anglo-American channels appeared to have broadly similar framing, yet the SABC was 
more hesitant, almost neglectful, of important narratives. As the only mainstream 
broadcaster in the country at the time ignored stories of the pre-election violence, the 
transition from apartheid to democracy (save for the brief and superficial packages about 
flag making), and citizen voices from the long queues, the SABC seemed neglectful of 
grassroots realities and instead reflected only the “safe” narratives. The SABC was 
disappointingly narrow in their coverage of the voting day in the limited number of 





3 DISCUSSION OF 1994 
 
Three narratives pervaded the 1994 election coverage, which stemmed from a push 
towards mediatised political communication. Firstly, Anglo-American coverage was 
overwhelmingly dramatized, with visualised violence underscoring the election, especially 
on US broadcasts. Secondly, global channels presented this first election as a triumph of 
logic, reason, and negotiation over the savagely violent past of South African society. The 
thrust towards this neoliberal narrative seems to be a symptom of post-Cold War frames 
and mediatised political communication. The fascination with the details of violence as 
well as the inability to explain its causes or consequences, and a fixation on economic 
concerns and negotiation as de facto universal values is typical of the literature (Sisk, 
1994; Windrich, 1994: 22; Norris, 1995: 359, 1997: 14; Evans & Glenn, 2010: 15; Evans, 
2014: 34). Finally, these frames, narratives, and stereotypes are entangled: broadcasters 
contradict themselves frequently and fall into already-known stereotypes of catharsis, 
communism, conflict, and event-based coverage, which is also consistent with the 
literature of the time (Norris, 1997; Turkington, 1997; Reta, 2000; Hawk, 2002). This 
entanglement is evidence of the episodic reporting of which Iyengar (1991: 18) speaks, 
and can be traced back to the global reliance on mediatised coverage of the election. The 
discussion tracks each of these three points in turn. 
 
 3.1 Dramatic and poetic global coverage 
The Anglo-American perspective of the 1994 election was more prominent than the 
local, South African perspective, but this was mostly because of the lack of available 
SABC broadcasts. Additionally, the SABC broadcasts were dull and fact-based with little 
mediation, while global narratives tended to be visually rich. Global channels tended to 
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use frames reminiscent of the post-Cold War news values, defined by Norris (1997: 14), 
Windrich (1994), and Hawk (2002: 168) as conflict resolution attained through 
negotiated settlement, a focus on neoliberal interests such as economics, trade 
agreements, and the security of Western democratic values such as multi-party 
democracy and competition. Meanwhile, the SABC broadcasts tended to ignore the 
majority of narratives and issues highlighted on global channels and focused instead on 
the flag ceremonies and early morning queues. This hesitation to highlight controversial 
or difficult issues was most likely due to the apparent “balanced” and “neutral” 
perspective of the SABC at the time,38 or because of the limited sample of broadcasts 
provided by the broadcaster. None the less, global coverage was overwhelmingly 
dramatic, with creative camera proxemics to represent the 1994 election in a series of 
poetic broadcasts. Most channels centred on the violence that surrounded the election. 
  3.1.1 Violence 
South Africa’s approach to democracy seemed chaotic and hampered by riots, terrorism, 
and armed men marching down streets, and these images dominated Anglo-American 
broadcasts. Journalists framed black South Africans as having as a seemingly inherent 
propensity for violence, which echoes Spurr’s (1994: 107) concept that when given the 
promise of development, in this case through democracy, failure is inevitable because of 
the African’s incorrigible violent nature. Violence was both manifest – in the debris, 
bloodshed, explosions, and drawn weapons bookending the election – but also in the 
framing narratives journalists used to explain the election. 
 
Violence was portrayed firstly in a visible, manifest threat of danger and bloodshed, 
which seems obvious because of the Johannesburg bombings in the week of the election. 
																																																								
38	See the above discussion on the UNMOSA observation under “South African perspectives” of 
democracy. 
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Close up shots of ruined cars and buildings, scattering black South Africans as police 
shoot into crowds, a seemingly unending impi marching in low angle towards the camera, 
and black Zulu mean holding spears up towards the sky. On closer inspection, however, 
the narrative of violence was not simply because the broadcasters covered the bombings 
and marching Zulu warriors; instead, global journalists highlighted the prolonged terror 
campaign that ran through the various ethnic and factional tensions. Violence in this 
respect was caused by ethnic groups (often Zulus), controlled by the military, and 
threatened to derail the election and therefore democracy, a fragile concept and not easily 
attained in South Africa. The broadcasters did not speak of this violence as 
homogeneously “black” (as in Fair and Astroff, 1991), but instead distinguished black 
ethnicity as bloodthirsty IFP Zulu warlords and the ANC as the victims of such violence 
and heroes of the Struggle. Black people still fought other black people, though, and 
were controlled by white authorities, a narrative that appears to be consistent with Fair 
and Astroff’s (1991) analysis.  
 
 3.2 Binaries and the horse race 
In attempting to explain the complicated stories of pre-democracy South Africa, 
journalists used binaries that tended to flatten these complexities into easily understood 
stereotypes. The negotiated settlement narrative, so paramount to news values in the 
post-Cold War era, played out in the portrayal of two sides competing, in a kind of 
“morality play” (Rassool & Witz, 1996: 339): land ownership in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe where white and black people had equal but contradictory claims, factional 
violence between the IFP and the ANC where peace ran neck and neck with war, rural 
South Africans hamstrung by their tribalist culture faced need for modernisation that the 
election promised, and overarching hopes and fears of the 1994 election. Broadcasters 
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played prophets in commenting on how these conflicts would develop. In this respect, a 
horse race was visible but not in the sense of a two-party contest (as in Patterson, 1980; 
Aalberg, et al., 2011; Benoit, 2004: 105): instead, the horse race was between peace and 
war, modernisation and tribalism, a bloodthirsty impi and a government-in-waiting, and 
hopes and fears, reflecting Nyamnjoh’s observation of the “polarised” media (2005: 235).  
 
Beverly Hawk (2002: 159) suggests that the binaries of promise and disappointment of 
development, of which democracy is a key element, created racial duality in the coverage 
of the first South African election. She scathingly calls the coverage “a composite of 
images from fictional entertainment than the result of personal experience in Africa or 
with Africans” (ibid.: 160). The horse race binary in my sample is less extreme than in 
Hawk’s observation, but the binaries observed in global coverage do tend to simplify and 
entertain, rather than enlighten and explain. The SABC’s narratives in this were not 
much better: although fact-driven, the omission of important events and issues (such as 
the violence before the election) gave a narrow view of the 1994 election. One hopes that 
additional broadcasts, if available, would show a deeper investigation of the first poll. 
 
 3.3 Entangled, contradictory narratives 
Achille Mbembe once described perspectives about Africa’s attempts at democracy as an 
“entanglement” (2015: 67). Indeed, Africa’s conflict with traditional territory governance 
and the demands of democracy placed upon it by the straight lines of colonialism has 
resulted in a struggling and chaotic approach to governance. As Mbembe describes the 
struggles of governance, he mentions the binary opinions of the “hope” of African 
democracy that “reduce the range of historical choices gestating in Africa to a stark 
alternative of either ‘transition’ to democracy and the shift to a market economy, or 
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descent into the shadows of war” (2015: 77). The simplistic binaries on US channels 
often resulted in contradictory reporting on the 1994 election. The one-dimensional 
dramatic stories, fixated on the visualisation of conflict and trauma, left little room to 
explore deeper consequences and acknowledge inherent contradictions through 
contextualised reporting. 
 
The US seemed to identify the cure-all for South African society as a free and fair 
election (in that poverty, racial inequality, unequal land ownership, education imbalance, 
and violent crime and factionalism would begin to disappear when the election 
occurred), but at the same time acknowledged that these deep-seated societal problems 
could not be swept away in one election. Black living conditions may improve by gaining 
access to wealth and land through suffrage, but that would mean handing over white 
capital to an unknown future. Democracy seemed a panacea for what ails South Africa, 
but at the same time journalists acknowledge that this cure-all is fundamentally 
impossible. White landowners “belong” on the land they purchased fairly and deserve 
rights to it, but so do black tribes who were forced off the land by these white settlers. 
The powerful juxtaposition between black desires, white fears, and the inequality of the 
two existences resulted in a binarised and entangled depiction of South African society 
during the election.  
 
Mbembe bemoans the representations of African democracy that are flattened into sides 
of a binary, similar to Spurr’s (1994) “failure” and “promise” of development. In this 
sample, the promise of development, democracy as dignity, is pitted against the 
disappointment of a violent, chaotic, fragile process, and is thus reduced to simplistic 
stereotyped stories that tend to favour dramatic reporting, rather than in depth coverage. 
	 141 
The episodic reporting seen on the global broadcasts in this sample is symptomatic of 
both the thrust towards post-Cold War news frames and mediatised coverage. 
 
 3.4 Mediatised reporting 
Most channels in this sample focused on the personalisation of politicians: Buthelezi’s 
love of war theatre was highlighted at the expense of any IFP policy discussion, and 
Mandela and De Klerk’s symbolic handshakes dominated coverage while the actual 
negotiation process was glossed over. Similarly, symbolism and visualisation were 
favoured over context, consequence, and explanation: the colourful new flags were 
hoisted over a jubilant, emotional populace on the SABC broadcasts, but little context 
was explored. For the Anglo-American broadcasts, the rural black masses were not only 
illiterate and unable to distinguish between parties, but also treated the vote as a toy to be 
played with, quite apart from the serious, sombre, and fearful white minority. Issue-based 
or thematic reporting (Iyengar, 1991: 18) was low in this sample, especially in the Anglo-
American channels, which fits with the modern style of political journalism that Louw 
(2005: 66) and Bennett (2012: 44) describe. Part of this mediatisation trend is that 
political journalism transforms elections into spectacle, obliterates context and therefore 
fragments news stories in order to focus on the dramatic, the violent, and the visual.  
 
 3.5 South African perspective 
While Anglo-American broadcasts fixated on visually rich and violent events, the SABC 
did the opposite: a dry and dull view of the voting day was punctuated by a symbolic 
lowering of the old flags. The brief South African perspective seemed to focus more on 
the “peace” brought by democracy, rather than the change from a violent past. While 
Ndlela (2011: 77) and Waldahl (2005a, 2005b) suggest local Zimbabwean state-owned 
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media was overwhelmingly superficial due to the problematic access to funds and 
information, in this study it seems superficial South African coverage was due to the 
media-monitoring spotlight from UNMOSA but also because of the small available 
sample of broadcasts. Additional broadcasts may suggest the SABC was far more 
explorative of the 1994 election, but previous literature suggests this was not the case 
(Silke & Schrirer, 1994: 142; Berger, 2002: 5; Gouws & De Beer, 2008: 274). 
 
Ultimately, the 1994 election coverage was far less negative than expected, given that 
literature of the time fixates on news media’s Afropessimism during the early 1990s 
(Schraeder & Endless, 1998; de B’Beri & Louw 2009; Evans & Glenn 2010; Nothias, 
2012). De B’Beri and Louw (2009: 337) suggest Afropessimistic discourse implies that 
there is inherently “something wrong with Africans” rather than that there may be 
something amiss with democracy: 
The heart of this discourse derives from the fact that Africans are failing to live 
up to a set of criteria developed by Westerners who want to develop Africa. 
Specifically, Westerners want Africa to function socially and economically in such 
a way that the continent would mesh neatly into the globalised economy built by 
Europeans and Americans over the past two centuries.  
Indeed, Anglo-American representations of democracy implied that it was South Africa 
at fault for being incapable of hosting a “proper” election. Instead of being inherently 
Afropessimistic, however, the news coverage was flattened and stereotyped, which 
reduced the complexities of South African pre-democracy society to simple, but not 
always negative nor incorrect, binaries. Rather than assuming South Africa could never 
progress politically, the journalists presented confusing and entangled narratives that 





Anglo-American broadcasts were diverse and contradictory in nature, while the SABC 
broadcasts were simplistic and cautious, and most coverage was symptomatic of a push 
towards mediatisation. The overarching narratives of the 1994 election included 
presenting South Africa’s chaotic and inept approach to democracy, pitting black desires 
against foregrounded white fears, with broadcasters playing prophet about the changes 
that democracy would bring to a divided South African society. The reporting style from 
Anglo-American broadcasters emphasised the visualisation of violence and media logic, 
at the expense of political information. The SABC, meanwhile, had very few meaningful 
narratives due, in part, to the strict spotlight on objectivity at the time. As demonstrated 
later in this thesis, the South African broadcasts tended to be very hesitant in exploring 
controversial narratives overall, so perhaps the UNMOSA spotlight is not the sole reason 















The 1999 election has been called “boring” (Khosa, 1999: 97; Bird, 2008: 59), a treatise in 
“normalcy” (Louw & Chitty, 2000: 293), a “popularity contest” (Saul, 2002: 32), and the 
“ethnic census” (Seekings, 2001: 164). This second poll drew very little media coverage, 
and as an event was thus almost incomparable to the media spectacle of 1994. Broadcasts 
were scarce for this election sample. While the South African news media landscape had 
changed with the inclusion of eTV, an independent news and entertainment channel, 
access was difficult due to the poor archiving techniques and expensive access present at 
the time of analysis.39 Only three channels from two regions were available, with nine 
broadcasts in total meeting the criteria for selection. In this small sample, both journalists 
and citizens showed a growing concern about politicians being fit-for-purpose. Mandela 
was criticised, subtly, while Mbeki was portrayed as the new hope for the future, able to 
rein in wayward ANC members and tackle looming crises head on. Although the 
narratives were mostly poorly explored, both local and global broadcasters ultimately 
denounced the Mandela presidency’s failure to bring about change to the electorate’s 
satisfaction. While the global media gave but a cursory glance to important issues, local 
media attempted a view from the ground.  
 
																																																								
39	As stated in the methodology chapter, archival access for eTV came with a high price tag – R35 per 
second of broadcast data. It was only through a long process of negotiation that the eTV sample became 
financially viable. Because of this, for the 1999 sample year, only two prime-time news broadcasts were 
available for analysis. 
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1  BACKGROUND TO 1999 
 
Although Mandela and his leadership are often glorified (Marschall, 2004; Posel, 2013; 
Dowden, 2013; Carlin, 2013; BBC, 2014; Biography, 2016), the first five years of South 
Africa’s new democracy were turbulent. Richard Calland calls Mandela’s government 
“one big laboratory” (1999: 1) of experiments: the Government of National Unity 
(GNU), 40 the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC),41 the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP),42 the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution 
(GEAR) project,43 and the new Constitution were all implemented during Mandela’s 
presidency. These policies were the responsibility of the deputy presidents, and from 
1996 that fell squarely on the shoulders of Thabo Mbeki when joint-deputy FW De 
Klerk resigned from parliament. Meanwhile, Mandela improved the global image of 
South Africa and ensured nation building was a top priority for the country, which Du 
Preez calls “Project Rainbow Nation” (2013: 25). His thrust towards unification of the 
divided country came at a price, however. Gevisser notes that Mandela was “a far better 
liberator and nation-builder than… a governor” (2007: 699). Saul (2002: 48) too notes 
that Mandela’s “mythos of consensus” and the narrative of a unified nation muffled 
societal contradictions and tensions. 
																																																								
40	The GNU consisted of 12 ANC officials, 6 NP, and 3 IFP, with Mbeki (ANC) and De Klerk (NP) as 
Deputy Presidents. Lawson (2003: 215) notes that the GNU was hardly a match made in heaven: slanging 
matches between Mandela and De Klerk in 1995 highlighted the tempestuous relationship. 
41	The TRC was a transitional justice body that gave victims of past conflict a chance to tell their stories of 
gross human rights violations, and offered amnesty to perpetrators who fulfilled certain criteria.	
42	The RDP attempted to address the socio-economic consequences of apartheid through alleviating 
poverty and addressing the social services shortfalls, which were seen as mutually supporting objectives. 
43	GEAR replaced the RDP and was adopted in June 1996 in order to cut expenditure, reduce budget 
deficit, and rationalise the public sector. Habib (2013) argues that sanctioning GEAR was probably because 
of intense international pressure from investors. See Saul (2002: 33-39) and Klein (2007) for examples of 
how the ANC adopted neoliberal policies that were radically different to the movement’s proclaimed 
socialist ideology. 
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1.2 The outgoing king 
Politician Van Zyl Slabbert (1999: 212) describes Mandela’s era in office as “the politics 
of charisma” and hints that spectacle and image came at the expense of effective 
governance. Jacobs and Calland (2002: 3) also suggest that Mandela could “float above” 
these politics because of his apparent mythic status, unencumbered by the realpolitik 
within the ANC. He was a modern politician yet in touch with traditional and tribal 
structures, and he embodied whiteness and blackness, privilege and deprivation 
simultaneously. However, it seems that his endeavour to straddle two contrasting worlds 
and the desire to promote an international image meant sacrificing the depth of political 
analysis required in order to “hold the centre”: divergent thrusts within the ANC during 
the first term of government threatened to pull the former liberation movement apart.  
 
For many South Africans, the heady promises of 1994 had not come to fruition by 1999. 
The dream of rapid change, promised in the ANC’s Freedom Charter and 1994 
manifesto, seemed eternally deferred. In his cynical and critical account of the ANC’s 
apparent capitulation to capitalism, John Saul (2002: 33) reflects Chris Landsberg’s (1994: 
290-1) observation that foreign governments (the UK, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the 
US) drew the ANC away from its socio-economic policies – including nationalisation – 
and persuaded the party to embrace Western-style free market principals in 1994. 
Mandela’s evolving fiscal responsibility was due to pressures from investors and 
governments, rather than an organic internal decision from the ANC NEC, Naomi Klein 
(2007: 207) reiterates. Saul’s essay on the “post-apartheid denouement” (2002: 27-33) 
outlines the ANC’s withdrawal from any form of genuine class struggle that might 
directly help the vast impoverished masses, while appeasing the smirking wielders of 
corporate power.  
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This “precipitous rush to the right” (ibid.) perplexed many critics; the ANC’s almost total 
capitulation to market forces begged the question of whether it was pushed into 
capitalism, or jumped in with both feet. Saul argues that the ANC may have had genuine 
misgivings about socialism based on the recent Soviet history and that the institutions the 
ANC inherited were weak and broken, which precluded the implementation of some of 
the founding principals in the Freedom Charter. Russell (2009: 12) asserts that 
The ANC would stabilise the nation’s tottering finances by bending to the winds 
of globalisation then gusting across the world and adopting an orthodox free-
market programme. In short, opponents on the left argued, [Mandela’s deputy, 
Thabo Mbeki] advocated the approach of the ANC’s Western ideological foes of 
the eighties, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. 
Ultimately, the electorate were given a raw deal in the first five years of the democracy. 
Fixing the broken institutions inherited from the brutal apartheid system necessitated a 
capitulation to capitalism, but doing so meant that many of the hopes and promises from 
the ANC’s socialist 1994 campaign were necessarily sacrificed.  
 
1.3 Problems in paradise 
Important achievements during the presidency occurred through the hard work and 
realpolitik of the ANC and the GNU. A democratic and innovative constitution was 
lauded as one of the most progressive in the world (Du Preez, 2013: 42); economic 
infrastructure was stabilised rapidly; service delivery occurred in critical areas; a trouble-
free 1999 election ran smoothly thanks to the IEC’s coordination; and the country 
witnessed a dignified changeover between presidents, from Mandela to Mbeki. Gevisser 
observes that the overriding legacy of South Africa’s first president is “a country where 
the rule of law was entrenched in an unassailable Bill of Rights, and where the 
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predictions of racial and ethnic conflict did not come true. These feats, alone, guarantee 
Mandela his sanctity” (2007: 699). 
 
Despite improvements in South African society in the five years after 1994, cracks began 
to appear in the Rainbow Nation: the inheritance of an anachronistic and shambolic 
National Executive set the scene for a turbulent presidency, while the increasing 
HIV/AIDS pandemic meant that as many as 25% of pregnant South African women 
had contracted the virus by the end of 1999, and the government was slow to respond.44 
Mandela’s crumbling marriage to Winnie Mandela grabbed local headlines. A burgeoning 
crime wave wracking the country led one writer to conclude that South Africa is “a 
"country at war with itself” (Altbeker, 2007). Inequality deepened among South Africans 
(Lang, 2013; Padayachee & Desai, 2008),45 the education system – especially in rural areas 
– crumbled, and promises were first extended and then broken, leading to criticisms of 
Mandela’s leadership skills (Lang, 2013). Additionally, the innovative GNU was at best 
schizophrenic (Calland, 1999: 6): the IFP and the NP found themselves in opposition 
and in cabinet simultaneously. Saul (2002: 30) remarks that although the new 
Constitution is internationally lauded, it is also vilified as a document designed to protect 
capital interests at the expense of transformation – referring in part to the “sunset 
clauses” that allowed certain privileges to whites for a certain period, and that the 
Freedom Charter was given little consideration in the draft.  
 
																																																								
44 The 2011 National Antenatal Sentinel HIV & syphilis prevalence survey in South Africa, National 
Department of Health of South Africa available: http://www.doh.gov.za. Mandela later acknowledged that 
the ANC’s early response to the pandemic was one of the major oversights of his administration (McNeil, 
2012; Sampson, 2013). 
45	Padayachee and Desai give a detailed explanation of the deepening inequality, including a critical 
discussion of the Black Economic Empowerment and GEAR programmes. In 1995, 28% of households 
lived belong the poverty line while in 2000 the figure was roughly 33%. 
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While these issues may have faded from public memory, the first five years were 
challenging. Saul (ibid.: 41) writes that the best point of reference for analysing the 
liberation movement’s acclimatisation to government might be Franz Fanon’s notion of 
“false decolonisation”, that the ANC gradually adopted their position as “intermediaries” 
of the global empire through capitalist policies rather than conducting true revolution, 
but this seems an extreme interpretation.  
 
One of the more alarming threats to this consolidated democracy was the government’s 
animosity towards the mainstream media. Jacobs (1999: 155) explains that the first ANC 
government had to deal with being on the wrong side of the press, and was not 
impressed with the criticism from editors and journalists once considered part of the 
liberation allegiance. Saul (2002: 41) writes that newly liberated African politicians often 
find themselves on the side of “them” (the enemy) rather than the “us” (the persecuted) 
in Fourth Estate media. The ANC struggled with this difficult binary throughout the first 
term in office, as evidenced by hostility towards the mainstream media (Berger, 2007; 
Jacobs, 1999; Malila, 2014). In 1999 ANC partisanship at the SABC remained strong; 
scholars (Jacobs, 1999; Russell, 2009: 74) suggest this bias was partly due to ANC 
members dominating senior management and editorial staff positions.  
 
1.4 The favourite son 
Part of the tension between the ANC and mainstream media was owing to Mbeki’s 
distaste for opposition. The deputy president barely tolerated any rebellion in the 
mainstream press and was accused of Machiavellian tactics to destroy any threat to his 
power (McGreal, 1999). From the outset, Mbeki was reluctant, almost “allergic” (Jacobs 
& Calland, 2002: 6), to play the “mediatised” political communication game so favoured 
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by the wider media and the first five years as deputy president caused a dampening of 
Mbeki’s previous charm. Although his international allure was strong, Mbeki lacked the 
common touch for his electorate and had something of a political tin ear (Russell, 2009: 
22). Mandela was able to straddle the traditional and modern with ease, acknowledging 
tribal leaders and Western democrats with the same easy demeanour. Mbeki, however, 
was “enigmatic” at best to his electorate: the arcane, besuited man was visibly out of 
place in the rural enclaves of South Africa, while Washington loved Mbeki; he was seen 
as “urbane and brainy” as the “West’s best hope for a continent mired in poverty, 
corruption and disease” (Masland & King, 2000, cited in Jacobs & Calland, 2002: 5).  
 
Although Mbeki finally won the position of deputy president, Mandela was reluctant to 
nominate another Xhosa politician to the upper echelons of the ANC cabinet, as he was 
concerned it would otherwise be seen as a “tribal” party (Calland, 1999: 5). He favoured 
Cyril Ramaphosa, a Venda, for the position instead. While second in charge, Mbeki 
ensured that there would be no further threat from Ramaphosa or any others to his quest 
for presidency. Russell (2009: 64) remarks that Mbeki’s series of coups split the ANC 
into the Exiles (those who fought apartheid from outside South Africa) and the Inziles 
(those who remained in South Africa for the Struggle), with Mbekites being almost 
exclusively Exiles (ibid.). In the run-up to the 1999 election, Mbeki ensured that he had 
elbowed out any perceived threat to his position as the favourite son (Gevisser, 2007: 
698; Russell, 2009: 20 – 21).  
 
1.5 The second election 
At the end of the 1999 election, and in a break from the African norm (Jacobs, 2003: 47), 
President Nelson Mandela stepped down after only one term in office, despite the 
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Constitution allowing him a second. The ANC therefore fought the second election with 
a new candidate in mind, deputy president Thabo Mbeki. The ANC’s slogan during the 
1999 election was “A Better Life For All” although, Saul (2009: 31) and Graham (2014: 
180) assert, the ANC tended to float on its credibility as the liberation movement rather 
than its service delivery during its first term in office. As in 1994, on the advice of Bill 
Clinton’s 1992 election advisor Stanley Greenberg (Sampson, 2011: 476), the ANC based 
its campaigning on actual physical contact with voters rather than through print or radio 
(Lodge, 1999: 66), supplemented with a sophisticated media perspective (Evans, 2014: 
172). The major campaign promises included a reduction in crime and stabilising the 
economy, but in the Western Cape the ANC attacked white privilege and focused on 
coloured-African solidarity.  
 
As one third of the GNU, the National Party was in an invidious position by holding at 
once a position in opposition and in government. As a result of this bipolar approach to 
politics, FW De Klerk resigned as deputy president in 1996 and retired from politics 
altogether in mid-1997. By 1999 the party was unrecognisable. The New National Party 
(NNP), as it was subsequently known, had a new look and a new candidate – Marthinus 
Van Schalkwyk – but even this reimagining was unable to arrest the decline. The party 
was forever “tainted with the fatal apartheid brush” (Welsh, 1999: 90) and the skeletons 
uncovered during the TRC damaged the party’s reputation further. The NNP also had 
no experience in being in opposition and so policies and campaigns were ultimately 
poorly conceived and executed.  
 
The DP was almost decimated in 1994, gaining only 1.7% of the national vote. In the 
subsequent years, however, new party leader Tony Leon was responsible for the 
significantly improved DP appearance and performance (Welsh, 1999: 89). Leon, a 
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lawyer by training and involved in the CODESA processes, was intelligent, adept at 
debate, sharp, cutting, and gutsy. Welsh remarks that he “never hesitated, inside or 
outside of parliament, to tackle the most sacred of cows” (ibid.: 89). The party became 
the single biggest host to white Afrikaners (ibid.: 91), effectively swallowing up the NNP 
and the Freedom Front electorate. With a new campaigning style and message, the DP 
electorate was more racially mixed than in 1994 but was still three-quarters white 
(Reynolds, 1999: 183). 
 
As the remaining third of the GNU, the IFP support had been practically decimated, not 
least because of Mbeki’s charm: the deputy president wooed Buthelezi so well that the 
IFP leader spoke in glowing terms of a party he once loathed, although this was to be a 
one-off statement: “I hold him in high esteem”, Buthelezi said of Mbeki. “I would say 
the country will be in good hands if he becomes president” (cited in McGreal, 1999). As 
with most opposition parties in the 1999 election, the IFP’s campaign manifesto was 
mediocre, while policies differed only slightly from the ANC (Marè, 1999: 105). The IFP 
relied on ethnic voting patterns, rather than debates over policy in the 1999 election. 
 
The 89.3% turnout for the 1999 election showed that the IEC polling administration was 
far more efficient than in 1994, while politically motivated violence (both real and 
perceived) was almost non-existent (Reynolds, 1999: 177). Instead, emotions ran high 
with euphoria, enthusiasm, and civic pride. Although the election was plagued by some 
problems, Reynolds (ibid.: 173) admits  
[t]here was a beauty in the boredom, hope in the uneventfulness, pride in the lack 
of attention. In 1994 the eyes of the world watched South Africa to see if the 
fragile child would survive its traumatic birth, but five years on far fewer friends 
attended the youthful democracy’s birthday party. 
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That global media ignored South Africa’s second elections could be a testament to the 
strides the country had made in normalising democracy, as Louw and Chitty (2000: 293) 
suggest, but also that the 1999 poll lacked the drama inherent in the 1994 election. South 
Africa held a calm, free, and fair multi-party election and thus took another step closer to 
democratic consolidation. Table 4.1 gives the spread of votes for each major party in the 
1999 election. 
 ANC DP IFP NNP UDM FF PAC TOTAL 
Percentage 66.35 9.56 8.58 6.87 3.42 0.80 0.71 16.2mil 
Table 4.1: Percentage of votes per party in 1999 election46 
 
Saul (2002: 28) argues that apartheid was the epitome of capitalist super-exploitation, and 
the criterion for advance or progression in South Africa was a revolution over this super-
exploitation. Notwithstanding the protection of capital interests during the negotiated 
settlement, South Africa made significant gains during the transition period to the 1999 
elections. In the early 1990s, the country was “still a killing field” (ibid.), but South Africa 
was “able to realise and stabilise the shift to a constitutionally premised and safely 
institutionalised democratic order – making peace without suffering the potentially 
crippling backlash from the right wing, both black and white” (ibid.). The very 




The findings below answer these three questions through a multimodal analysis of the 
broadcasts. The broadcasts available for 1999 were scarce, with only nine broadcasts 
across three channels from two regions (Graphs 4.1 – 4.2). 	
																																																								
46	Statistics gathered from Reynolds, 1999.	
	 154 
  
Graph 4.1    Graph 4.2 
eTV provided three broadcasts: one studio interview and two packages. The two 
packages were suitable for analysis but the studio interview was a talking-head piece 
between the Cape Town studio and the NROC and was thus unsuitable, based on this 
project’s research questions that take into account mediation between journalist and 
images. The SABC provided many hours of unedited and thus unsuitable raw footage 
barring five packages that were selected for analysis. Similarly, Getty Images provided 
raw data from the US newswire AP, but again this footage was unsuitable as there was no 
journalistic voiceover or finalised editing. Only two packages were suitable. The visuals in 
the analysed broadcasts for this year were particularly dull and straightforward, lacking 
the narrative journalism approach as seen in 1994, and so the focus for this analysis was 
mostly on discourse. As in previous chapters, the frequency of events and political party 
coverage, as well as the narratives of the election, are set out below in order to investigate 
how, if at all, the two regions differ in the coverage of the election. 
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2.1 Frequency analysis 
2.1.1 Events 
A total of four events were observed (Graph 4.3), with some broadcasts reporting 
multiple events at a time (Graphs 4.4 – 4.5): the voting day generally including ballot 
paper preparation, polling station preparation, and problems and successes of the 
election so far; long queues of people waiting to get into the polling station; the 
transition from Nelson Mandela as president to Thabo Mbeki; and Mandela casting his 





Graph 4.4   Graph 4.5 
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Fewer events were covered in this second poll,because the sample size was much smaller 
than in 1994. ITN focused on the “personalities” of the election: Mbeki’s transition to 
president and Mandela voting next to his new wife Graça Machel. The South African 
broadcasts seemed more interested in the voting process, covering the leaders of all 
major political parties voting in dedicated broadcasts on both SABC and eTV.  
2.1.2 Political parties 
Graphs 4.6 and 4.7 show the total political party representation as well as the spread 
across three channels. The SABC represented all major political parties over five 
broadcasts, while eTV focused on the ANC but still represented competing parties. 
Meanwhile, ITN showed the ANC, the DP, and the NNP only.  
  
 Graph 4.6 
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Graph 4.7  
As with 1994, the ANC dominated coverage on both local and global broadcasts, but the 
South African broadcasts were more diverse in the representation of political parties than 
ITN. The lack of political party coverage on the very few global news broadcasts 
available indicates how far South Africa had slipped off the global news radar (Louw & 
Chitty, 2000: 293) compared to the news media “circus” of 1994. 
2.1.3 Who speaks 
As in 1994, the type and frequency of speakers on the broadcasts were listed based on 
Cross’s (2010) study. Some 24 Unknowns and 19 Knowns spoke across nine broadcasts 
(Graph 4.8), and of the Knowns, the majority of speakers were political party 
representatives (Graph 4.9).  
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 Graph 4.8 
 
Graph 4.9  
Distinct subsequent years, the 1994 and 1999 election years contained no political analyst 
speakers and instead focused on political party sources as Knowns.   
 
Unlike 1994, the sample for 1999 contained more broadcasts from the local channels 
than international channels, signifying just how far South Africa had “slipped from the 
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global radar”. Themes that existed on the few broadcasts available included the depiction 
of democracy, the lack of violence in the second election, race, and the fear of a two-
thirds majority. This next section outlines how the AP newswire and two South African 
channels represented the second election.  
 
2.2 The process of democracy 
The most prominent theme on the broadcasts was that of the process of democracy. All 
three channels, ITN, eTV, and the SABC, described the lengthy queues and the 
experience of the election as well as the differences between Mandela and Mbeki, but the 
tone between the South African and UK regions differed. 
2.2.1 Queues 
On the SABC’s Election 99 Journalist Recap, long queues snake into the distance seemingly 
as proof of the enthusiasm for democracy in South Africa as journalists explain: 
“Election excitement just starting to build up in Mitchell’s Plain” 
“The situation is very exciting. The day started for most of the voters around half 
past four” 
“This is Vosloorus this morning where at least 600 people were ready to vote 
before the polls had even opened” 
“The IEC officials bought the chairs out but people have not had time to sit 
down because the queue is moving so fast” 
“The figure stands at around 300 with another 200 people in the queue. So the 
IEC are coping very well; this station is running very smoothly indeed” 
“At the moment we’re flying over Pretoria, not many queues here” 
These queues signify an enthusiastic, excited electorate and both SABC and eTV 
journalists commend the IEC for running the poll smoothly. Hence, the voting lines 
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were simply due to the sheer number of people arriving to cast their ballot rather than 
any IEC inefficiency. The SABC appeared proud of the length of queues, choosing to 
focus on reporters that mention queues or with visuals of smiling voters in unending 
lines (see Images 4.1 – 4.3). 
 
Image 4.1: Election 99 Journalist recap, SABC, 1999. “PTC in Khutsong” 
 
Image 4.2: Election 99 Journalist recap, SABC, 1999. “Smiling queues” 
	
Image 4.3: Election 99 Journalist recap, SABC, 1999. “Robyn Curnow PTC” 
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ITN, however, took a different stance. Journalist Tim Ewart explains that “democracy is 
a slow process” in South Africa and “it’s taken several hours to reach the front of the 
longest queues” (Elections polling day). A visibly agitated voter later says, “I’m sick of this. 
They’d better do something better” (Polling day 2, ITN). “People queuing in the dark were 
assured that polling stations wouldn’t close until they’d been able to cast their vote” 
Ewart explains. ITN thus show long queues and exasperated voters as evidence of 
inefficiency. Although one could argue that frustration and queuing might indeed be 
“normal” in a democracy, ITN framed it rather as a “disappointment”. 
2.2.2 Transition between Mandela and Mbeki 
Just as the UK and South African news channels differed in the depiction of voting 
queues in 1999, the regional news also differed in the portrayal of the incumbent 
Mandela and the candidate Mbeki. For example, both the SABC and ITN show a clip of 
Mandela casting his vote but they framed this event differently. On the SABC (Election 99 
Journalist Recap), Mandela explains that the feeling was not as “intense” as 1994: 
Well I’m saying it’s a very wonderful occasion to be in here to vote. And now I’m 
doing so for the second time, it gives me a wonderful feeling. The feeling is not 
as intense as it was in 1994, because I was exercising this right for the first time. 
But now I’m comparatively relaxed, and I’m very happy today to have exercised 
that right. Thank you. 
While using the same clip, ITN cuts his speech short at “wonderful feeling”, ignoring his 
further explanation. This editing might have been simple time constraints, but the 
resultant framing removes Mandela’s normalisation – that he has multiple emotions 
about the event – and choses instead to focus on the “kiss” for his “new wife” Graça 
Machel (Polling day 2, ITN). Mandela appears one dimensional in this global broadcast, 
and the portrayal seems superficial compared to the SABC’s full quote.  
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The SABC was surprisingly critical of Nelson Mandela and his cabinet, but presented this 
criticism indirectly. SABC journalist Linda van Tilburg (Election 99 Sowetan Youth, SABC) 
hosts a focus group with various Sowetan youth, who openly criticise Mandela: 
“I don’t believe the present government has done much and nobody has 
impressed me yet.” 
“If they mess up a second time then they aren’t good enough.” 
“But you don’t chow R14-million when people’s health is at stake. Oh our dear 
minister of health. I am bitter. People are dying of AIDS and she chows the 
money. That money could have been used to make the AIDS drug.” 
Critical voices about Mandela and his presidency are rare on mainstream media and to 
hear these comments on the SABC in 1999 were unexpected. Literature of the time 
suggests the broadcaster hesitated in criticising the ANC (Jacobs, 1999: 154; MMA, 1999: 
28; Berger 2002; Gouws & De Beer 2008; Russell, 2009: 74), so this long-form SABC 
broadcast containing multiple vox pops condemning Mandela is rare.  
 
Mbeki, conversely, is the president-in-waiting on all channels. ITN calls him “less 
charismatic than Nelson Mandela but a hard-nosed politician” (Polling day 2, ITN) with a 
focus on reform and transformation. eTV interviews his parents in the Eastern Cape, 
where Epainette says that she is voting for her son, and the austere Govan has a few 
words of wisdom: “As long as he carries out those policies [of the ANC], South Africa is 
going to be happy” (Mbekis in the Eastern Cape, eTV). Similarly, SABC journalist Linda 
van Tilburg’s Sowetan youth focus group states: 
“Somehow I think he’ll do a better job [than Mandela]. He seems like somebody 
who has a better hold, so to speak, on the politicians.” 
“Mr Mbeki has to get out there and pull his weight. And out of all the politicians 
that I know now, I think he’s got the weight.” 
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“Thabo Mbeki, he’s a suitable candidate. I wouldn’t have anyone else fill 
Mandela’s shoes.” 
Gevisser observes the tension between Mandela and Mbeki as a would-be Napoleon 
filling King Lear’s “ugly shoes” (2007: 697). In a classic misstep, Mbeki spoke at the 
official conference of the ANC presidency in December 1999. “Madiba,” Mbeki 
proclaimed to the ANC assemblage, “members of the press have been asking me how it 
feels to step into your shoes. I’ve been saying I would never be seen dead in such shoes. 
You wear such ugly shoes!” (ibid.). Far from filling Mandela’s shoes, the favourite son 
desired new shoes all of his own.  
 
Both the SABC and ITN implied that Mbeki might be a more effective president than 
Nelson Mandela, while eTV did not mention this transition at all in the two available 
broadcasts, focusing instead on the ‘wise words’ from his parents (Mbekis in the Eastern 
Cape, eTV). Meanwhile, ITN’s Tim Ewart visited a township and claims Mbeki 
“promised to speed up reform here”, indicating that perhaps the outgoing president did 
not do enough to change the township residents’ lives. Later, Mbeki votes sombrely and 
explains, “It should be a very proud moment for us as South Africans because indeed 
this demonstrates a commitment to the democratic system, a commitment for people to 
choose a government that they like” (Polling day 2, ITN). Mandela’s quote, however, 
highlighted only his emotion regarding the voting process (ibid.). Ergo, it seems ITN 
viewed Mbeki as a more “hard-nosed” politician that could bring rapid change to the 
country, while Mandela was simply excited in the election process.  
 
These channels suggest that transformation – service delivery, health care reform, closing 
the inequality gap – had not been as forthcoming as was hoped because of Mandela’s 
ineffective governance. ITN proclaimed that voters wanted “rapid change”, and young 
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Sowetan students discussed corruption, expenditure waste, and arrogant politicians on a 
10-minute SABC broadcast. eTV meanwhile represented vox pops that demanded more 
service delivery from government, because “during the country’s first democratic 
election, they voted for their freedom; now the election is about bread and butter issues” 
(Ismail, Western Cape voters, eTV). Unfortunately, because the channels committed very 
little airtime and depth to the campaign issues, the type of transformation that voters 
desire from Mbeki’s new government is mostly unclear. 
 
2.3 Lack of violence 
In 1994 coverage, journalists fixated on the visuals of violence and South Africa’s ability 
to host an election in this violent context. In 1999, however, South African and global 
journalists instead highlighted peace and the lack of political unrest. Mbeki hoped for a 
“peaceful” and “trouble-free” election three times in the SABC’s Election 99 Elites Voting 
broadcast, and that his government was on “standby for any emergencies that might 
arise” during the polling day. Reporter Kgomotso Sebetso (Election 99 Elites Voting, 
SABC) went further: 
We wanted a democratic system, we can vote in conditions of freedom, of peace, 
of stability. It’s a confirmation of that. And I think the commitment of the South 
African people that we’ve seen in the registration, you’ve seen it in the 
campaigning, and you see it in the queues… the hope that today’s elections will 
be peaceful so that at the end of the day, all South Africans can say the elections 
were free and fair. 
Back in the studio, the anchor for the broadcast remarks: 
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South Africans owe it to themselves and the rest of the world to ensure that the 
second democratic election proceeds smoothly, IFP leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi 
said in Ulundi. 
The peaceful election is seemingly down to South Africans’ inherent ability to police 
themselves. Journalist Colleen Lemawana observed “a visible presence of the South 
African National Defence Force troops together with the police dog unit” (Election 99 
Journalist Recap, SABC), which was the only mention of military or police control of the 
election on South African channels.  
 
Later in the same broadcast, a journalist in a helicopter observes, “we have been flying 
over the East Rand area, Katlehong, Thokoza, and Vosloorus, and there have been 
tremendous queues there” (ibid.). These three areas witnessed some of the worst 
factional violence in the run-up to the first election, but the journalists avoid mentioning 
this outright – instead the focus is on “queues”, despite grouping the three areas together 
seemingly intentionally. eTV frames the lack of violence in much the same way, referring 
to the long, peaceful queues (Western Cape voters, eTV). In this sample, it seems that the 
local journalists deliberately avoid mentioning violence or showing previous instances of 
unrest, a decision that might be a form of “peace journalism” (Onyebadi & Oyediji, 
2011: 219) that highlights peace and avoids war terminology and themes, but also an 
attempt to normalise the elections.  
 
ITN’s Polling day 1 is the only broadcast to directly reference the bloody tensions from 
the previous election. Tim Ewart visits a long queue stretching into the background, and 
speaks as black faces smile at the camera: “But there’s been little sign of trouble, and 
certainly none of the violence that marred these last elections five years ago.” The focus 
of all broadcasts is on the lack of violence, rather than simply peace. The broadcasters’ 
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disregard of previous violence was seemingly a tacit acknowledgement of the 1994 
experience. 
 
2.4 Depictions of race 
Reynolds (1999) implies that this second election was underscored by race throughout 
the campaign, coverage, and results, and Seekings (2001: 164) calls the election a “racial 
census”. And yet only a third of the 1999 broadcasts mentioned race, which was 
underwhelming. Both the SABC and eTV referred to the coloured community’s support 
of the NNP in the Western Cape, but the SABC gathered information directly from the 
citizens themselves, while eTV mentioned the NNP’s support offhandedly.  
 
In the SABC’s extended view of voting around the country (Election 99 Western Cape 
community), reporter Faizel Cook visits a coloured family in Manenberg. As the large 
family walk in the dawn to the long voting lines, they discuss some of their concerns in 
Afrikaans: 
“They cut the water off there in Manenberg, and then, yesterday, the Bantus got 
money, and the brown people didn’t get money.” 
Cook acknowledges that the “ANC is desperately trying to make inroads to win the 
coloured vote”, but “many blame it for the ills that have befallen this community, 
plagued by poverty and crime”. The SABC once again subtly criticises the ANC by 
interviewing discontent citizens: 
Basier Petersen: “With the old government, you weren’t white enough. Now all 
of a sudden you’re not black enough. I don’t know where I stand anymore in 
South Africa.” 
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Coloured woman: “Don’t even want to vote, because you don’t even know who 
to vote for, because there isn’t a coloured party we can vote for, so that we 
coloured people can also become something in life.” 
The SABC was the only broadcaster to overtly single out any particular racial group in 
this way, and investigated citizen voices from the coloured community about their 
concerns in the new South African democracy. As such, the SABC was far more 
investigative than any other channel in 1999, but the small sample size precludes firm 
conclusions. However, it was surprising that the SABC criticised the ANC government, 
based on the previous research (Jacobs, 1999: 154; MMA, 1999: 28; Sparks 2012: 209) 
that suggest a pro-government bias. 
 
2.5 Fear of a two-thirds majority 
Jacobs (1999: 148) argues that a focal story in the 1999 election was that the ANC might 
win a two-thirds majority stake of the votes cast, giving the party, amongst other things, 
the ability to change the Constitution. Jacobs suggests that the 1999 media (presumably 
local, South African) called this two-thirds majority a “danger to democracy”, and that 
“white material reality was at stake” (ibid.). 
 
While in 1994 global journalists emphasised white concerns about black hopes and 
dreams, the fear in the 1999 election was more about the ANC gaining an overwhelming, 
unopposed majority. ITN reporter Tim Ewart emphasises six times in two broadcasts 
that the ANC would win the election against a negligible opposition. The fear is, he 
states, that the “target is two thirds [of the vote], allowing them to change some parts of 
the Constitution. They’ll know tomorrow if they’ve achieved it” (Elections polling day 2, 
ITN). He predicts that the ANC is “guaranteed to win by a wide margin” because “there 
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is little opposition to the ANC”, and that Mbeki’s “ANC party is heading for an 
overwhelming majority” (Elections polling day 1, ITN). This perceived lack of opposition 
seemed to be a concern for democracy. The only time the SABC referred to this “threat” 
was through quoting the Freedom Front Plus: “Opposition parties should negotiate to 
form an alliance to prevent South Africa from being governed by a centralised 
government with a two-thirds majority, [Constand Viljoen] said” (Election 99 Elites Voting, 
SABC). Hence, a dominating party with negligible opposition appeared to be the central 
“fear” in the 1999 election coverage, an idea that aligns with Jacobs (1999). However, as 
with the black hopes in 1994, what the ANC would do with two-thirds majority was not 
explored and left as an indistinct fear.  
 
3 DISCUSSION OF 1999 
3.1 Slipping off the global radar 
Louw and Chitty acknowledged in 2000 that South Africa had seemingly fallen off the 
global radar since the media frenzy of 1994. The narratives contained in the few 
broadcasts available for this sample were rudimentary and somewhat dull. There was 
much less of the mediated journalism seen during the 1994 election, and certainly less of 
a media spotlight. This was surprising because the nature of consolidated democracy 
would be such that broadcasters may have been interested to see if the “revolution” so 
feared by white capital in 1994 had come to pass by 1999. When only nine aired 
broadcasts were available for this data set, Louw and Chitty’s remark seemed ratified. 
South Africa had indeed slipped off the global radar. But why would this be? 
 
Part of the reason might be the sheer “mundaneness” (Saul, 2002: 28) of the 1999 
election, or its “normalcy” (Louw & Chitty, 2000: 293). The lack of drama, violence, and 
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visually rich events in 1999 might point to the lack of global media attention. The 
SABC’s Linda van Tilburg suggests that the “apathy” of young voters could “be a sign 
that South Africa is returning to a normal society” (Election 99 Sowetan Youth, SABC). 
Indeed, the lack of violence, the optimism of the voters, and the efficiency of the IEC’s 
organisation could have contributed to the inattention of global news because, as media 
scholars (Fiske, 1987: 285; Hartley, 1982; McQuail, 1987; Chandler, 1994a) are firmly 
aware, news is inherently negative and if it bleeds, it leads. News values dictate that 
negative or bizarre news lead headlines, and in this respect the narratives of the 1999 
election was radically different to 1994, which were characterised by visuals of violence. 
Perhaps, then, the global news spotlight shone away from South Africa in favour of 
other news stories (the war in Kosovo, for example, began in March 1999). 
 
But what of South Africa’s lack of broadcast data? Only seven broadcasts were available 
from two channels. The lacuna here is because of the organisation in the archival system 
or the quality of broadcasts archived. eTV supplied two broadcasts at high cost. The 
SABC archival crew retrieved nine 1999 broadcasts that fit the election keywords or 
dates, but only five were finalised and aired broadcasts. The rest comprised raw data, 
were insufficiently recorded (in that they cut out in the middle of the broadcast or were 
recorded over with cricket matches from 2015), or were of entirely different stories than 
specified in the log data. The SABC’s ineffective organisation, therefore, might be 
responsible for the paucity in this section.  
 
3.2 Democracy in 1999 
Two illustrations of democracy dominated the 1999 coverage: firstly, local news 
attempted to normalise the experience by showing a “committed” electorate. Secondly, 
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ITN presented a narrative about the “disappointment” of democracy. Local channels 
viewed the IEC as efficient, voters as enthusiastic, opinionated, and patient, while 
democracy itself was normalised through the dignified manner in which the election 
occurred. The SABC criticised the ANC through vox pops, an action that was seemingly 
an effort to demonstrate “objectivity” in the face of accusations of partisanship. Russell 
observes that Mbeki’s desire for absolute loyalty influenced the SABC management 
structures and by 1999 “the party was completely in control” (2009: 74). While the fierce 
tension between Western and African media ethics (cf. Wasserman, 2010, 2013) in South 
Africa’s media had yet to truly transpire in 1999, the signs were there in the careful, 
almost dull way that the SABC treated electorate concerns in this sample.  
 
ITN, however, portrayed disappointment in the experience of democracy in South 
Africa: voters were left frustrated and abandoned in the long lines, and the failure of 
transformation, especially in poor areas, led to angry outbursts. Mbeki was presented as 
more of a “hard-nosed” politician than Mandela, who was in turn reduced to a smiling, 
jovial elderly man with a new wife. The only policy discussion that occurred on ITN was 
the implication that none of the promises in 1994 had been kept, or at least not 
happened quickly enough. Indeed, in 1994 ITN mentioned that the overall struggle 
against apartheid was “to vote” (Nicholson, South Africa elections; Austin, South Africa – 
election voting), and that the IEC was unable to cope with the strain of the first election. In 
1999 the channel’s reporters still seemed disappointed in the speed of this change. For 
ITN, South Africa had mostly “failed” in some of the promises of 1994, and thus in 
development of an efficient and well-run election and society, suggestive of Spurr’s 
binaries of failure and development. Spurr (1994: 19) argues that democracy is often 
measured against the level of progress of Westernising developing countries, and if an 
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African state does not demonstrate American democratic values such as regime change, 
then it automatically falls on the “failure” side of the binary. 
 
3.3 Disparity with literature  
The sparse literature about the 1999 election media coverage highlights the disjuncture 
between media issues and those of the electorate. Jacobs (1999: 149, 158) and Duncan 
(2009: 218) note that the press focused on immigration and land rights as paramount 
concerns for South Africa, while job creation and unemployment topped opinion polls. 
This disconnect was not visible in the above sample, as only a few campaign issues were 
touched upon (crime, service delivery, HIV/AIDS, corruption, and education). 
Consequently it is not possible to verify the discussions that Jacobs and Duncan raise, as 
this data sample was too small. 
 
The Media Monitoring Africa project (MMA, 1999: 28) found that vote-catch events 
such as campaign rallies were prioritised on local media in 1999, which resulted in 
uncritical and shallow media coverage of the election. Based on the SABC and eTV data 
available, this statement seems inaccurate. While the campaign trail may have included 
such media coverage, the sampled election broadcasts were dull but not uncritical. In 
Election 99 Sowetan Youth for example, Linda van Tilburg depicts five young Sowetan 
students criticising the government on everything from its approach to HIV/AIDS to 
the growing systemic corruption. Faizel Cook interviews the coloured community in 
Cape Town (Election 99 Western Cape Community, SABC), who call the politicians’ attempt 
to woo them “a bunch of hot air”, and that no political party represents their 
community. In this respect, the SABC allowed deeply critical voices on air, and more so 
than both eTV and ITN. Mattes, Taylor, and Africa (1999: 37) argue that the 1999 
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electorate were sophisticated, engaged, discerning, critical, and mostly satisfied, and not 
likely to be as blindly loyal as often depicted. The SABC broadcasts bear out their 
argument. 
 
3.4 The political economy of the SABC 
Despite transformation occurring immediately after 1994, the SABC was still accused of 
partisanship by unfairly favouring the ANC in television and radio news, and Jacobs 
(1999: 154) suggests that this partisanship was partly due to ANC loyalists dominating 
senior management and editorial staff at the SABC. Board members were cherry-picked 
to be prominent and loyal ANC supporters. Hence, I expected to see more manifest 
endorsement of the ANC in the 1999 SABC broadcasts. However, the type of ANC 
references was almost always critical on the broadcaster: the vox pops disparaged the 
overall Mandela presidency, and reporters highlighted racial tensions in the Western 
Cape, a key contested province. This study does not find the SABC to be particularly 
biased towards the ANC in 1999, which goes against the literature of the time (Jacobs, 
1999; MMA, 1999; Duncan, 2009). The discrepancy with the literature on both the vote-
catch event coverage and the SABC’s bias towards the ANC can be explained by the 
small broadcast sample but also the different methodology employed to analyse the 
narratives. Researchers such as Jacobs (1999), MMA (1999), Davis (2005), and Duncan 
(2009) rely on mostly content analysis coding schema that take into account discourse 
only, while my study employed a multimodal analysis that looked at juxtapositions, 






Although the 1999 election drew little media attention, sampled broadcasts showed a 
growing concern about fit-for-purpose politicians. Although the narratives were narrow, 
in that not many stories or topics were investigated, all broadcasters denounced the 
failure of the Mandela presidency to adequately bring about change to the electorate’s 
satisfaction. Vox pops explained that crime and poverty did not improve, that education 
systems crumbled, and that corruption was extensive. While the global media gave but a 
cursory glance to these issues, if at all, local media attempted a critical view from the 
ground. This was surprising because the literature noted that the SABC was reluctant to 
show failures of the ANC government, presumably because of the government’s 
increasing involvement with the SABC board. 
 
With Mbeki in charge for almost a full decade, the forthcoming chapters are dedicated to 
his increasingly paranoid approach to leadership, his African Renaissance project, and 
scandals that haunted his campaign trail in 2004 and ended in his ultimate undoing in 












Louw and Chitty’s (2000: 293) remark that South Africa had slipped off the global radar 
post-1994 endures in the 2004 election sample. The SABC provided eight finalised, aired 
broadcasts and eTV provided two. Equally, global news broadcasts were astoundingly 
scarce: only one broadcast was suitable for analysis despite many hours spent dedicated 
to a comprehensive search in local, global, free, and paid-for specialist archives. Perhaps 
additional broadcasts could be found, given extra time and funding, but this data set 
remained paltry at best.  
 
This analysis chapter begins with a background of South African society in the 
intervening five years, including the lacklustre vestiges of the “miracle”, the profiles of 
the electorate and the president, and an overview of the media during Mbeki’s 
presidency. While 1999 election coverage saw local channels criticise the incumbent 
government, the same channels in 2004 glamorised both the authorities, such as police 
and IEC officials, and Mbeki’s government. Mediatisation played an important role in the 
global journalist’s perspective of South African society during the election.  
 
1 BACKGROUND TO 2004 
 
Berger argues that global powers tend to perceive South Africa as “beacon of light” in a 
continent “to be evaluated not against the realities of postcolonial Africa but rather 
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within the context of the liberal democratic societies of Europe and North America” 
(2004: 77). There is a view, therefore, that postcolonies with racist legacies experience the 
transition to democracy with difficulty, but Berger argues that in South Africa this 
transition seemed painless. By 2004, the ANC had achieved ten years of majority rule in 
the country. At the time, Steven Friedman (2005: 19) acknowledged that much of the 
voting since 1994 followed identity politics, and that any threat to the ANC dominance 
would have to come from a vibrant opposition party made up from splinters within the 
ANC itself. 
 
1.1 Profiles of the electorate 
Seekings (2005) explains that a third of the electorate in 2004 were young post-apartheid 
voters with a demography of 83% African, 8% coloured, 7% white, and 3% Indian. By 
2004 a low birth rate and high emigration reduced the potential white electorate while the 
accelerated growth of the black middle classes and the elite was dramatic. “Active 
policies of affirmative action and, to a lesser extent, BEE have inflated the demand for 
black and especially African personnel. This last factor provides the growing African 
middle classes with strong incentives to support the ANC” (Seekings, 2005: 25). 
However, despite this rise in the black elite, unemployment rose from 30% in 1994 to 
over 40% in 2004 (ibid.).  
 
The potential electorate in 2004 were therefore predominantly young, poor, and 
unemployed. Mattes (2005: 52) points out that public opinion between 1999 and 2004 
ranged from a widespread popular acclaim for Mandela’s presidency (70% to 80% 
approval), to “mere majority approval” for Thabo Mbeki (between 50% and 65%). He 
suggests (ibid.) that 
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such approval ratings clearly do not show the type of massive dissatisfaction one 
might expect in a society with 40% unemployment and declining life 
expectancy…. This is not because South Africans fail to realize how bad things 
are, or that, playing Pollyanna, they simply turn a blind eye to these problems. 
Rather, they balance significant disappointments in some areas against a range of 
impressive achievements in others. 
As the voter turnout declined between 1999 and 2004, foreshadowing the imminent 
decline until 2014, Mattes (2005: 62) notes that, “dissatisfied voters must either swallow 
hard and vote for the ANC as the least bad alternative or simply not vote at all.” The 
lack of a main opposition party encouraged this disillusionment, too. 
 
 1.2 The froth of the miracle has disappeared 
Having followed Madiba, the icon of the nation, in 1999, Mbeki had large shoes to fill. 
Mandela’s presidency was mainly concerned with uniting the disparate South African 
society (Jacobs & Calland, 2002: 3; Van Zyl Slabbert, 1999: 212), and it was up to the 
pragmatic Mbeki to make this inheritance work economically. But all was not well in the 
Rainbow Nation. Giliomee observes that by 2004 “the froth of the miracle had 
disappeared” (quoted in Russell, 2009: 147), with sections of society pulling in different 
directions. Crime, inequality, the economy, and an HIV/AIDS pandemic haunted the 
start of Mbeki’s presidency. 
 
An estimated 25% of all pregnant women in the country were already HIV-positive in 
1999 and this statistic had risen to 30% by the start 2004 (Gevisser, 2007: 728; Kharsany, 
Frohlich, Yende-Zuma, Mahlase, Samsunder, Dellar, & Karim, 2015). Over 5 million 
South Africans out of 46 million were HIV positive at the time, reducing the life 
	 177 
expectancy for South Africans to 48.5 years for men and 52.7 years for women 
(Donnington, Bradshaw, Johnson, & Budlender, 2004). AIDS orphans totalled 1.1 
million. Although the full impact of Mbeki’s HIV/AIDS policy had not yet been felt by 
2004, Russell (2009: 216) reveals that in order “to understand Mbeki’s stance on AIDS, 
you had to appreciate that he was an intellectual president who raises questions”, and he 
approached the issue as an academic, rather than a president. Mbeki’s sin, Russell notes, 
was that he raised the question first rather than dealing with the problem. Despite 
allowing Antiretroviral (ARV) drugs in 2003, Mbeki’s cabinet still implied that people had 
a choice between nutrition and medicine to cure the disease, indirectly questioning the 
effectiveness of ARVs. Yet again, it was the poor black masses that bore the brunt of the 
government’s procrastination in providing adequate healthcare. 
 
While there was growing evidence of salience in class by 2004, with the black middle 
class on the rise, Seekings (2005: 23) argues that inequality had instead shifted from race 
to class. Over the decade post-apartheid, various socio-economic problems had escalated 
that caused disjuncture in a presupposed “Rainbow Nation”. As Russell noted in 2009, 
South Africa’s crime statistics are “extraordinary” (2009: 109), with the murder ratio at 43 
per 100 000 people (Burger, 2009: 5), one of the highest in the world. In addition, 
statistics often centre only on murder, failing to take account of all other crimes 
committed. Complaints about the crime rate under Mbeki’s administration were scoffed 
at as a symptom of “white angst” (Marais, 2011: 226), yet the cycles of violence in the 
country affected all races. According to polls, a third of black Africans felt personally 
unsafe most days (Roberts, 2009); roughly 1.8 million South Africans sought medical 
assistance due to assault (Seedat, 2009); and 18 000 South Africans were murdered per 
year (SAPS, 2008). 
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Russell (2009: 113 – 116) suggests that South African society’s propensity for violence 
rested on three pillars: the collocation of poverty and wealth, where one exists almost in 
the other’s back yard; the legacy of resistance to apartheid, where the brutal Struggle 
collapsed many of the traditional codes of behaviour; and the desperation of poverty, 
leading young men to participate in burgeoning syndicated crime networks, from drug-
dealing to car jacking. The legacy of apartheid also left inequality scar tissue, which a few 
simple government policies of redistribution and empowerment did not and could not 
resolve in a decade. Instead, the culture of inequality was deeply moulded in South 
African society.47  
 
The distribution of income is exceptionally unequal in South Africa. In 2008, the Gini 
Coefficient48 ranked South Africa at 0.8, possibly the worst in the world, and the gap had 
widened 0.2 points between 1995 and 2005 (StatsSA, 2002; 2008). While social grants 
implemented during these years narrowed the gap slightly, the nature of this inequality is 
still alarmingly racial – the wealthy are overwhelmingly white and the poor are almost 
exclusively black. Wealthier households benefitted disproportionately from the economic 
upturn in the early 2000s, while poorer families struggled to make ends meet (Marais, 
2011: 210). The implementation of the ANC’s economic policies (such as RDP and 
GEAR) seemed to do little to rectify the structural inequality existent in the country. 
 
																																																								
47	Russell (2009: 151) notes the peculiarity of “maid culture”: supposedly “liberal” white South Africans 
still treated black domestic workers as the underclass, erasing their existence not only from the “above 
stairs” white household but also from politics. The maid in Russell’s anecdote “worked for 11 years 
without a pension”, and was summoned with “a dog whistle” by a white academic who supposedly 
abhorred apartheid. 
48 The Gini Coefficient measures inequality, with zero (0) representing complete equality (all people have 
equal income) and one (1) being complete inequality (one person owns all the country’s wealth).  
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1.3 Profile of Thabo Mbeki 
Mbeki’s well-documented (Gevisser, 2007; Russell, 2009; Jacobs & Calland, 2002) 
awkwardness in straddling the urban and the rural – a technique that Mandela seemingly 
mastered – appears to have originated in the Mbeki household in a rural village in the 
Transkei. Govan Mbeki, an accomplished academic, and Epainette Mbeki, a similarly 
educated egalitarian, left Johannesburg to start a small village shop in the hills of 
Mbewuleni, a “frontier of Western civilisation and traditional Xhosa culture” (Gevisser, 
2007: 50). While Mbeki was born, raised, and educated in this tiny village, he always felt, 
according to Gevisser (2007: 57), an outsider, most at ease when engulfed in a mess of 
literature. The “African Pride” narrative, so distinctive of Mbeki’s presidency, was rooted 
in his upbringing in both the small village in the Transkei hills and the education instilled 
through his parents. Gevisser (2007: 32) emphasises that Mbeki  
born in 1942, was thus suckled on the era’s optimism and many of the ideas he 
was later to embrace have their roots in the [1930s] ideals of the New African: his 
mission for redemption through an African Renaissance, his quest for personal 
autonomy and African self-sufficiency, his particular combination of urbanity and 
African nationalism. 
Mbeki was torn between two worlds. The traditional village surrounding conflicted with 
his parental progressive ideology, and Mbeki was never really suited to the rural setting. 
After an education at the private Lovedale College, Mbeki, now in exile from South 
Africa, joined his mentor Oliver Tambo to study economics at Sussex University in 
England.  
 
After completing a Masters degree, Mbeki joined other Struggle icons including Walter 
Sisulu’s son Max, Albert Dhlomo, Jacob Zuma, Essop Pahad, and his mentor Oliver 
Tambo in multiple African nations to bolster the anti-apartheid movement from outside 
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the borders. Tambo, now president of the still-banned ANC, appointed Mbeki to 
conduct private talks with the representatives of the NP government in the early 1980s. 
It was here that Mbeki made his name as the “seducer”. Charming, self-assured, a joker, 
and able to smooth ridges between disparate parties with tact and diplomacy, the Mbeki 
of the transition era is held high on plinths by all who met him: Gevisser (2007), Du 
Preez (2004: 148; 2013: 51-52), and Russell (2009) write nostalgically for this charismatic 
Mbeki, rather than the overly paranoid academic visible in 2004 that relied on the African 
Renaissance concept. This African Pride narrative drove his overriding policy for 
governance in the first five years as president. 
1.3.1 African Renaissance  
Vale and Maseko (2002: 121 – 123) claim that throughout South Africa’s history, 
politicians have suggested the country should play a larger role in Africa’s modernisation 
and development. Mbeki’s notion of an “African Renaissance” was just one such 
instance in a long line of leaders promoting South Africa as hegemonic across the 
continent, and was similar in many ways to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “New Deal”. Despite 
being “mysterious, obtuse, and puzzling” (ibid.: 124), the concept was meant to promote 
science, technology, and globalisation in Africa’s thrust towards development. Mbeki’s 
fascination with new technologies, globalisation, education, and African identity was 
strongly evident in his conception of the African Renaissance. His comprehension of 
Africanism is not racial, Ryklief (2002: 114) argues, but regional: Africans are those who 
are born on the continent, rather than delineated by race. The idea of an African 
Renaissance does not draw a line between the traditional and the modern but is driven by 
economic development through modernisation.  
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Allison Bullen (1999, cited in Ryklief, 2002: 115) claims that Mbeki’s use of an African 
identity in an anti-colonialist framework is problematic, however. The concept does not 
challenge existing power structures; the regeneration encompasses competitive global 
capitalist systems rather than socialist communitarian method; and the discourse around 
the role of South Africa in relation to the rest of the continent is ambiguous at best. Not 
all African countries agreed that Mbeki’s African Renaissance was fit for purpose: what is 
good for South Africa was not necessarily good for all of Africa, and there does not exist 
a “final identity that is African” (Appiah, 1992: 117). Too much difference, too many 
fractures, and too much oppression existed on the continent to enable a single thrust 
towards “modernisation” in Mbeki’s utopic concept. “Without acknowledging the anger 
and economic discrimination people of colour fair in what has been termed ‘global 
apartheid’, African Renaissance can never succeed,” Vale and Maseko (2002: 130) assert. 
Mbeki’s concept49 mirrored his own tension between the traditional and the modern: his 
political “tin ear” (Russell, 2009: 22) and austere demeanour rendered him 
unapproachable by the majority of the rural poor in South Africa, yet that very 
disposition was enchanting to the Western leaders. 
1.3.2 Tension with the media 
During Mbeki’s first term in office, his paranoia was “palpable” (Jacobs & Calland, 2002: 
3). He seemed obsessed with an overarching plot to harm him, and the president’s 
hostility towards the media caused ructions throughout the government. His demand for 
absolute loyalty within party structures and an overarching paranoia is characteristic of 
ANC members who remained a long time in exile (Russell, 2009: 64; Du Preez, 2013: 65, 
76). When the media turned against the government “post-froth”, his hostility towards it 
increased. Mbeki quickly turned into the media’s whipping boy, termed the “power-
																																																								
49	African Renaissance was built on Mbeki’s perspective alone, which also indicates his demand for 
absolute loyalty and to follow the party line in all matters.	
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monger” and “arch-manipulator, wooer of factions” (Jacobs & Calland, 2002: 12). In 
typical ANC fashion (ibid.), the government attacked anti-Mbeki depictions in the press. 
Sparks (2009: 210) and Louw (2005: 91) report that the SABC adopted a procedure 
ensuring that the president and his ministers appear at least four times in each news 
bulletin. Part of this intervention was rooted in Mbeki’s African Renaissance concept: 
positive news about the government was supposed to counteract the negative media 
perception of African governance. Sparks (ibid.) observes that mechanisms designed to 
strengthen ANC control over the editorial process were put in place in 2003, and Berger 
suggests these were part of “an increasing effort to exercise greater political influence 
over the nature of broadcasting” (2004: 73). The dominance of the ANC on the SABC 
board and management may have resulted in media coverage that favoured the ANC. 
Myburgh (2006) documents how the ANC captured the SABC through three waves of 
purging independence and populating the upper echelons of board members with 
government supporters. By 1999, three loyalists ruled the news channel: Enoch Sithole, 
chief executive of news; Phil Molefe, head of television news; and Snuki Zikalala, deputy 
editor-in-chief. By 2004, the board was packed with Mbeki-stalwarts. Myburgh opines 
that the “most noticeable is the jarring contradiction between the legislative and 
constitutional requirements for the public broadcaster and the lived reality” (2006), 
whereby the diversity of views and promotion of fair and objective reporting clash with 
the “encroaching spirit of ANC power” (ibid.). 
 
1.4 The third election 
The 2004 election proved a difficult period for most political parties. A culture of ANC 
affirmation had sprung up in the celebration of ten years of democracy, whereby 
opposition parties were often seen as “unpatriotic” or “anti-liberation” (Booysens, 2005: 
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130; Gouws & De Beer, 2008: 281; Russell, 2009: 155; Grootes, 2013: 29). The NNP’s 
decimation and subsequent merger with the ANC meant that the DA became the official 
opposition party in claiming most of the NNP’s electorate. Smaller parties suffered too, 
with the left being almost entirely unrepresented in the National Assembly in 200450 due 
in part to their competition with the ANC for the same constituency of black voters 
(Hoeane, 2005: 204).  
 
For the 2004 election campaign, as in previous years, the ANC used a combination of 
advanced electioneering techniques learnt from American election strategists and 
traditional mass organisation methods (Lodge, 2005: 109). For the first time since 1994, 
the party was able to penetrate the rural enclaves in KwaZulu-Natal IFP strongholds, and 
managed to exploit the power of holding office in their campaign strategy in these areas 
(ibid.: 119-120). The ANC’s 2004 campaign approach differed little from previous 
strategies, and the campaign message centred on improving services, giving more but 
improving on the same, as well as “celebrating freedom” (ibid.). Party manifesto issues 
included job creation, poverty reduction, turning the tide against the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic, and significantly reducing crime (ibid.). The sophisticated election campaign 
combined with old-fashioned “listening” gatherings ensured the party reflected the 
electorate’s needs and concerns, and the ANC was voted into a third term in government 
with 69.68% of the popular vote.  
 
The Democratic Alliance (DA)51 was at unforeseen crossroads in 2004: Booysens 
comments that “robust opposition was perceived to be unpatriotic” (2005: 130) mostly 
																																																								
50 With the exception of the South African Communist Party (SACP), which held seats due to its allegiance 
with the Tripartite Alliance of the ANC, most of the left-leaning parties (including the PAC and AZAPO) 
did not garner enough votes to gain parliamentary seats in 2004. 
51	The Democratic Party (DP) of 1999 became the Democratic Alliance (DA) after a brief merger with the 
New National Party (NNP) subsequent to the latter party’s dismal showing at the 1999 election.  
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because the celebration of ten years of democracy centred on the ANC’s Struggle 
affirmation, rather than the government’s vulnerabilities. However, the DA managed to 
hold the torch as the primary party political watchdog (ibid.), continuing to highlight 
scandals, wrongdoings, and poor policy choices (Russell, 2009: 152). During the 2004 
election campaign, the party tried to gather votes from the decimated NNP, please its 
liberal heart, and make inroads into the “black voter market”, all the while exposing its 
dualities and inconsistencies. Nevertheless, the party did reasonably well in the election, 
as the only opposition party to register significant growth. The campaign addressed 
issues of poverty, crime reduction, development, and unemployment through nation 
building, privatisation of the economy, and tackling the housing shortage. The party 
jumped from 1.9% of the popular vote in 1994 to 12.4% in 2004. 
 
Scholars often find it difficult to talk about the Inkatha Freedom Party without 
mentioning violence, and Piper acknowledges, “the relative absence of violence and 
intimidation in 2004 is all the more remarkable” (2005: 148). Politically motivated 
murders dropped from over 1 000 people in 1994 to just 15 in 2004, and Piper (ibid.) 
reports the IFP had jettisoned the militant nationalism of the 1980s and 1990s and 
instead embraced more liberal-democratic policies. This process was not complete by 
2004, however, ultimately placing the party in a no-mans-land between traditional Zulu 
nationalism and liberal-democratic policies comparable to the ANC. With an invasive 
and successful ANC canvassing strategy in rural KwaZulu-Natal, the IFP’s showing at 
the 2004 election was dismal.52 The party’s campaign rallies were, like its policy shift, 
divergent. Gatherings differed in style from “a hybrid between a charismatic church 
																																																								
52	Another part of the IFP’s problem is, sadly, the structure of South African rural societies. Albert 
Mncwango, national election committee chair, implied in 2004 that a lack of resources and costs of 
transporting people to the voting stations played a majority role in the IFP’s poor election results (cited in 
Piper, 2005: 153). Rural townships simply did not have adequate voting stations, and the costs of transport 
were seemingly too high or not appropriately considered in the 2004 election.  
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meeting and a rave” (ibid.: 156) to a more menacing assembly, amatbutho (Zulu warriors) 
mock fighting with weapons drawn. For the first time since its existence, the IFP found 
itself out of power in KwaZulu-Natal and the party dropped from 10.54% of the 
national vote in 1994 to 6.97% in 2004.  
 
The last major political party in South Africa at the time was mostly out of the 
contention for the third poll. Shortly after the 2004 election, NNP leader Marthinus Van 
Schalkwyk announced the end of the party and a merger with the ruling ANC 
government. This was not the their only attempt at collaboration: after the 1999 election 
the NNP and DP combined forces, which ultimately led to a coalition government in the 
Western Cape that elbowed the ANC out of that province. The two parties joined under 
the name Democratic Alliance, with Tony Leon as leader and Van Schalkwyk as deputy, 
but the partnership backfired in 2001, mostly because of differences in party ideology 
(Schulz-Herzenberg, 2005: 167). Schulz-Herzenberg notes, “these shifts and experiments 
suggest that since 1994 the NNP has struggled with questions of tactics and strategy” 
(2005: 168). Despite the cooperation with the ANC, the NNP gave a half-hearted 
attempt to woo the black voter populace in 2004 and had very little presence in black 
communities, resulting in a weak and ambiguous campaign. The biggest challenge for the 
NNP, Schulz-Herzenberg believes, was to convince the South African populace there 
was room for consensual opposition, especially as this message came from the “former 
apartheid party” (2005: 184). It seems this message was unclear or unpopular to voters, 
as the party only gained 1.64% in 2004, a staggering 94% loss of its 1994 support. 
 
Piombo & Nijzink (2005: 257) observe that, by 2004, political leaders were more 
concerned about voter apathy than political violence. This shift “signifies that politics 
have become increasingly routine. Certainly, this is a sign of the institutionalization of 
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democracy in South Africa” (ibid.). The European Union, United Nations, 
Commonwealth, and Carter Centre refrained from sending election monitors to South 
Africa during the decade of democracy (ibid.: 253). Table 5.1 provides the percentage of 
the popular vote won for the largest five parties in 2004. 
 ANC DA IFP UDM NNP Total 
Percentage 69.69 12.37 6.97 2.28 1.65 15.6mil 
Table 5.1: Percentage of votes per party in 2004 election53 
Despite this apparent “normalisation” of democracy, the turnout of the voting age 




Despite the disappointing representative sample of 11 broadcasts that limits conclusions 
drawn from this 2004 election year, the observed narratives are still interesting. Graphs 
5.1 and 5.2 depict the spread of broadcasts for this sample. 
  
Graph 5.1     Graph 5.2 
The SABC provided the eight broadcasts for this sample, eTV provided two, and the 
single AP broadcast was the only one suitable for analysis from any international channel 
																																																								
53 Statistics gathered from Piombo & Nijzink (2005). 
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available. As in previous chapters, the frequency of events and political party coverage, as 
well as the narratives of the election, are set out below in order to investigate how, if at 
all, the two regions differ in the coverage of the election. 
 
2.1 Frequency analysis  
2.1.1 Events 
A total of five event types were observed in the news coverage of the 2004 elections (see 
Graph 5.3 for the total coverage and Graphs 5.4 – 5.6 for channel specific spread): the 
campaign trail, including final rallies and meet-and-greets from politicians; the election 
eve; following the IEC in their set-up and the IEC process during voting; the actual 





54 Fewer broadcasts focused on the actual voting day, but that is probably down to the archival records 
rather than any meaningful connotation: the SABC provided unedited, raw broadcast data of thousands of 
Unknowns voting, but all this data was unusable because it was not finalised. Despite attempts to retrieve 
it, the SABC were unable to provide the aired broadcasts that presumably contained this footage.  
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Graph 5.4     Graph 5.5 
 
Graph 5.6 
eTV focused on the voting day, depicting leaders and Unknowns voting and speaking, 
while the SABC preferred the campaign trail and process of democracy – such as the 
IEC setting up voting tents and handing out ID documents. Additionally, the AP 
broadcast was a snapshot of a wealthy and successful black lawyer juxtaposed with urban 
township slums. 
2.1.2 Political parties 
Graph 5.7 shows the total spread of parties covered in the 2004 sample, but this graph is 
somewhat misleading. The single AP broadcast mentioned only the ANC, eTV 
mentioned the IFP, DA, and ANC, and the other parties were all contained on the eight 
SABC broadcasts. Again, as in previous election years, the ruling ANC garnered the 




2.1.3 Who speaks 
As seen in Graph 5.8 and 5.9, the most frequent speakers in the 2004 sample were 
Knowns at 25 out of a total 32 speakers. Mbeki, the IEC, and the police were the most 






Authorities and the government were the most frequently sourced during the 2004 
coverage. Political leaders of other parties were allowed a brief statement on the SABC 
broadcasts, but ultimately the authorities – Mbeki, the IEC, and the police – spoke most 
often. 
 
The frequency analysis shows that authorities and the government were more frequently 
voiced in this small sample, while the ANC received the lion’s share of the political party 
coverage that was diverse. The next section explores the narratives on the limited 
broadcast sample, starting with the portrayal of the election. Problems in South African 
society were also highlighted for the first time, as embedded SABC journalists followed 
the police on a heavy-handed raid to quell pre-election crime. AP’s journalist exposed the 
stark realities that black people experience in South Africa, harshly divided by both 
geography and economics. Ultimately, the local news channels glorified the government 
and authorities, while the international broadcast highlighted divisions and 
disappointment of democracy. 
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2.2 The personalities of the election 
Journalists in 1994 and 1999 focused predominantly on the act of voting to show the 
experience of the election: there was little evidence of campaigning or the election 
preparation, and the majority of visuals showed the electorate arriving at the polls, 
standing in long queues, or actually voting. In 2004 however, there were far fewer visuals 
of the voting, and only the South African broadcasts depicted this action. Local 
journalists predominantly showed firstly the process of the election (focusing on the 
IEC), and secondly the personalities (treating Mbeki as a celebrity). 
 2.2.1 IEC are heroes 
The IEC took centre stage in the depiction of the 2004 election, especially on the SABC 
broadcasts. IEC officials were portrayed as helpful, efficient, acting above and beyond 
the call of duty, and framed as heroes on both local channels. SABC reporter Clayson 
Monyela visits Taba-Nchu in the North West province on voting day, where IEC 
officials “had a busy day helping residents who were sick and bedridden to cast their 
special votes” (Monyela, IEC Special Votes, SABC). A white-shirted IEC official enters a 
small tin-roofed house and assists a frail bed-ridden woman (see Image 5.1). The official 
could be mistaken for a nurse, if not for the branded IEC shirt.  
	
Image 5.1: IEC Special Votes, SABC, 2004. “Assisting the bedridden” 
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Later in the broadcast, more IEC officials push a wheelchair-bound woman up a ramp 
into the voting station, feed an elderly woman while she waits in the queue, and guide a 
disabled or frail voter toward the ballot box. The compassionate officials seem at the 
ready to help the citizens, and voters smile gratefully up at the IEC’s assistance, while the 
IEC officials smile down benevolently. eTV mentions that “for many, elections have 
brought not just democracy, but also development” (Bramdeo, Election 2004, eTV) where 
electrification of halls and schools used for voting stations had been a direct result of the 
IEC’s involvement. This eTV broadcast plays into the binary of elections being 
synonymous with democracy and, in this case, development. 
 
In preparation for the main day of voting, SABC journalist Altaaf Khazi (IEC preparation 
and election briefs) follows IEC officials setting up a voting tent in Thabong, Welkom. The 
officials are hardworking, hammering in the tent pegs quickly and efficiently in close-up, 
while the IEC spokesperson Archie Jonas is concerned with bringing facilities to as many 
people as possible.  
Archie Jonas: “This is where we’ve got former informal settlements being turned 
into formal settlements where we don’t have, like, building structures where we 
can have our voting. So we are using the tents… It is quite important because it 
has also to do with the distance. Because we always say people should just get out 
of their house, so to say, and to go to their nearest polling station, without any 
help for transport or taxis, to go to the furthest point.” 
Piper (2005: 153) notes that one of the main reasons why the IFP did so poorly at the 
2004 poll was because the supporters simply had no resources to get to the voting 
stations in rural KwaZulu-Natal. So while the IEC seemed to be attending to informal 
structures adequately, as in Khazi’s report, the rural former homelands seemed to be 
lacking the same attention, an issue that is overlooked in these broadcasts.  
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eTV acknowledged that the IEC had made blunders in the Special Voting days (Election 
2004 follows a disabled voter who complains that no IEC officials had turned up to the 
voting station), but ends the piece with a “happy ending” (Debora Patta, Election 2004, 
eTV) as the IEC chairman personally invites all Special Vote citizens to vote in the 
regular ballots. Overall, both local channels present the IEC as efficient, heroic, and 
effective problem-solvers, even though the reality of the 2004 election was likely more 
ambiguous. 
 
While Western journalists reproached the IEC of incompetence in previous election 
years, the only international broadcast available in 2004 did not mention the process of 
democracy at all. Louw and Chitty (2000: 293) claim that the country had dropped off 
the global radar post-1994, and this seems evident in the lack of focus about the election 
on any news channel during the sample dates. Even local news media presented 
astounding normalcy in the democracy narratives of erecting tents, feeding frail care 
patients and, as seen below, endorsing the government, which further confirms Louw 
and Chitty’s (ibid.) conclusions. 
  2.2.2 Mbeki is popular 
While the international broadcaster did not mention political leaders at all, local channels 
tended to personalise these leaders through visual proxemics and discourse. The SABC 
illustrated that Mbeki’s prodigious intervention alleviated the poverty that affected voter 
registration and eTV showed Mbeki cracking jokes as he voted while the IEC officials 
and journalists stood “laughing at his Afro hairstyle” (Titus, Election 2004 2, eTV) in his 
ID book photograph. The SABC in particular continued its personality-driven coverage 
with the focus on the President Mbeki’s various appearances at vote-catch events. We 
see him at an ANC rally in the Mpumalanga region in KwaZulu-Natal (Campaign Trail), at 
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the Rand Easter Show in Gauteng (Thabo Mbeki visits the Rand Show), and as a guiding 
spirit in ID Books, whereby his representative hand-delivers an ID book.  
 
During ID Books, anchor Mahendra Raghnuath states,  
By now you can’t really blame people for being sceptical of politician’s promises. 
But there’s one who kept his word. Two weeks ago, ANC president Thabo 
Mbeki was on a door-to-door campaign… and promised to help [Francina, a 
township pensioner]. And today, he delivered. 
Although we never see him, Mbeki is presented as a helper, saviour, and keeper of 
promises. Instead, we see ANC members walking up a dirt road to a small tin shack 
community, while an elderly woman pleads with the officials that she cannot receive 
grants from the government because her ID document is incorrect. Home Affairs 
officials, wearing bright white shirts with the IEC logo, return in a few weeks and 
Francina Mkhabela, now also dressed in an overly large IEC shirt, gratefully receives her 
new ID book. She says that it will change her life and “lift me out of poverty” 
(Mkhabela, ID Books, SABC). Thus, by becoming the saviour and delivering on his 
promises, Mbeki and his government apparently cures the plight of poverty. 
 
Mbeki also visits the Rand Easter Show in a broadcast of the same name. He laughs, 
smiles, and speaks jovially with the gathered crowd. In another medium close-up, Mbeki 
signs an autograph for a young Indian girl on the back of her sweater, and she receives it 
with delight (see Image 5.2). In Campaign Trail and Thabo Mbeki visits the Rand Show, Mbeki 
waves to the crowds in eye level mid shots, shakes hands in with the electorate medium 
close-up, and speaks to the crowds in a packed stadium in wide shots, moving to mid 
shots (Images 5.3 – 5.5). Edward T Hall referred to close-up shots as the “personal 
proxemic” (1982: 118) while Gianetti (1990: 64) maintains that the distance between the 
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camera and the subject on screen mirrors the emotional distance between subject and 
viewer. Bucy and Grabe (2009: 203) observe that television close-ups promote the 
illusion of face-to-face contact with the candidate. Ergo, the closer Mbeki appears to the 
audience on screen, the greater the viewer’s supposed emotional attachment to him. The 
propensity of medium close-up shots in these various broadcasts present Mbeki in a 
conversational distance, emphasizing emotion and relation to the viewer.  
 
Image 5.2: Mbeki visits the Rand Show, SABC, 2004. “Mbeki and the Indian girl” 
	
Image 5.3: Campaign Trail, SABC, 2004. “Mbeki mid-shot at rally” 
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Image 5.4: Mbeki visits the Rand Show, SABC, 2004. “Mbeki in MCU” 
	
Image 5.5: Mbeki visits the Rand Show, SABC, 2004. “Mbeki waving in mid shot” 
 
While the SABC frames Mbeki in this “personal distance” frequently, implying his 
emotional attachment with the electorate, Mattes (2005: 51-2) refutes this attachment, 
arguing that the public opinion dropped 20 percentage points between Mandela’s 
presidency and Mbeki’s. Davis observes that “an SABC spokesperson [alleged] on radio 
that the SABC had to ‘compensate’ for the ‘Mbeki-bashing’ characteristic of other 
sections of the media” (2005: 232). The SABC’s apparent framing of the president as a 
“man of the people” was seemingly part of this demand and plays into Mbeki’s concept 
of the African Pride – positive news framing might counteract the perceived negativity 
surrounding Africans. Myburgh’s (2006) concern that the SABC lacked objectivity 
throughout 2004 also seems to play out here. So, while 1999’s SABC coverage was 
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critical of the ruling government, in 2004 the channel appeared far more biased towards 
positive frames of the ANC, in particular Mbeki. 
2.2.3 Personalities fix problems in paradise 
While the first ten years of democracy in South Africa are generally considered a 
consolidation of the democratic process (Friedman, 2005: 4), the decade was not without 
its problems, and local media picked up on these issues. Each of the smaller parties – the 
African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), the New Labour Party (NLP), and the NA 
represented on the SABC’s Small Party Campaigns – had an anti-crime proposal in their 
manifestos. However, at no point in the sample was the issue of “crime” overtly tackled. 
Instead, the SABC presented a pro-police broadcast where officers tracked down and 
apprehended criminals, including drug dealers, murderers, car thieves, illegal immigrants, 
and what appeared to be prostitutes (Police, SABC), but without acknowledging that the 
government had largely failed to control crime in the city centres. 55 Finally, although the 
SABC’s ID Books was quite clearly designed as a pro-ANC campaign message, it implies 
that government grants are the only way out of poverty for some elderly South Africans, 
without raising the problem of slow government bureaucracy. 
 
Jacobs (1999: 149, 158) and Duncan (2009: 218) argue that there was a disjuncture 
between the media and the electorate’s priorities of issues in the second and third 
elections. While the 1999 and 2004 samples are small, the few broadcasts from the SABC 
and eTV suggest that the local media do in fact attempt to portray citizen concerns, 
albeit from the authority’s perspective. In the SABC’s Police, ID Books, and Small Party 
Campaigns, and eTV’s Election 2004, crime and poverty seem pervasive problems. 
Unfortunately, it seems that the local media – particularly the SABC – were influenced in 
																																																								
55	Robert Mattes conducted large-scale public opinion research and found that South Africans were 
broadly critical of the government’s efforts to control crime (2005: 51).	
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the African Pride narrative and thus unable to adequately criticise the government’s 
response to either of these two issues. In a personality-driven narrative, the police control 
crime and Mbeki alleviates poverty. 
 
2.4 Profiles of the electorate 
The small sample did not give as much breadth to the portrayal of the 2004 electorate as 
other years, but four interesting themes were noted: the singing and dancing electorate 
on local channels, the rising black middle class, the poor black majority, and a much 
shallower view of the youth vote (as compared to the SABC’s view of the youth in 1999). 
2.4.1 Singing and dancing electorate 
As the only channel to report the run-up to the election, the SABC portrayed the 
members of the IFP, NNP, AZAPO, DA, PAC, and the New Labour Party singing, 
dancing, and applauding leaders during the election campaign. Multiracial DA members 
sang and danced to contemporary music in town halls, while AZAPO and the PAC 
danced while marching up the streets. These swaying bodies of supporters are 
reminiscent of Mbembe’s (2015: 129) observation that the “postcolonised subject” 
provides fealty to the ruling party through dance. Mbembe remarks that when “the body 
that dances, dresses in the party uniform, fills the roads, ‘assembles en masse’ to applaud 
the passing presidential procession in a ritual of confirmation”, these very acts 
“dramatize its subordination through such small tokens of fealty” (ibid.). The only 
people seen to move in this way are black supporters, however – white supporters are 
often sombre, solemn, and, when they do dance, awkwardly stiff. The ANC, National 
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Action (NA)56, and Freedom Front Plus (FF+) members were sombre in sharply 
juxtaposing imagery. The FF+ hosted a poorly attended conference in an indoor venue; 
the NA members sat in a quiet, elegant garden setting; while depiction of the ANC, in 
contrast to previous and subsequent election years, was entirely without singing, dancing, 
or jubilation, only business.  
 
A large IFP rally on the SABC’s DA/IFP Campaigning signifies Piper’s allegation that the 
party was “a hybrid between a charismatic church meeting and a rave” (2005: 156). 
Anchor Joanne Josephs observes, “Ancient and modern converged in KwaZulu-Natal 
today as thousands of people came together for a traditional gathering of IFP 
supporters” (DA/IFP Campaigning, SABC). A wide shot of dancing young Zulu girls, 
each wearing traditional clothing, cuts to hand-held shots of a close-up Kwaito star 
dressed in a gaudy yellow suit. Zulu men in warrior clothing stamp their feet and tell the 
story of their ancestors, before a low angle of two besuited men sing Kwaito songs into 
microphones, punching their fists into the air in close-up. The jarring cutaways (Images 
5.6 – 5.8) juxtapose the traditional with the modern and echo the IFP’s eternal struggle, 
in both politics and a shifting society, which Piper highlights too (2005: 155). 
	
Image 5.6: DA/IFP campaigning, SABC, 2004. “Reed skirt dancers” 
																																																								
56 The National Action was a short-lived political party formed by Cassie Aucamp during the floor-crossing 
period in 2003. Other Afrikaner-centric parties joined the FF+, but the NA wanted to remain separate. 
With no seats won in the 2004 election, the party eventually died out. 
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Image 5.7: DA/IFP campaigning, SABC, 2004. “Warrior dancers” 
	
Image 5.8: DA/IFP campaigning, SABC, 2004. “Kwaito stars” 
 
As a side note to how the SABC represented the IFP, DA/IFP Campaigning ends with a 
wide shot of policemen standing around a Nyala truck,57 demonstrating anchor Joanne 
Josephs’ priming: “20 000 policemen stood by in Nongoma as IFP leader Mangosuthu 
Buthelezi renewed his call for a peaceful ballot”. Piombo & Nijzink suggest political 
violence had almost completely ceased by 2004, although there were still some 
“hotspots” of conflict (2005: 253). Because of this relatively calm process, the focus on 
control of politically motivated violence seems a paranoid action on the behalf of the 
SAPS to send such a large contingent of police to the event and a strange angle for the 
SABC to take. The channel seemingly fell into already-known stereotypes of the IFP as 
																																																								
57 The RG-12 Nyala Armoured Personnel Carrier, or just Nyala, is specifically designed for the South 
African Police Service for riot control. The vehicle can carry 6 crew and has mesh-covered, bullet resistant 
windows. 
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“traditionally” violent, ergo the framing the party as a “threat” to be controlled. Fair and 
Astroff argue along much the same lines: South African authorities are often positioned 
as “the bringers of law and order” (1991: 58) while (US) news media assume 
homogeneousness in violence and blackness (ibid.: 65). Yet the SABC do not frame all 
black political parties in this way – just the IFP. The traditionally black PAC and 
AZAPO are shown marching under a banner and singing in church halls, without the 
same kind of intimidating “hands up” stance symbolic of the IFP. Fair and Astroff’s 
argument thus seems pertinent to the SABC too – the IFP must be “controlled” by the 
authorities, which come in the form of 20 000 police officers standing by at an IFP rally.  
  2.4.2 The rising black middle class 
AP’s South Africa preview is a snapshot of the wealthy lifestyle Sisa Ngebulana enjoys in the 
suburbs of Johannesburg. The journalist follows the Billion Group property executive 
from his mansion in the gated Dainfern housing estate in Johannesburg to his luxury 
Mercedes Benz, until he arrives at his sparsely furnished office. Ngebulana speaks about 
how grateful he is for the opportunities afforded to him through democracy and that he 
“would never have imagined it”. He is clearly one of the “beneficiaries of democratic 
rule” and “black empowerment”, as the journalist states. To signify his success, 
Ngebulana, dressed in a snappy black suit, steps out of the front door of his mansion 
(Image 5.9) and opens the boot of his luxury Mercedes Benz, the number plate 
personalised with “Ngebs”. Strangely, Ngebulana’s messy car seems to be the focal point 
during these scenes – the litter-filled boot is a focal shot and, when Ngebulana enters the 
car, the camera films this through the passenger-side door, showing a foot well covered 
in paper and junk food wrappers (Image 5.10-5.11). It seems unnecessary to show this, 
and the mess contradicts Ngebulana’s polished appearance expected of a “top 
executive”.  When Ngebulana arrives at his office, the sparse furniture and piled up 
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papers (Image 5.12) don’t signify a successful executive of one of South Africa’s largest 
property development and investment groups. The messy car, the “gratefulness” 
Ngebulana proffers for democracy, and the sparse office evoke the controversial 
“window dressing” narrative. 
 
Image 5.9: South Africa preview, AP, 2004. “Ngebulana’s mansion” 
	
Image 5.10: South Africa preview, AP, 2004. “Ngebulana’s messy car boot” 
	
Image 5.11: South Africa preview, AP, 2004. “Ngebulana’s messy car” 
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Image 5.12: South Africa preview, AP, 2004. “Ngebulana’s sparse office” 
 
Berliner explains that this term refers to policies and actions that are “impressive to 
international donors and media but of little use for real social or political action” (2015: 
2), while Magubane suggests window dressing indicates policies with “very little 
substance” (2006: 752). During the early years of transformation in South Africa, there 
was a perception that companies placed people who simply “looked right” in executive 
positions to fulfil Black Economic Empowerment transformation guidelines, while 
continuing as usual behind the scenes. In the AP broadcast, Ngebulana appears hastily 
thrown into the wealthy position – the sparse office he holds doesn’t fit with his lavish 
mansion and luxury car, while the messy interior of the car sits uneasily with the 
anchored label of a “top executive”.58  
2.4.3 The poor black majority 
Ngebulana’s lush lifestyle contrasts starkly with the lived experiences of the majority of 
black people in the country, and the AP broadcast is a harsh reminder of that divide. 
“For thousands, democracy has brought nothing but empty promises” (South Africa 
preview, AP), the journalist explains, as we watch smoke rise over tin roofs, creating a layer 
																																																								
58 Sisa Ngebulana is a highly qualified lawyer, holding an LLB from the University of KwaZulu-Natal and a 
Masters degree from the Rand Afrikaans University. He has also held directorships in multiple property 
and investment companies (cf. http://whoswho.co.za/sisa-ngebulana-8453). Despite this impressive CV, 
Ngebulana’s portrayal on the AP broadcast is simplified and stereotyped into a “window-dressing” 
narrative.  
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of smog over the expansive township. Black people meander up a mud path lined with 
rubbish; children in tattered clothing cycle down the dirt road between silver shacks; 
black men pump water into containers and the journalist explains how “people are 
bitterly disillusioned” in the township of Jerusalem, Johannesburg. The township’s name 
refers to the ‘promised land’, and the irony is striking. The AP journalist deliberately 
highlights the juxtaposition between Ngebulana’s fortunate existence and the dire 
hardship of the majority to show, he states, just how much further the ANC government 
has to go to “improve the lot of the masses”. While the SABC promotes the 
government’s ability to improve the lives of all by delivering on promises (in Police and 
ID Books particularly), AP suggests the electorate is increasingly “disillusioned” and the 
ANC has to work much harder to keep their promises. 
2.4.4 The youth 
The IEC did not capture demographic information such as age and gender differences 
during the 1994 election; neither was there a voter’s roll (Ballington & Fick, 1999: 91). 
Hence, the number of young people voting in the first election was not identified. Even 
in 1999, the youth registration or turnout statistics are difficult to ascertain. By 2004, 
however, the IEC appeared to have galvanised their efforts in recording the statistics of 
the youth: 44.5% of all registered voters were aged between 18 and 35, representing the 
“youth”. The Electoral Commission of South Africa’s Election Report (Tlakula, 2004) 
states that this percentage  
gives us a reason to believe that ours is not a crisis of youth being lost as a 
generation, as others have said before. To the contrary, this is an indication of 
the growing support and appreciation by South Africans of all ages of the value 
of the vote as a means of participation in the governance process of their 
country. 
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Tlakula’s claim might be an overstatement – most researchers (Piombo & Nijzink, 2005: 
252; Schulz-Herzenberg, 2014a: 189) bemoan the drop in voter turnout between 1994 
and 2004 (and onwards), of which the meagre youth registration is part. By 2014 the 
disillusionment in political parties and the process meant that only 33% of 18—19-year-
olds eligible to vote actually registered (Tracey, 2014: 21). Tracey argues that the 
reluctance to register has more to do with disillusionment in South African political 
parties rather than mere apathy. 
 
In the SABC’s 1999 broadcast Election 99 Sowetan Youth, journalist Linda van Tilburg 
interviews five Sowetan students and concludes that the South African youth are 
“apathetic”. Upon analysis, these young people seemed quite the opposite. The five 
students were critical of the government, engaged in the political process albeit quiet 
disillusioned, and enthusiastic about future political developments. In the SABC’s only 
youth-focused broadcast Mbeki visits the Rand Show in 2004, young people crowd around 
Mbeki at a vote-catch event as the president rejects the idea that the youth are apathetic. 
While the youth of 1999 were allowed critical voices on the SABC (about corruption, the 
AIDS crisis, and Mandela’s cabinet), in 2004 they are only spoken about, signalling the 
SABC’s focus on pro-government narratives rather than electorate profiles. 
 
2.5 Control of violence 
In the final theme of the 2004 election sample, local journalists highlighted the control of 
the threat of violence on broadcast in particular. This theme was already touched on in 
the depiction of democracy and how personalities fix problems in paradise. Local 
channels focused on the police and military as an intermediary force in a personality-
driven narrative style. 
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On the SABC’s Police, Preshane Pillay follows the police officers on a raid in Pretoria, to 
“make sure the polls are safe on Wednesday”. Police raided suburbs and arrested 66 
people and “seized Mandrax, cocaine, dagga, and stolen vehicles” (Raghnuath, Police, 
SABC). The discourse and the visuals are particularly telling of how the SABC view this 
authoritarian crackdown on the eve of the election. A high-speed police chase, filmed 
from within the following vehicle, leads to a side-of-the-road arrest in dim torchlight. 
Uniformed police form a line in the foreground with suspects barely visible beyond. An 
armed police officer marches up a flight of stairs, with the camera light focused on a gun 
tucked into his trousers and the journalist follows the officer from room to room. 
Uniformed officers apprehend Indian men on the side of the road, scrutinising 
documents, and rooting through their open car boot. Police officers are often in the 
foreground of shots with the “criminals” or suspects in the background, and so shots are 
framed from the authorities’ point of view (see Images 5.13 – 5.16).  
	
Image 5.13: Police, SABC, 2004. “Cops foregrounded” 
	
Image 5.14: Police, SABC, 2004. “Cops in subjective angle” 
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Image 5.15: Police, SABC, 2004. “Cops followed into rooms” 
	
Image 5.16: Police, SABC, 2004. “On the side of the police” 
 
The viewer always “follows” the police officer, rather than watches the authorities enter 
the room or scene, implying that the journalist is on the “side” of the authorities rather 
than the “side” of the suspects. This “subjective narrative angle” (Chandler, 1994; du 
Plooy, 2009: 171) positions the subject on screen either facing the same direction as the 
viewer, or allows the viewer to see the action through the subject’s point of view. For 
example, watching the police chase inside a police vehicle is a subjective angle, while 
watching it from the street as the vehicle passes would be objective. Du Plooy argues 
that subjective camera angles assume “the viewpoint of one of the persons who are 
involved in the scene… This camera position is frequently used for instructional and 
marketing purposes, or to increase the tension in a dramatic scene because it increases 
the reader’s involvement” (2009: 171). This broadcast not only seems to enhance the 
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drama of the otherwise “boring” election, it also reiterates Fair and Astroff’s argument 
that the authorities in South Africa are viewed as unambiguous “bringers of law and 
order” (1991: 58). The embedded journalists almost automatically take the side of the 
authorities and the SABC again shows signs of Mbeki’s African Pride concept – 
highlighting the positive attributes of authorities, rather than the negative. 
 
3 DISCUSSION OF 2004 
 
Despite the small sample available, two main themes characterised the 2004 election: 
local and global perspectives about South Africa’s decade-old democracy differed greatly, 
and broadcasters approached the election with stark binaries. Ultimately, the global 
broadcast’s disparaging view of post-apartheid South Africa contrasted with South 
Africa’s formulaic and pro-government African Pride narratives. 
 
3.1 Images of democracy 
3.1.1 Perception of the government  
Local channels tended to take a sympathetic view of the government in 2004, which is 
different from the 1999 coverage. Mbeki was glamorised throughout the SABC coverage, 
signing autographs like a celebrity, laughing and joking with officials and the electorate, 
and acting as a guiding spirit in alleviating poverty. Mbeki seemed “in touch” with his 
electorate, but the reality could not be further from the truth. Along with having a 
“political tin ear” and perceived as being aloof and academic, Mbeki was detached from 
the majority of his electorate by 2004. It seems that eTV and the SABC ignore this flaw; 
instead, a kind of “sunshine journalism” is applied and problems are glossed over in 
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favour of highlighting the simplistic, the good, and the positive news. This kind of 
journalism is reminiscent of Mbeki’s African Pride concept, whereby journalists were 
prompted to be an African first, a journalist second, and avoid negative typecasting of 
Africa (Saidykhan, 2007).  
 
Unfortunately, this kind of framing flattens the experiences of South Africans. Duncan 
warns that local media that does not adequately represent its populace “has serious 
implications, as it fosters a society that is unable to see itself, and respond to its most 
pressing problems” (2014a: 92). Temin and Smith (2002: 593) and Waldahl (2005a) 
suggest that shallow and narrow frames exist on some African media because of 
government involvement, which ultimately hinders reporters in presenting “watchdog” 
journalism. While it’s not clear that the ANC had a direct influence in local journalism, 
researchers (Jacobs, 1999: 156; Davis, 200559; Gouws & De Beer, 2008; Sparks, 2009; 
Wasserman & De Beer, 2009; Malila, 2014) suggest that a chilling effect did occur, largely 
due to Mbeki’s quest for unquestioning loyalty from the media.  
 
In the single AP broadcast, the government was implicitly to blame uplifting the few at 
the expense of the many – Ngebulana lives the life of luxury while the majority of black 
South Africans wallow in disappointment and disillusionment, dire poverty a harsh 
reminder of the ANC’s failure to deliver in the last decade. Democracy should have 
brought development to the nation, but the government appears to have “window-
dressed” a lucky few and carried on as normal. 
																																																								
59 Davis (2005: 234) finds that there was no real quantitative bias towards the ANC on television in 2004. 
He maintains that the ANC received more coverage, time wise, on eTV than the SABC, which is not 
reflected in my own study. While my own sample doesn’t cover nearly as many broadcasts as Davis – he 
also analysed pre-election broadcasts – there was only a slight quantitative bias in the ANC coverage 
compared to other parties in the SABC sample, while qualitatively the ANC got much more in-depth and 
favourable coverage than other parties on both eTV and the SABC. My methodology differs from Davis 
and takes into account narratives and semiotics, which may account for the discrepancy. 
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As with the findings of 1999, the representation of the ANC in 2004 is far more nuanced 
than the literature of the time suggests. The authorities, including Mbeki, are glorified 
through discourse but also through camera angles. Most research about the elections in 
South Africa only takes into account discourse and tones (Davis, 2005; MMA, 1999), 
rather than looking at the visualisation. This analysis of the 2004 election therefore 
highlights how the authorities are often revered on local media through angles, discourse, 
and juxtaposition.  
3.1.2 Problems in paradise 
While the SABC inferred that poverty still exists in South Africa (ID Books, SABC), the 
issue is manifest on the AP broadcast (South Africa preview). Ms Mkhabela states that the 
new ID book “will change my life and lift me out of poverty” in ID Books, but we do not 
see anything like the kind of miserable existence evident on the AP broadcast. It is only 
AP that juxtaposes the wealth afforded to the black middle class and the desperation of 
the majority of South Africans. Instead, the SABC tends to take a “sunshine journalism” 
view of South African society in this sample: the only mention of South Africa’ “crime 
wave” (Russell, 2009: 109; Burger, 2009: 5) is that the police ensure a safe election 
through a large-scale raid in Pretoria in Police; and poverty, while a systemic issue 
confirmed by the increased Gini Coefficient (StatsSA, 2002, 2008), does not appear 
merciless or dire in ID Books. The AP broadcast, however, uses narrative journalism and 
juxtaposition to highlight just how stark the divisions still are in South Africa, yet does 




 3.2 Juxtapositions  
As seen throughout the sample, reporters depicted stark juxtapositions in political party 
atmosphere, images wealth and poverty, and the ancient and modern approach to the 
IFP’s political rallies. Intercutting these images and sound resulted in sudden and often 
jarring contrasts. On AP’s South Africa preview, Sisa Ngebulana’s immense wealth, signified 
through his ownership of a luxury vehicle, a mansion in a gated community, and a top 
executive job, is sharply contrasted with images of desperate poverty experienced by the 
black masses in South Africa (see Images 5.17 – 5.18). Sewage seeps down mud streets, 
water is only accessible through communal taps, and children play in filthy conditions. In 
pitting one side of fortune against the dismally poor other, AP thus creates the narrative 
that the ANC government has not yet fulfilled its promise of “A Better Life for All”.  
	
Image 5.17: South Africa Preview, AP, 2004. “Starkness: Dainfern wide shot” 
 
Image 5.18: South Africa Preview, AP, 2004. “Starkness: Jerusalem wide shot” 
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Yet this polarised starkness was not limited to global broadcasts only – the SABC also 
employed juxtaposition. During Small Party Campaigns, the SABC reporter follows the 
NLP, a small regional Cape Town party, as supporters jovially shout and dance in the 
streets of Atlantis. The shrill audio matches the brash actions of the coloured NLP 
supporters as they ride six abreast on car rooftops, waving at the camera and provoking 
onlookers with vulgar hand gestures. Suddenly, the report cuts to a silent, sombre garden 
party where white NA supporters sit contentedly around tables in the shade. The sudden 
change from shrill audio to flat silence is jarring. The SABC report creates, very clearly, a 
narrative of two distinct sections of South African society, separated not only through 
race, but also class and the approach to campaign rallies. The SABC and AP thus create 
binaries between two sides: wealth and poverty, shrillness and silence, and party 
campaigning. Binaries were commonplace in the 2004 election coverage on both local 
and global broadcasts, and creatively depict the accurate divisions between sections of 





In summary, then, the sampled 2004 election broadcasts presented two main narratives: 
the local broadcasts, but especially the SABC, told the story of a government in charge 
and successfully assisting a diverse electorate, with a president who was a popular “man 
of the people”. This pro-government narrative is a symptom of the ANC’s increased 
involvement in the public broadcaster’s policies and editorial board. The global broadcast 
from AP, however, juxtaposed wealth and poverty as a way as to comment on the failure 
of the South African government to bring a “Better Life for All”, without taking into 
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account the many economic, social, and cultural hurdles that prevent efficient 
transformation. It ultimately framed democracy through binaries reminiscent of David 
Spurr’s (1994: 19) writings on postcolonial Africa. Spurr and Nay (2013: 5) believe that 
global news coverage of African elections tends to fall on one side the development 
binary: the promise of development (becoming an idealised Westernised state), or the 
disappointment of development (failure of that Westernising influence). Framing 
democracy in this way, as an “either-or” concept, tends to trivialise complex political 





















The number of broadcasts available for 2009 increased sharply due to improved 
digitisation and storage techniques, and the final tally came to 46. The channels available 
ranged from state owned broadcasters to online-only, alternative channels. Chapter 6 
follows a similar structure to previous chapters and opens with a background of the 
election, including societal and political issues that set the stage for the 2009 “Zunami”60. 
It then moves on to presenting the findings, first the frequency analysis of event and 
political party coverage, and then the qualitative analysis of themes. These themes were 
broadly grouped into three sections: the portrayal of Jacob Zuma and the repercussions 
of framing the candidate as a celebrity; democracy in action on global channels, where 
populism and the game frame take precedence in the coverage; and democracy in action 
on local channels, portrayed through process-oriented coverage that was disappointingly 
narrow. The chapter ends with a discussion of the main narratives and a summary of the 
findings. Chapter 6 posits that the international broadcasters depicted a lingering doubt 
over Zuma’s fitness for office, and presented the game frame between the pragmatism of 
the youth and opposition and the ANC’s threatening populist tendencies. Additionally, 
global journalists appeared to seek out the “why” in the ANC’s mysterious victory, but 
were hindered because of shallow frames. Local broadcasts, however, did not even seek 
the “why” and instead focused on process-oriented coverage that remained mostly 
ignorant of controversial topics. 
																																																								
60 “Zunami” refers to Jacob Zuma’s unstoppable win at both Polokwane in December 2007 and the 
general election in April 2009. The term was coined by COSATU secretary general Zwelizima Vavi (Du 
Preez, 2013: 119) and is the title of Roger Southall’s detailed analysis of the 2009 election.	
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1 BACKGROUND TO 2009 
 
“South Africa had had the liberation saint. It had then had the African intellectual. In 2009 it looked 
set to embark on rule by a charismatic populist.” 
(Russell, 2009: 259) 
 
1.1 The ousting of a king 
Mbeki’s nine-year presidency was turbulent. His denialist attitude towards HIV/AIDS 
caused an explosion in the disease, resulting in a pandemic that killed 18.5% of the 
country’s adult population by 2007 (South Africa - CIA Factbook, 2017). Mbeki negotiated 
the global financial crisis towards the end of 2007 and, in May 2008, a period of 
xenophobic violence that left 62 dead, thousands displaced, and an ill taste in the mouths 
of South Africans and investors alike (Neocosmos, 2010). Southall (2009: 2) observes 
three issues that precluded the 2009 elections: demographic changes among the potential 
electorate, including a brain drain and increased HIV/AIDS deaths and infections; 
inequality and poverty that exacerbated the despondency towards the ANC; and service 
delivery backlogs increased community protests. Butler (2009: 66) also notes that citizens 
no longer trusted national institutions by 2009 and the increase in protest campaigns 
pointed to increased intolerance for cronyism and corruption at the local level. At the 
same time, the ANC was on the verge of a catastrophic split in ideologies that resulted in 
the “Mbeki camp and the Zuma camp” (Du Preez, 2013: 102). Yet this split had not 
always existed. 
 
In 1999, Mbeki had insisted that Zuma be his deputy president: the two had a long 
history and they often operated as a team, but were extremely different men. Mbeki, the 
well-educated, austere, urbane intellectual fashioned himself as a modern African leader 
yet conservative Western politician, a diplomat. Zuma meanwhile prides himself on his 
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traditional Zulu roots, is a practising polygamist, an “anti-intellectual” (Calland, 2013: 
11), and a former ANC intelligence chief. When Mbeki appointed Zuma as deputy 
president, he was aware that Zuma’s traditional identity would go down well with the 
Zulu speakers in KwaZulu-Natal (Du Preez, 2013: 98). In 1997, the IFP was still running 
the province but, as Du Preez (ibid.) acknowledges, it has become the ANC’s strongest 
province since Zuma took office. Mbeki chose Zuma as his deputy because no one, “not 
even Zuma himself, thought he had what it took to be president” and what better 
sidekick “than a man who could never have presidential ambitions and thus could never 
become a threat” (Du Preez, 2013: 98)?  
 
 1.2 Polokwane 2007 
When Mbeki attempted to run for a third term as ANC president in 2007, it was his 
ultimate undoing. As one of South Africa’s most surprising political outcomes post-1994, 
the ANC’s national elective conference (NEC) in Polokwane in December 2007 has 
been touted as a “spectacle of a lifetime” (Du Preez, 2013: 102). Political leaders shouted 
each other down during planned speeches, with some professing allegiance to the 
newcomer Jacob Zuma and others remaining aggressively loyal to the incumbent Thabo 
Mbeki. “Looking back now,” veteran journalist Max Du Preez admits, “Polokwane 2007 
signalled the moment when cheap populist politics, the culture of insults and threats, 
started flourishing in South Africa” (2013: 103). 
 
Jacob Zuma, the charismatic Zulu politician with the loud, rambunctious support of the 
ANC Youth League, had won the 2007 ANC election to the humiliating defeat of Mbeki. 
This moment signalled a shift in South African politics towards Stalingrad tactics that 
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would eventually create a split in the ANC not seen for forty years.61 In September 2008, 
the long-running corruption trial against Zuma suddenly floundered as high court judge 
Chris Nicholson declared, inter alia, that “undue political interference in Zuma’s 
prosecution” was at the hands of Mbeki. The Zuma camp moved quickly – on the 22nd 
of September, ANC secretary general Gwede Mantashe and deputy president Kgalema 
Motlanthe demanded Mbeki resign, visiting his official residence late at night. The next 
morning, Mbeki announced his resignation with dignity but rejected Judge Nicholson’s 
report. The country was briefly without a president until Motlanthe was sworn into office 
on the 25th of September. Du Preez echoes Frank Chikane62 and calls this recalling 
“close to a coup d’état” (2013: 105), arguing that it was “clearly in violation of the 
constitution. The president is elected by parliament and cannot be ‘recalled’ by a political 
party” (ibid.). The National Prosecuting Agency (NPA) shortly afterwards served Zuma 
with an indictment for corruption, fraud, and racketeering. Nevertheless, the Zuma camp 
had got what they wanted – Mbeki was officially out of the picture and Zuma was free to 
run for president in the general election in 2009. The new, fresh start was about to begin, 
supporters declared, as Zuma’s touted progressiveness heralded a significant step to the 
left. As Du Preez contends, “they were wrong on both counts” (ibid.).  
 
1.3 A push towards populism 
A strange hand gesture was often seen during the Polokwane conference: the “wheeling 
hands that football managers use when they wish to signal a substitution” (Calland, 2013: 
159). These were the hands of Julius Malema, president of the ANC Youth league, a 
																																																								
61 In 1959, a group of Africanists broke away from the ANC as they opposed the party’s collaboration 
with white and Asian people. They formed the rival liberation movement, the Pan Africanist Congress, 
which later organised the ill-fated Sharpeville march.  
62 Chikane was director-general of the presidency from 1994 to 2010, and author of bestseller Eight Days in 
September: the Removal of Thabo Mbeki (2012).  
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position once occupied by Nelson Mandela in the 1940s, and his many Youth League 
followers. Calland is particularly indurate when describing the “neo-fascist” Malema, his 
followers, and the rising populism within the ANC, which is apparently “denuded of 
political principle or any ideology, driven only by the politics of voracious self-
enrichment” (2013: 187). Malema, he suggests, relies on military rhetoric and populist 
demagoguery politics to stir emotions of disgruntled working classes in order to mobilise 
the masses to acquire power.  
 
The push towards populism was iconic of Malema’s style of politicking during this 
period. Malema famously stated that he would “kill for Zuma” (Du Preez, 2013: 119), 
and frequently led rousing renditions of Zuma’s campaign theme song “Umshini 
Wami”.63 Zuma very clearly had the support of the rowdy Youth League, which helped 
the Zunami sweep away all opposition. Butler (2009: 69) observes that this populism 
marked the beginning of a period of extravagant incendiary rhetoric, directed not only at 
opposition parties but also the NPA and the judiciary. 
 
1.4 100% Zulu boy 
Zuma represented a refreshing gasp of air after Mbeki’s austere presidency. His Zuluness 
and traditional identity set him apart in the rising feeling amongst South Africans that the 
rural poor were not represented in government. Russell (2009: 255) finds that Zuma “has 
the populist trait of tending to say what his audiences want to hear” and that when he 
speaks to his followers in Zulu, “he was behaving not as a tribalist but as a true African 
leader” (ibid.: 258). His heritage also ensured that the book was ultimately closed on IFP 
																																																								
63	Umshini Wami translates as “Bring me my machine”. The song originated from MK soldiers during the 
Struggle. The implication is that “machine” refers to “machine gun” and the armed struggle against 
apartheid, but Dubin (2012: 69-72) fears that Zuma’s use of the song post-apartheid is misplaced; firstly 
because of the sexual connotation and Zuma’s repugnant rape trial, and secondly for inciting violence 
during the xenophobic attacks in 2008.	
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nationhood in KwaZulu-Natal (Du Preez, 2013: 98). During Zuma’s high profile rape 
trial, swarms of loyal supporters wore shirts depicting Zuma’s smiling face with the 
words “100% Zulu boy” emblazoned below (see Image 6.1).64 
 
Image 6.1:  “100% Zulu Boy”65 
 
As a child, Zuma was a cattle herder in the rural hills of Nkandla. He had no formal 
education, learned to read and write only as an adult, and was arrested in June 1963 while 
conspiring with MK to overthrow the government. He spent a decade on Robben Island 
and as soon as he was released back to Nkandla, resumed his political activities as 
recruiter and transporter of soldiers for MK, under Harry Gwala. In 1975, Zuma fled 
into exile following Gwala’s arrest. In 1987, he was appointed as the ANC’s Chief of 
Intelligence at the movement’s exile base in Lusaka, Zambia, and commanded the 
Mandla Judson Kuzwayo (MJK) unit, an underground counter-intelligence unit. In early 
1990, Zuma re-entered South Africa to work with the ANC steering committee on the 
negotiation process in KwaZulu-Natal. In December 1994 Zuma was elected as 
																																																								
64 The use of “Zulu boy” in connection with Zuma’s rape trial has always been problematic. Supporters of 
the then-deputy president accused the media and the courts of being “anti-Zulu” in their depiction of the 
trial, and that Zuma was simply being true to his Zulu heritage. Robins (2008) analyses the sexual politics 





Chairperson of the ANC in the province as well as national Chairperson of the ANC. 
From 1999 to 2005, Zuma served as Mbeki’s deputy president. 
 
His Zulu name, Gedleyihlekisa, is constructed from the Zulu phrase that translates as, 
“the one who smiles in your face while causing you harm” (Du Preez, 2013: 97). His 
political career has certainly followed that aptronym. Zuma’s rise to power had not been 
easy, nor without controversy, yet he always managed to return to office smiling. In 
2005, he was sacked as deputy president over allegations of corruption with his disgraced 
financial adviser Schabir Shaik, yet remained deputy president of the ANC. This divided 
the party, with a groundswell of support for Zuma rising within the ranks of the ANC. 
The Schabir Shaik court case led to further investigations of Zuma’s financial records. 
On top of these mounting problems, he was accused of raping Fezekile Ntsukela 
Kuzwayo, known as Khwezi, in October 2005 but denied the charges. The matter went 
to court in February 2006 and Zuma stated he knowingly had unprotected sex with HIV-
positive Khwezi but had a shower afterwards “to protect himself” from the disease.66 He 
was acquitted of rape in May 2006 after an extensively publicised trial and subsequently 
reinstated as ANC deputy president. The NPA finally withdrew the corruption charges in 
May 2009, two weeks before the general election. 
 
Zuma inherited a delicate political position as president of the ANC. He faced the 
challenge of keeping the party together as well as his winning alliance in the aftermath of 
Polokwane. The party had, at that point, “no real ideological underpinning. [The ANC] 
are together in opposition to something, not in promotion of something. All experience 
of political science suggests that, unless you are together for something, you stand the 
																																																								
66	This statement has been the focus of many mockeries of Zuma, including local cartoonist Zapiro’s 
caricature of the president with a shower on top of his head.	
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risk of being pulled in all directions at once” (Saki Macozoma, Mbeki confidant, quoted 
in Russell, 2009: 256). The ANC’s campaign manifesto was thus wide-ranging, detailed, 
“boring, and low-key” (Butler, 2009: 72), with unemployment, health, education, rural 
development, and a reduction in crime and corruption as top priorities. Their campaign 
also revolved around Zuma’s personality, his Zulu identity, and popularity with the 
masses. Zuma visited the many disparate sections of South African society and courted 
both the rich white suburbanites and the rural black Zulus. Russell was particularly 
concerned about the “Big Man” (2009: 259) personality cult that followed Zuma around 
during the campaign trail, fearing that it masked the growing social and economic 
problems. Flamboyant rallies and mass meetings held in stadia packed to the brim with 
chanting and swaying loyalists included brief sightings of the frail, mute Nelson Mandela 
wheeled onto the stage and through the crowds in a golf buggy. Despite the ANC’s use 
of symbolism that promoted unity and using Mandela to appeal to ANC loyalty, Zuma’s 
on-going controversy caused an irreversible rift not only between Mbeki and Zuma, 
which Hamill calls the “Broedertwis” (2009: 4), or fight among brothers, but also the ANC 
itself: those who were loyal to Mbeki and those who followed the new blood, Zuma. 
 
1.5 Splitting of the rock: opposition  
Some of the ANC national executive members who voted for Mbeki at Polokwane in 
2007 agonised over whether to leave the movement to which they had devoted most of 
their lives (Russell, 2009: 270). When Mbeki was recalled in September 2008, their 
thinking was cemented. On December 16th 2008, South Africa’s Day of Reconciliation, 
and in a deliberate echo of the Freedom Charter launch that met in 1955 under the same 
name, the Congress of the People (or COPE) was launched. Headed by Mosiuoa 
“Terror” Lekota and Mbhazima “Sam” Shilowa, former ANC senior members and 
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Struggle activists, the party appealed to the black middle class who were wary of the left-
wing rhetoric of Zuma’s allies, as well as dispirited Mbekiites.  
 
Some hoped that the party would break the explosion-fizzle mould of start-up rival 
parties, and Calland notes that the party “might have some important attributes that 
previous new parties did not have or did not have enough of: cash; ANC genetics and, 
therefore, legitimacy decent leadership; and mobilising capacity on the ground” (2013: 
241). Major problems plagued the new party right from the start, however: the three 
main leaders, Mosiuoa “Terror” Lekota, Mbhazima “Sam” Shilowa, and the party’s 
eventual presidential candidate Mvume Dandala competed endlessly. The campaign also 
lacked visibility, strategy, and funding, and the ANC countered COPE on all levels, 
resisting the use of the name, disrupting meetings, and opposing by-elections (Booysen, 
2009: 89-100). The party’s manifesto was not dissimilar to the DA’s in that the core 
ideology consisted of progressivism, a belief in human rights, social justice, sustainable 
democracy, human development, and the rule of law and equity, and as a result, voters 
had little distinction between the two.  
 
The DA’s 2009 campaign effectively consolidated their position as the official 
opposition. Former investigative journalist and anti-apartheid activist Helen Zille took 
over from Tony Leon as party leader in 2007 and eventually became Premier of the 
Western Cape in 2009. For the first time, the DA gained an absolute majority in the 
Western Cape and contributed to keeping the ANC below the two-thirds parliamentary 
majority. However, the party was still unable to increase their coloured or black votes. 
The DA’s manifesto in 2009 focused on the eradication of poverty, the establishment of 
a quality education system, improving the fight against HIV/AIDS, and ultimately 
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promoting their Open Opportunity Society.67 Jolobe (2009: 146) notes, however, that a 
major weakness of the DA’s campaign strategy was targeting black voters because the 
lingering perception was still that the DA was a white, wealthy, middle class party. 
 
1.6 The 2009 election 
Calland exclaims that, “actually, there is not a lot to say” about opposition parties (2013: 
239). With the exception of the DA, the opposition has struggled in leadership, access to 
resources, and ultimately in competing with the ANC’s Struggle credentials. The IFP 
membership had been mostly amalgamated into the ANC thanks to Zuma’s reflection of 
Zulu ideals, while other smaller parties had been unceremoniously wiped off the 
parliamentary representation bill over the years. Calland believes that new parties are 
eventually “welcomed into, and smothered by, the warm embrace of the ANC’s 
commodious bosom” (2013: 161), while Heyn suggests a less cosy embrace as smaller 
parties are “squeezed into oblivion” (2009: 163). The UDM, ID, ACDP, Freedom Front 
Plus, and AZAPO all found attracting attention difficult because the spotlight was on the 
ANC, COPE, and the DA the majority of the time (ibid.). Ultimately, voters tended to 
see a vote for the smaller parties as a “waste”, as only the big three parties were capable 
of delivering: if voters did not support the government, then their vote often went to the 
most effective opposition grouping (ibid.: 177). Table 6.1 depicts the spread of votes in 
the 2009 election. The ANC received 65.9% of the vote, just 3.8% less than in the 2004 
election. This was mainly due to the masses of IFP supporters defecting to the ANC, 
which now had a traditional Zulu leader. 
 ANC DA COPE Total 
Percentage 65.9 16.6 7.42 17.6million 
Table 6.1: Percentage of votes per party in 2009 election68 
																																																								





The sample size for the 2009 election represented a gargantuan jump from the paltry 
2004 sample. A total of 46 broadcasts across 16 news channels from nine countries were 
available and, as seen in Graph 6.1, the majority of broadcasts came from CNN, the 
SABC, and the BBC. The considerable jump in the number of broadcasts might be 
symptomatic not only of the renewed interest in the South African election, but also of 
the enhanced technology: YouTube was founded in 2005 and the improved capabilities 
of digitising and storing broadcast news data online is an on-going process. 
 
Graph 6.169  
As Graph 6.2 depicts, channels were grouped together based on region for ease of 
explanation, with 14 broadcasts from five African channels, 16 European, 10 North 
																																																																																																																																																														
68 Statistics gathered from Southall & Daniel (2009). 
69	Under “African channels”, only two channels are from the continent: NTV, a Kenyan TV network and 
AfricaNews, broadcast from the Republic of Congo. The rest are broadcast out of South Africa. In 2008 
eTV launched its rolling news channel eNews in 2008, which subsequently rebranded as eNCA (eNews 
Channel Africa) in 2012. For ease of explanation, this study uses eTV for the pre-2009 broadcasts and 
eNCA for the post-2009 rolling news broadcasts. As with previous chapters, see Appendix 1 for a brief 
explanation of these channels.	
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American, and six designated as “Other”, including China (2), New Zealand (1), and the 
Middle East (3).  
 
Graph 6.2 
The following sections, as in the previous chapters, outline the frequency of event 
coverage and political party coverage, and the themes throughout the broadcasts, in 
order to investigate how, if at all, the four regions differ in the coverage of the 2009 
election. 
 
2.1 Frequency analysis 
  2.1.1 Events 
Overall, seven events were noted across all channels including: the actual voting day 
including set-up of stations, queues, and casting ballots; political party rallies and 
campaigns; Zuma’s court trial for corruption and rape; a frail Mandela voting in 
Houghton; the ANC victory celebrations; the standoff between Zuma and Mbeki; and 
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finally the vote counting process. Graph 6.3 depicts the total spread of event coverage, 




Graph 6.4    Graph 6.5 
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Graph 6.6    Graph 6.7 
The 2009 coverage focused more on the actual voting day than previous election years. 
North American and European focused on rallies, his court appearance, and the 
celebrations of the ANC victory more often than the African and Other channels. 
Conversely, these predominantly non-Western channels focused on vote counting and 
the actual voting day. These results point to the Western fixation on dramatizing the 
election: Zuma's court appearance, the exuberant rallies, and victory celebrations were all 
visually entertaining, and all Western channels mentioned Zuma’s scandalous past in 
almost every broadcast. Conversely, despite the five African channels referring to the 
ANC (see Graph 6.4) no African journalist discussed or depicted Zuma’s court case, his 
background, or the standoff between Zuma and Mbeki. Instead, the election process was 
key for African and Other channels: vote counting and the voting day seemed the most 
important.  
2.1.2 Political parties 
Graph 6.8 shows the total spread of political parties across all channels, while Graph 6.9 
represents the split between the regions, with the Other region representing only the 
ANC. As a common trend in the overall election coverage, the ANC received the largest 
representation on the news broadcasts, across all regions. The European channels 
dedicated the most broadcasts to the ANC, while the least were the North American 
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channels. Typical of previous election years too, the African channels gave more 






The majority of coverage was dedicated to the top three parties, the ANC, COPE, and 
the DA, effectively turning the election into, as Jane Duncan suggests, “a three and a half 
horse race” (2009: 220). The SABC tracked all “major” political parties as their leaders 
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voted on the polling day, which is why the UDM, the IFP, and the ID appear in this 
sample. The inclusion of these smaller parties may be due to the Proportional Access 
used in South Africa (Strom, 2007), whereby media coverage is based on the strength of 
support, and this makes it difficult for opposition parties to garner media coverage 
against the ruling party. 
 
CNN’s Election Oddballs broadcast focused on AZAPO's race-based exclusion policy, 
KISS’ charismatic founder, and the gendered WomanFirst party. The inclusion of these 
three minority parties in CNN’s ANC-dominated coverage is unclear if one only looks at 
the quantitative aspects of the coverage. Unlike the SABC’s trend of covering as many 
political parties as possible, global broadcasters tend to only focus on the “big three” 
over the years – the DA, ANC, and interchangeably the IFP, COPE, NP, and so on. As 
seen later in this section, Western news channels tended to favour the 2009 opposition in 
South Africa by implying that the diverse nature of the many parties would eat away at 
the ANC’s “guaranteed win”. It therefore seems that CNN’s inclusion of AZAPO, 
WomanFirst, and KISS play into this narrative. Thus, time measurement alone does not 
adequately show how opposition was depicted in the broadcasts. Even though the ANC 
was mentioned far more often, across all channels, than the opposition, Western 
broadcasters gave more extensive coverage to opposition leaders than the ANC.  
  2.1.3 Who speaks 
As noted before, Cross (2010: 417) describes Knowns as people who are politicians, 
officials, or the elite. She (ibid.: 428) argues that the lack of political leadership sources 
points to the media-centric depiction of election strategies and activities, which trivialises 
the amount of information that the political leaders can provide. Graph 6.10 shows the 
split between the Knowns (65%) and Unknowns (35%) speaking during the sample 
	 230 
across all broadcasts.70 More Knowns spoke overall, and Graph 6.11 shows the 






70	“Speaks” was coded as being both a “lip flap” (Bucy & Grabe, 2007: 662), whereby the speaker is seen 
speaking but not heard – usually the journalist speaks over the top of the images, as well as synchronous 
sound – being heard at the same time as seen speaking.	
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Known speakers were predominantly political leaders – other Knowns included pundits, 
including business and political analysts, and Archbishop Desmond Tutu. Simple 
frequency numbers do not give an adequate picture of how these sources spoke during 
the sample, however. This section therefore explains that Mandela and Zuma were 
shown in “lip flap” rather than voiced directly; that punditry increased the distance 
between the political leaders and audience even further; and finally that the opposition 
were voiced directly more often, which gave these leaders more time and space to explain 
policy issues and campaign promises. 
 
Nelson Mandela was mute in this sample: the only time the former president “spoke” 
was in a lip flap71 from a previously recorded, formal speech that was reused across four 
broadcast, but he was not the only leader to appear in unflattering lip flap sound bites. 
As expected, due to the man’s plentiful appearances across the channels, Jacob Zuma 
“spoke” the most during the sample: journalists fixated on his image as if he were already 
president, yet the candidate hardly ever spoke directly to journalists. He spoke most 
frequently in prepared speeches that were depicted as lip flaps. Bucy and Grabe (2009: 
202) suggest that lip flaps are unflattering and are generally discouraged in political 
journalism:  
Lip flap is a type of audiovisual incongruency, which has been shown 
experimentally to prompt tune-out of the verbal channel (the reporter’s voice) 
and tune-in of the visual channel. Visual scenarios where attention is drawn to a 
candidate who appears voiceless but is awkwardly mouthing words cannot be 
taken as neutral coverage. 
																																																								
71 Bucy and Grabe (2009: 202) describe a lip flap as where the candidate is seen speaking on screen but not 
heard. 
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This type of framing positions Zuma as seen, but not heard, in a trend that Bucy and 
Grabe (2009: 74) suggest is common in Western political journalism. Zuma “speaks” 
most frequently in the 2009 sample, which highlights his importance, yet because of the 
lip flaps and prepared speeches, he remains distant and unknown. Zuma is essentially 
“re-voiced” in that the journalist speaks over the top of him, or uses political analysts to 
interpret his actions, words, and policies. 
 
The 2009 election coverage represented the first time that political analysts, or “pundits” 
(Cross, 2010: 417; Louw, 2005: 80), represented such a large slice of the Known 
speakers. CNN’s Nkepile Mabuse (South Africa election: inside Africa) interviews business 
analyst Karima Brown about Zuma’s effect on the rand, Sky News’s ANC’s Jacob Zuma 
divides South Africa voices a political analyst about Zuma’s corruption case, while Roxanne 
Lawson from TransAfrica Forum speaks about rifts within the ANC in VOA’s South 
Africa’s parliament selects a new president. On the SABC (Small party campaigns), Dr Chis 
Landsberg notes the ANC has restored its legitimacy and credibility, while Professor 
Susan Booysen refers to the “liberation narrative” surrounding the party, where people 
continue to vote for the ANC despite issues of delivery. As journalists use pundits to 
explain Zuma’s background, the corruption trial, and the ANC, these topics are reduced 
into small, “bite-sized” information quotes rather than a deep investigation with first-
hand sources from Zuma or the ANC. The lack of first hand sources indicates Zuma’s 
disdain for the media (discussed at length in Calland, 2013 and Duncan, 2009). Yet the 
use of pundits in place of first hand quotes increases the distance between Zuma and the 
viewers. This particular use of punditry to prophesise Zuma’s effect on South Africa 
post-election illustrates Cross’s (2010: 417) suggestion that pundits give the impression 
of objectivity, while Louw argues that “smooth talkers” offer “cultural fast-food – pre-
digested and pre-thought” (2005: 81). The increase in punditry indicates media-centric 
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election coverage, or mediatisation, but also highlights the deterioration of the 
relationship between the ANC and ANC leaders and journalists. 
 
While Zuma and the ANC were most frequently re-voiced in pundit quotes, opposition 
leaders were interviewed directly on both local and global channels, and given more time 
and space discuss policy issues and campaign strategies in their own voices. These leaders 
spoke chiefly about policy strategy, issues affecting South Africans, the strength of the 
opposition, and spoke most often through one-on-one interviews or at press 
conferences, rarely in a lip flap. Journalists interviewed opposition political leaders on the 
campaign trail and gave leaders adequate time to describe and explain their manifestos. 
Robyn Curnow from CNN interviews a COPE member in a bustling Sowetan 
marketplace about policy issues such as land, corruption, and implementation of policies 
(South Africa Today). The BBC’s Jack Fisher follows the COPE and DA campaign trail, 
interviewing Dandala on his branded party bus about siphoning ANC support and 
bringing morals back into politics (South Africa gets ready to vote), and the SABC follows 
Helen Zille as she returns to Cape Town, stating the DA will “realign politics” in South 
Africa (DA and ANC in the Western Cape). The direct contact with these leaders presented 
the opposition as knowable, understandable, and with detailed policy that could dislodge 
the ANC’s majority.  
 
Even though the opposition seems diverse, vibrant, willing to engage with journalists, 
and enthusiastic in these pieces, the overall narrative visual framing in the sample 
positions Zuma as a cult-like leader with an unshakably loyal support base that ensured a 
“guaranteed ANC win”, ultimately undermining this opposition party framing. The 
following section explores this contradictory framing through three narratives from 
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global and local broadcasts: the “Jacob Zuma Show” that visualised the leader’s cult-like 
following, and democracy in action on both international and South African channels. 
 
 2.2 The Jacob Zuma Show 
Although Zuma was framed as a personality on almost half of the 46 broadcasts, as 
journalists focused on his “controversial” nature and his image as a traditional “man of 
the people”, South African and indeed African channels did not mention either of these 
frames, instead choosing to focus only on the leader voting in his home town Nkandla. 
Hence, the majority of framing narratives came from global, Western channels. This 
section details how the global channels present Zuma. Firstly, the portrayal of his 
corruption trial showed a leader nonchalant in the face of serious allegations, and his 
vehement support and cult-like status seemed at odds with this controversial 
background. Secondly, Zuma was seen as a traditionalist buffoon and a man of the 
people, quite unlike the silent Nelson Mandela whose “Rainbow Nation” may be under 
threat from this new leader. Ultimately, these frames tended to wipe out contextual 
information about the 2009 election, including the transition from Mbeki to Zuma and 
the complexity of Zuma’s Zulu background in garnering key support for the ANC.  
  2.2.1 Corruption and controversy 
Zuma’s corruption trial was strongly emphasised on Western channels, and the most 
visually engineered broadcasts came from Sky News and CNN. Sky News’s Emma Hurd 
and CNN’s Nkepile Mabuse employ juxtapositions between audio and visual to depict 
Zuma as nonchalant in the face of serious allegations, while the tone of the reports 
suggest a convenient coincidence in the charges moments before the election. Sky 
News’s Emma Hurd refers to the trial (ANC awaits South African election result; ANC’s 
Jacob Zuma divides South Africa; Zuma’s ANC closing in on election victory), but instead of giving 
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any sense of background to the court case, Hurd repeatedly says the “charges were 
dropped suddenly” two weeks before the election. Similarly, CNN presents Zuma’s 
smiling face in close-up while reporter Nkepile Mabuse states “just two weeks before the 
election, those charges were suddenly dropped” (South Africa election: ANC under fire, 
CNN) before cutting to Zuma laughing heartily in the court room – the audio of his 
laughter competes with Mabuse’s voiceover: “He was also charged with rape but was 
acquitted in a high-profile trial.” 
 
The most frequent representation of Zuma on global channels is his “controversy” – that 
is, his difficult personality, his mishandling of events in the run-up to the election, and 
his “cult-like status” (Mabuse, Inside Africa: South African election, CNN). Mabuse claims 
Zuma is a “populist”, which comes with problematic consequences, including that his 
“supporters don’t care about any of that” – meaning his controversy, his corruption 
charges, or his lack of education. AFP’s journalist also states that Zuma is a “charismatic 
leader, but also a controversial one” (Results from Wednesday’s election, AFP), going on to 
repeat the corruption and rape charges. Journalists were preoccupied with assessing how 
Zuma could derail South Africa’s democracy, but without any real discussion of policy 
from the ANC themselves.  
  2.2.2 Traditionalist, man of the people 
While most journalists take a slightly more formal stance on Zuma’s controversial 
leadership, repeating concerns of populist politics and suspicious judgements on his 
court cases, Sky News was particularly disparaging of Zuma’s traditionalist character and 
personality. Journalist Emma Hurd’s broadcasts employed creative editing, camera 
angles, and her voice tone to imply that Zuma was not “fit for purpose” in taking over 
Mandela’s “Rainbow Nation”. In ANC’s Jacob Zuma divides South Africa, Hurd frames 
	 236 
Zuma as a buffoon and a tyrant, surrounded by bodyguards and silent on controversial 
issues such as HIV/AIDS and Zimbabwe. Interestingly, Hurd seems to have made a 
spectacular mix-up here. It was Mbeki who was “silent” on these issues, not Zuma. This 
kind of inaccurate reporting might be a simple oversight, but as noted later in this 
chapter Western broadcasters effectively wiped out Mbeki’s presidency by inferring 
Zuma took over from Mandela, rather than Mbeki. Later, Hurd goes further. As Zuma, 
dressed in skins, performs a traditional Zulu warrior dance surrounded by a crowd, Hurd 
narrates, “He has no formal education and still practises a polygamous lifestyle. He’s also 
overcome allegations of rape and corruption that might have felled his political career” 
(ibid.). On the word “felled”, Zuma overbalances in his dance moves and falls backwards 
into the crowd, shield and shoes flailing into the air. Not only is Zuma controversial, he 
is also a buffoon and slightly ridiculous in this broadcast. 
 
North American and European journalists also frequently referred to Zuma as a “man of 
the people”, with a carefully cultivated working class image (Challenges await South Africa’s 
future leader, AFP) that can reinvigorate the grassroots electorate (South African election day, 
CBC), and has traditional roots as a practicing polygamist (South Africa today, CNN). 
These references seem to hint at an attempt to explain Zuma’s cult-like status among 
black South Africans, but journalists never quite go far enough to explore why Zuma 
holds such sway with the majority. This focus on Zuma’s profile as a “man of the 
people” hints at the ideological differences between Mbeki’s austere presidential style and 
Zuma’s traditionalism. CNN’s Mabuse is the only reporter to go into depth about the 
2008 split between Mbeki and Zuma in the ANC: “Zuma also enjoys the support of 
those who loathe his predecessor in the ANC, Thabo Mbeki. Mbeki was seen as aloof, 
and disconnected, an intellectual, while Zuma, who rose to the top despite being born 
into poverty, is regarded as a man of the people” (South Africa Today, CNN).  
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  2.2.3 Mandela endorses Zuma 
At the start of ANC’s Jacob Zuma divides South Africa, Zuma sings a loud rendition of 
“Umshini Wami” on stage at an ANC rally, as Hurd narrates: “You’re looking at South 
Africa’s next president, a man whose Zulu anthem is Bring Me My Machine Gun… 
[Nelson Mandela] entrusting his legacy to the ANC’s most controversial leader yet”. The 
judgemental simplification of Struggle-era songs and separation between viewer and 
participant aside, Hurd’s narration suggests Zuma might harm Mandela’s legacy, the 
precious jewel of democracy in South Africa. Global journalists often compared the 
controversial Zuma to Nelson Mandela, the apparent father of the nation, and suggest 
that Zuma’s presidency would be a turbulent time for the young democracy. Mandela, 
meanwhile, appeared to endorse this controversial newcomer. The BBC’s Karen Allen 
says that Mandela’s attendance at Zuma’s rally is a “ringing endorsement” (Final election 
rallies, BBC) while CNN’s Nkepile Mabuse notes that “a public endorsement by the 
Nelson Mandela family is as precious as gold” (South Africa election: ANC under fire, CNN). 
The strong themes of Zuma’s unsavoury background and his perceived threat to the 
“Rainbow Nation” make Mandela’s endorsement seem strange.  
 
Broadcasters used and reused broadly similar footage of the elderly man seated silently 
on stage at an ANC rally, a seeming statue behind the animated Zuma that acted as an 
“endorsement”. We do not hear or see Mandela speak directly about this endorsement: 
he only appears on screen as an elderly man, mute, frail, and smiling (see Images 6.2 and 
6.3). Only South African broadcasters SABC and eNCA noted that Mandela was “too 
frail” to manage more than a “warm smile and a wave” (Leaders vote, eNCA). Mandela’s 
health was indeed, at this time, in decline, but Western broadcasters didn’t refer to 
Mandela in these terms. Mandela’s mere presence at a few ANC rallies was considered 
emphatic endorsement for Zuma’s controversial presidential campaign (Final election 
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rallies, Huge turnout in South African election BBC; South African election: ANC under fire, 
CNN). Mandela’s framing in this way reduces him into a one-dimensional smiling, mute 
symbol, whose only contribution to this election is as keeper of the kingdom. 
 
Image 6.2: ANC’s Jacob Zuma divides South Africa, Sky, 2009. “Mandela on the stage” 
 
Image 6.3: Challenges await South Africa’s future leader, AFP, 2009. “Mandela on stage” 
 
Martha Evans writes about how Mandela’s image can be “bent (almost) to mean just 
about anything”, and that Zuma attempts to “create some kind of continuity between 
South Africa’s beloved first president and the divisive Zuma figure” (2013: 28). Many 
South Africans were puzzled by Mandela’s appearance at this particular rally, held at 
Johannesburg’s Ellis Park Stadium (symbolic too, for this is the location where Mandela, 
in an iconic No. 6 rugby jersey, presented the Webb Ellis Cup to the victorious 
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Springbok captain at the 1995 Rugby World Cup final). There was a resultant backlash 
from both South African media and the Nelson Mandela Foundation who criticised the 
party for putting the 90-year-old’s life at risk (Evans, 2013: 29). However, broadcasters 
acknowledged none of this controversy: in fact, Karen Allen repeats that Mandela 
“requested to be here” (Final election rallies, BBC). 
  2.2.4 Wiping out context 
International broadcasters, and particularly CNN, Sky News, and AFP, continually 
referred to the ruling party as “Mandela’s ANC” (Results from Wednesday’s election, AFP) 
and South Africa as “Mandela’s Rainbow Nation” (Inside Africa: South African election, 
CNN; ANC awaits election result, Sky News; ANC’s Jacob Zuma divides South Africa, Sky 
News), under threat from Zuma’s populism. Throughout the sample, Mandela appears to 
symbolically hand over the reins directly to Zuma, but this effectively wipes out Mbeki’s 
presidency. Despite CNN’s portrayal of the Mbeki/Zuma split on South Africa Today, 
Mbeki was notably absent in this sample. The transition between cabinets seemed to pass 
the torch from “Mandela’s Rainbow Nation” to the turbulent Zuma administration, 
where the future was uncertain and Mandela’s legacy was at stake. What this narrative 
fails to mention is that the transition is not from Mandela to Zuma, but from Mbeki to 
Zuma. Interestingly, by framing this transition in this way, Mbeki is all but written out of 
the narrative across the various regional broadcasts. The fixation on visually appealing 
Zuma at the expense of dry and dull Mbeki  is neglectful, reductionist, and inaccurate. 
 
In a reflection of Cross’s (2010) findings, Zuma was mediated as a “symbolic 
representation” of the election race, rather than as a “substantive definer” of news 
content. Combined with Zuma’s representation on international news channels as a 
controversial and corrupt populist, his mediated speeches on the broadcasts highlight his 
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role as a symbol rather than political actor. Despite this fixation on Zuma’s personality, 
journalists neglected any kind of depth about the ANC’s campaign style, manifesto 
issues, or policy. Instead, international journalists presented a lingering doubt about his 
fitness for office because of his inherent controversial nature and scandalous 
background. 
 
 2.3 Democracy in action: global coverage 
So, while the overriding sense of the global coverage of the election was of Zuma’s 
symbolic representation, international broadcasters also presented the election as a kind 
of horse race between two competing sides: first, the populist ANC support and the 
pragmatic youth voices that represented a potential swing vote and second, the loyal 
ANC support but the disappointing ANC leadership and service delivery. 
  2.3.1 Populist, frightening support 
Out of 16 broadcasts that visualised the electorate, 69% were from the North American 
and European channels, and the majority showed ANC supporters. These depictions 
were often threatening: low angles, close-ups, overly loud audio that drowned out the 
journalist’s piece to camera, and tight camera proxemics and low angles made these 




Image 6.4: Final election rallies, BBC, 2009. “Extreme low angle ANC support” 
 
Image 6.5: Inside Africa: South African election, CNN, 2009. “Close framing ANC support” 
 
Image 6.6: Zuma’s ANC closing in on election victory, Sky, 2009. “Close framing vehement 
ANC support” 
 
Image 6.7: Zuma’s ANC closing in on election victory, Sky, 2009. “Extreme low angle” 
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Image 6.8: Zuma’s ANC closing in on election victory, Sky, 2009. “ANC supporters carry 
coffin effigies” 
 
The low angles of Images 6.4 and 6.7 show ANC support as powerful and intimidating, 
as supporter dance and toyi-toyi72 above the camera. Meanwhile, the close, 
claustrophobic frames of Images 6.5 and 6.6 make it seem as if the supporters crowd the 
camera, threatening to overrun the journalist in their flamboyant and vehement support 
of the ANC. Image 6.8 shows ANC supporters carrying coffin effigies of opposition 
party leaders, filmed in “hands up” framing. The supporters then toyi-toyi in a circle 
around these coffins, clapping their hands and sing loud Struggle-era songs. 
 
More than the claustrophobic and intimidating proxemics, the loud audio of the 
supporters was particularly noticeable on global broadcasts. Global journalists were 
frequently drowned out in their pieces to camera. The BBC’s Andrew Harding is 
drowned out twice on the BBC, once while standing among singing children in Grassy 
Park, and again in a stadium amongst COPE supporters (South Africa gets ready to vote). 
Crowds of boisterous ANC supporters routinely disrupt Emma Hurd’s pieces to camera 
for Sky News. In ANC awaits South African election result, Hurd interviews four young black 
men in red jackets about their first time voting. “It could be another generation before 
the ANC electoral dominance is dented here, and it might take even longer for voter 
apathy to set in”, she says, as the young men’s singing almost drowns out her voiceover. 
The young men dance and crash into each other, lurching towards the camera and sing 
Zuma’s “Umshini Wami”, the volume steadily increasing towards the end of the 
broadcast. The “enthusiasm” these young people show is intimidating. Hurd goes further 
in another broadcast. Zuma’s ANC closing in on election victory opens with a low-angle 
																																																								
72 To “toyi-toyi” means to dance the war dance of black South Africans, says Lisa Nevitt (2010), and dates 
back to the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya. “Throngs of people charge forwards, stomping and chanting 
political slogans. Such energy struck fear into the hearts of the armed forces who tried to contain them.” 
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medium close-up of a black woman wearing an ANC shirt depicting Zuma’s face. She 
screams “Viva ANC” into the camera and later says “Zuma is the president of South 
Africa, like it or not”, surrounded by fellow supporters who fill the screen. Hurd states 
that Zuma’s “supporters here are jubilant” but this jubilancy almost drowns out her piece 
to camera (see Image 6.9). In extreme low angle, an ANC supporter claps his hands at 
the camera (see Image 6.7), singing so loud it distorts the audio. Later, ANC supporters 
in medium close-up shots dance carrying homemade “coffins” adorned with the faces of 
COPE leaders (Image 6.8). Hence, on these Western channels, the “noisy” electorate are 
not only exuberant but also intimidating through this visualisation. These intimidating 
camera proxemics highlight the vehemence of ANC support throughout the election 
days, and present the ruling party’s patronage as something to be feared. 
 
Image 6.9: Zuma’s ANC closing in on election victory, Sky, 2009. “Hurd drowned out” 
2.3.3 Youth voices 
While the ANC’s support seems threatening, other voices in the sample were not 
presented in this way. In 2009, the “Born Free”73 description had not yet taken hold in 
the narrative about South African democracy. However, journalists still focused on the 
youth as an important section of the electorate, interviewing young people about their 
																																																								
73 Born Frees is a term used to refer to those South Africans who were born shortly before or after 1994 
and are eligible to vote. The Born Free theory suggests that those born after apartheid hold no or very little 
party loyalty because they were not subject to the racist regime, and have had free access to education and 
information (Du Preez, 2013: 14).	
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decisions and concerns about the poll, whether they would vote, and what they thought 
of the ANC. The overriding narrative seemed to be that the youth had little or no 
allegiance with the ANC because, journalists implied, they were too young to remember 
apartheid. As the 2014 chapter will explore, this argument is a fallacy: apartheid has had 
long-lasting structural implications and effects.  
 
An AFP broadcast (Youth in South Africa) opens on a multiracial group of pupils seated 
on school bleachers, and the journalist remarks, “A scene South Africa would be proud 
to hold up to show how far it’s come. These pupils were all born in 1994, the year of the 
country’s first all-race democratic elections”. Two black girls and two white boys voice 
their opinions about apartheid, discrimination, and the Afrikaans language schools. “I 
really don’t like thinking about the past, because it’s in the past, and it doesn’t really 
matter to me,” one girl explains, while another boy says, “I just think that it was a terrible 
mistake in the past and we did learn a lot from it and we are growing as a country.” This 
snapshot of young people without perceived allegiance to the ANC nor a memory of 
apartheid is repeated on other broadcasts too: Mpho Lakaje (First time South African voters, 
BBC) notes, “A new generation of voters are likely to have less emotional attachments to 
the ANC than their parents.”  
While conducting a focus group with multiracial young South Africans, CNN’s Nkepile 
Mabuse (Inside Africa, South Africa’s youth vote) also states:  
There has been an impressive increase in voter registration among South Africa’s 
youth, many of whom are too young to remember the reality of apartheid…. 
Contrary to the views of this group, a recent poll conducted by Plus 94 research 
reports that 65% of young South Africans say they will vote for the ruling ANC. 
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Later in the broadcast, Zuma dances on stage, intercut with a high-angle shot of ANC 
supporters in “hands up”74 framing. Vox pop Nebu Sill says in voice over: 
The ANC has been there for a very long time now, and they are literally the face 
of democracy as we know it right now, so people are very afraid to let other 
political parties come into power and actually take control and leave the ANC 
behind. They will always want the ANC to be there, because the ANC was what 
took us from the apartheid era and they want it to stay the same. 
This kind of framing suggests that ANC support is mostly driven by fear of change, and 
the juxtaposition implies that it is the youth in South Africa that are the hope for change 
as potential swing voters. It also implies that the ANC has a strong hold over older 
people who “remember” the dark days of apartheid, which apparently the youth do not. 
Mabuse admits that the focus group she interviews are the outliers, and the majority of 
South African youth say they will vote for the ANC reflected in a poll by Plus 94.75  
 
Admirably, in an era where vox pops and sound bites are declining (Bucy & Grabe, 2007: 
652; Bennett, 2012: 10), these journalists attempt to get vox pops from the youth 
directly, but seem to select the voices that adhere to their narrative where the youth have 
no memory of apartheid and little attachment to the ANC. If the Plus 94 poll is correct 
and over two thirds of young people identify with the ANC and would vote for them, 
then these voices are missing from the 2009 representation of youth.76 
																																																								
74	Both the 1994 and 2004 chapters deal with this signification.	
75 Richards and Zakwe (2009: 17) confirm this statistic, noting, “more than 65 per cent of youth voters 
between the ages of 18 and 24 years indicated they would vote for the ANC. It would seem that youth 
allegiance to and identity with the ANC remains strong”. 
76 Despite this perception, the youth turnout in this election was still relatively low: Scott and Vawda 
(2012) from the HSRC observe that 72.9% of registered young voters turned out in 2009, below the 
national average of 77%. Young voters were regularly less likely to actually turn out on voting day than 
other age groups (ibid.: 21).	
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  2.3.2 Loyalty to the ANC 
Given the global coverage of the vehement support for the ANC and Jacob Zuma’s 
controversial background, journalists appear to question why so many black South 
Africans still support the ruling party. When global journalists speak about Zuma’s 
corruption trial, the next sequence is almost always a wide shot of jubilant supporters 
filling stadia at ANC rallies or rambunctious victory celebrations outside the courts (see 
Images 6.10 – 6.12). Even though Zuma may be “controversial” and apparently 
“corrupt”, it also seems this background has little to no effect on the masses of ANC 
supporters, yet journalists don’t explore the reasons why this happens: instead, all we see 
is the corruption trial juxtaposed with mass ANC support, as journalists exclaim that 
“supporters don’t care about any of that” (Huge turnout in South Africa election, BBC; 
Election promises for South Africa, BBC; ANC’s Jacob Zuma divides South Africa, Sky News; 
Zuma’s ANC closing in on election victory, Sky News; Inside Africa: South Africa election, CNN; 
South Africa Today, CNN). Journalists don’t seek out the “why” of the support, choosing 
instead to focus on the visually rich images of celebration and fealty. 
 
Image 6.10: Inside Africa: South Africa election, CNN, 2009. “Support outside court” 
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Image 6.11: South Africa election: ANC under fire, CNN, 2009. “Jubilant support” 
 
Image 6.12: ANC’s Jacob Zuma divides South Africa, Sky, 2009. “Celebrations for Zuma” 
 
During Growing anger as South Africa goes to the polls, Sky News’s Emma Hurd states this 
confusing loyalty openly as she walks around Alexandra township, just outside 
Johannesburg. She reveals the squalor and dangerous living conditions residents endure, 
and lays the blame on the ANC’s failure to deliver. Hurd asks a young black man if “this 
is what you expected after the end of apartheid”, while standing in his cramped, damp, 
filthy tin shack barely bigger than a cupboard. In the next shot, in a slow zoom from 
establishing shot to long shot over the tops of the tin shack roofs, Hurd states, 
15 years after the end of apartheid, the squatter camps are actually expanding 
instead of shrinking. Unemployment is running between 30% and 40%, and for 
those who do have jobs the minimum wage is about 100 pounds a month. This is 
not the life the ANC promised its people. 
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As she finishes the broadcast, she asserts that despite this failure, “the ANC will win this 
election, in part because of its successes but also because it can count on the loyalty of 
those it liberated – for now.” As Hurd speaks, Zuma’s smiling face on an ANC poster 
fills two thirds of the screen in the foreground, while a woman scrubs clothes in the 
remaining screen space in the background (see Image 6.13). This juxtaposition, along 
with the rest of the broadcast, highlights the intense lack of service delivery in the 
townships, creating the narrative that the ANC has in fact failed “its people”, yet these 
same people will still vote for it. 
 
Image 6.13: Growing anger as South Africa goes to the polls, Sky, 2009.  “Zuma’s face in the 
township” 
 
In trying to understand the seemingly unshakable support the ANC has in the South 
African electorate, Western journalists often rely on fragmented, mediatised framing. 
Suggesting that the electorate “don’t care about any of that” oversimplifies the issue – 
the ANC holds support in the country not just because the electorate turn a blind eye to 
critical issues. Mattes reports that South Africans are astutely aware of problematic issues 
in politics, and “balance significant disappointments in some areas against a range of 
impressive achievements in others” (2005: 52). While this may be the reality, journalists 
from Anglo-American channels delve neither deeply nor broadly enough to gauge this. 
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Instead, international journalists rely on already-known and easily digestible stereotypes 
of the black African voter blindly following a cult-like leader in populist political theatre. 
 
It therefore appears that the 2009 election coverage on global channels consisted of a 
loyal electorate that followed a corrupt, controversial leader no matter what, and the 
hope for regime change came not from the threatening, noisy supporters, but the 
subdued and intelligent youth. These narratives pitted one side against the other: 
populism in Zuma’s following and the pragmatism of the youth and reality that the ANC 
had not fulfilled all of its promises to the poor. The next section explores how the local 
South African coverage portrayed the election. 
 
2.4 Democracy in action: local coverage 
  2.4.1 Process-oriented 
South African and non-Western news channels explored the process of democracy more 
often than framing the personalities of the election. Process was key for these channels, 
where long-form broadcasts about the housing crisis, voting, and IEC efficiency were 
presented with numerous vox pops. Unlike the Western portrayal of the candidate, Jacob 
Zuma was simply another leader casting a vote and his controversial background was 
skimmed over or ignored. The primary narratives for the South African broadcasts were 
dedicated to the regularity of democracy in the country: leaders voting, calm and 
thoughtful queues, capable IEC officials, and a smooth transition between 
administrations. As reflected in Hubbard’s (2010) analysis of the 2009 election, the South 
African broadcasts had a far more cautious approach to presenting the election. Hubbard 
notes that the SABC preferred to depict stability rather than conflict, which he suggests 
maintains and benefits the status quo. In my own study, both the SABC and eNCA were 
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far less critical of Zuma and the ANC as a whole when compared to international 
broadcasters.  
 
eNCA’s Leaders voting was the only African broadcast to mention Zuma’s court trial and 
corruption case. Zuma clowns around with IEC officials, about to drop his ballot into 
the box, and the reporter says, “the man who was sacked as deputy president in 2005 and 
just recently had corruption charges withdrawn against him, votes here knowing he’s 
almost certain to be South Africa’s next president” (Leaders voting, eNCA). This was the 
only time in any African broadcast that Zuma’s court case was mentioned. The disregard 
of this high-profile backstory appears to be an attempt to normalise democracy by 
ignoring this controversial element to Zuma’s profile. Given that South Africans are 
probably already aware of these issues, the local broadcasters could be forgiven for not 
mentioning the court cases more often. The local journalists do not contextualise as 
often as their global counterparts presumably because they are aware that the audience 
lives within the context and is already familiar with many of the issues. However, the 
contrast in stories on the global and local broadcasts is starkly different, and the 
avoidance of themes on South African broadcasts looks like neglect, rather than audience 
targeting. 
  2.4.2 Calm queues and eloquent electorate 
Compared to the global portrayal of a noisy, intimidating, threatening electorate, with a 
particular focus on rambunctious ANC support, South African channels presented the 
electorate as quietly spoken about their excitement for voting, their concerns for the 
election, and their experiences of the voting queues. The SABC’s Voting starts and Youth 
vote portray queues of voters standing calmly and silently, waiting to get into the station 
(Images 6.14 and 6.15), while young voters speak eloquently to the journalists. 
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AmandlaTV investigates issues of housing in the Western Cape (AmandlaTV South 
African election: housing), where citizens, in static mid-shots, relate their concerns (Images 
6.16 and 6.17). The electorate in local broadcasts simply waited in the sun for their turn 
to vote, without the kind of mediatised, striking framing seen on Western channels. This 
“normality” of the election on South African channels is a trend over all five election 
coverage years: consolidated democracy without controversy was a theme on local 
channels, rather than the controversial frames and narratives on Western broadcasts.  
 
Image 6.14: Youth vote, SABC, 2009. “Reporter PTC next to calm, quiet queue” 
 
Image 6.15: Youth vote, SABC, 2009. “Eloquent young voter” 
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Image 6.16: AmandlaTV South African election: housing, AmandlaTV, 2009. “Vox to 
camera” 
 
Image 6.17: AmandlaTV South African election: housing, AmandlaTV, 2009. “Vox to 
camera” 
 
3 DISCUSSION OF 2009 
3.1 Narrow South African coverage 
Temin and Smith (2002: 595) suggest that coverage of the Ghanaian 2000 election across 
both private- and state-owned media was superficial, topical, and lacked critical analysis. 
Although South African and Ghanaian media are not especially similar, this study has 
some similarities to Temin and Smith’s analysis. Local South African media during the 
last four elections were narrow and uncontroversial, in comparison to the narrative 
journalistic style found on global broadcasts. Temin and Smith (2002: 603) suggest 
narrow frames in local media occurred because of partisanship to the government, but 
there is no clear link between the ANC’s interference with the public broadcaster SABC 
and this kind of coverage. Instead, the lack of exploration of controversial frames is a 
culmination of points over the years: in 1994 the UNMOSA spotlight was fixed on the 
SABC’s coverage to ensure balanced, neutral reporting; under Mbeki, local coverage 
became more pro-government due to the president’s African Renaissance concept that 
pervaded government structures, not least because the majority of the SABC board was 
made up of pro-Mbeki members. In 2006, the SABC was accused of self-censorship 
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when it refused to air a Thabo Mbeki documentary. Later in the year an SABC 
“blacklist” was discovered and leaked to the media. The document lists an arbitrary 
group of commentators who should not be consulted, including Business Day political 
editor Karima Brown, journalist William Gumede, businessman Moeletsi Mbeki, and 
activist Elinor Sisulu, and outlines the current affairs managing director Snuki Zikalala’s 
iron-fist rule in the newsroom (Inside the SABC blacklist report, 2006). In 2009 the SABC 
coverage was uncritical but also neutral – narratives were neither here nor there, banal 
and dull. Duncan (2009: 218) finds similarly, in that local media refrained from covering 
controversial, but important, topics. The combination of state interferences in the public 
broadcaster’s newsroom may have affected their coverage during the election.  
 
A key difference in local coverage should be mentioned, however. The non-mainstream 
news broadcasts of AmandlaTV and AfricaNews depicted far more diversity in citizen 
voices that speak about issues of concern during the election. While the SABC tended to 
focus on the process of the election – the IEC coping with high volumes of voters, 
scanning ID books, setting up ballot boxes, and so forth – these non-mainstream 
channels interviewed citizens about the housing crisis and unemployment figures in the 
Western Cape, as well as what they thought about the new party COPE. These two 
channels attempted to seek the “why” far more often than mainstream global and local 
journalists, who appeared to be quite puzzled by the ANC’s continued victories at the 
polls. Friedman’s (2011: 109) observations about the “view from the suburbs” comes 
into play here: the non-mainstream South African media are far less biased towards a 
middle-class or neoliberal narrative than the mainstream media, which, he argues, has a 
“propensity to ignore the experiences and perspectives of people outside its suburban 
world” (ibid.: 110). The non-mainstream media in this sample seek out poor, rural, black 
voices rather than white, middle-class pundits, although these too are used sparingly. 
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 3.2 The perplexing ANC win 
That the ANC seem “bound” to win the 2009 election through the passionate support, 
despite numerous scandals and failures, seems perplexing. Global journalists present the 
two competing narratives of ANC support and Zuma’s scandals in juxtaposition 
segments, posing the question that one should not exist with the other. The ANC has 
failed poor black South Africans (as seen in Hurd’s Growing anger as South Africa goes to the 
polls, Sky News), Zuma is nonchalant in the face of serious allegations (in Mabuse’s South 
Africa election: ANC under fire, CNN), and threatens Mandela’s prized legacy of the 
Rainbow Nation (in Hurd’s ANC’s Jacob Zuma divides South Africa, Sky News), yet these 
very same people apparently follow Zuma with all the flamboyance of Mbembe’s 
aesthetics of the burlesque. This entangled narrative is confusing and contradictory, but 
is again symptomatic on the reliance of spectacle and scandal over explanation and issue-
based reporting. 
 
ANC supporters blindly follow Zuma and back him vehemently, and journalists visualise 
this fealty through the “burlesque” (Mbembe, 2015: 133) nature of their support. As in 
2004, the “singing and dancing” theme continues in this sample and is reminiscent of 
Mbembe’s (2015: 129) proclamation that dance is a form of fealty to the political party. 
The portrayal of flamboyant black groups highlights the type of loyalty Mbembe notes: 
the “postcolonised subject” employs aesthetics of vulgarity to imitate the elites in power 
and “join in the madness” (2015: 133) of devotion. Coffins carried in silhouette by 
intimidating ANC supporters, journalists drowned out by rowdy singing, and party 
regalia covering supporters’ bodies in close-up shots depict this apparent fealty for all to 
see. The journalists assume that even despite the ANC’s continued broken promises, 
failure in delivering services, and scandalous presidential candidates, these swaying, 
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chanting black masses still blindly support the ruling party. It is an oversimplification of 
the reality of ANC support in the country, which Mattes (2005: 52) demonstrates. 
 
Without an adequate investigation into the complexities of the ANC’s loyal support, 
fixating instead on the singing, dancing, threatening appearance of the support base, it 
was unsurprising that the ANC victory and support seems so bewildering. Ndlela (2005), 
Willems (2005: 95-101), and Hall (2015) suggest that European media often work with 
episodic frames, simplifying content and ignoring context, when reporting on news out 
of Africa. “Acting like a mayfly” (Hall, 2015) leaves little time to explore context or 
evaluate consequences.  
  3.2.1 Seeking the “why” 
Duncan noted that in 2009 local journalists failed to investigate the elections beyond a 
brief and superficial portrayal of parties and voters, and that US-style mediatisation, 
negative public interest, and issue-based reporting was prevalent in South African news 
coverage (2009: 230). The “who, what, where, when” were prioritised, resulting in a 
paucity of the “why” (ibid.: 219). This analysis of the 2009 media coverage shows that 
the “why” was missing from both local and global news. While local news avoided 
controversial frames and issues almost entirely, global journalists tended to flatten and 
simplify democracy in the country. Global journalists drew the conclusion that the ANC 
is bound to win the 2009 election simply because of loyal support that happened to be 
blind to all other controversies. The reality is, however, far more complex. These 
broadcasts fail to take into account the nature of the ANC’s support in South Africa, 
Zuma’s Zulu heritage and thus the almost complete decimation of the IFP (Du Preez, 
2013: 98), and the ANC’s sophisticated campaign strategy in 2009. Southall (2009: 3-5) 
argues that the ANC employed the same strategy as in previous years and worked hard to 
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maintain a majority stake in public opinion, rather than relying on Zuma’s popular image 
with the people. Calland (2013: 5) asserts that Zuma’s strategic win at the polls was due 
to his palpable and explicit desire to distinguish his ANC from the ANC of his 
predecessor, but this sample of news broadcasts mentioned none of this: instead, the 
myth that Zuma won on populism alone was cemented through narrative journalism, 
visualisation of intimidating vehement support, and juxtaposition in the voice and visuals 
of political leaders. Additionally, Mbeki’s near-decade of presidency was all but wiped out 
on global broadcasts, as journalists favoured the visually rich “Zuma show”. 
 
The problem is not that these journalists mention the intense, apparently threatening 
support; the black electorate who are seemingly blind to all of Zuma’s scandals or the 
ANC’s failings; or the inherent contradictions in South Africa’s democracy, but that they 
frame these issues as simplified stereotypes of unthinking voters showing fealty only 
through intimidation. Global journalists do not seek the “why” deeply enough, glossing 
over issues that could help explain the ANC’s passionate support, and ANC political 
voices are mostly missing from this sample. The reality is far more complex and neither 
local nor global journalists portray this adequately enough, which is symptomatic of the 
thrust towards mediatised reporting: simplistic, fast news stories that focus on the 




As substantiation of Jane Duncan’s analysis of the 2009 election media coverage (2009: 
218), this chapter ultimately shows that local and global broadcasts lacked depth and 
largely failed to cover issues of concern to the electorate such as the housing crisis in the 
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Western Cape, the ANC’s policy issues, or the growing non-participation of rural black 
communities in elections, choosing instead to present a mediatised snapshot of a “untidy 
but lively democracy” (Calland, 2013: 22) with high personalisation. Zuma’s candidacy 
was framed as a “turbulent time” for the Rainbow Nation, where Mandela’s legacy of 
democracy, unity, and triumph over adversity is at stake. The Zuma campaign in 2009 
featured Mandela as an icon of unity and support, but this appeared to have backfired: 
global journalists juxtaposed the beloved first president with the controversial Zuma, 
usually to Zuma’s disadvantage. The vehemence of Zuma’s supporters is framed as 
threatening and intimidating, symbolically opposite to the youth, who were positioned as 
potential swing voters. For global broadcasters, populism and pragmatism vied for the 
winning line of the election, but local broadcasters simply ignored these frames and 

















The 2014 election occurred in a time of increased digitisation, Internet connectivity, 
convergence journalism, and social media awareness. Far more broadcasts were therefore 
available for this year than ever before, with 63 sampled broadcasts. In order to 
understand the 20th anniversary of democracy in the country, a background to the 
troubles faced by the government is necessary, not least because the election was flanked 
on either side by violent and lengthy community protests as well as allegations of ANC 
corruption. This chapter follows the same structure as previous chapters. 
 
This analysis asserts that the 2014 election coverage was a continuation of narratives seen 
in 2009: competitive global, predominantly Western, channels presented mostly 
superficial narratives without much context or depth, while mediatised coverage 
mythologised South African democracy and the electorate. Conversely, the importance 
of South African channels lay in the omission of narratives rather than what was stated 
manifestly, as narratives were overall narrow and restricted to uncontroversial topics. 
Overall, the top-down organisation of media meant that grassroots voices, issues, and 
context were often excluded, with journalists instead favouring visual rhetoric, simplistic 
binary stereotypes, and a “view from the suburbs” (Friedman, 2011: 109). The 2014 
election coverage represents mediatised political communication that resulted in 
contradictory and entangled news frames that ultimately supported the status quo. 
Although instances of profound coverage existed on both South African and 
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international channels, it could not find adequate expression and was lost in the 
symbolic, superficial, or restricted framing of the election. 
 
1 BACKGROUND TO 2014 
 1.1 ANC on the defence 
The ruling party entered the fifth democratic election on the defence, haunted by 
widespread labour disputes, mining sector problems, mismanaged parastatals (state-
owned enterprises), as well as mishandled crises and scandals, ranging from violent 
protests to allegations of corruption. Additionally, the death of Nelson Mandela in 
December 2013 and the accompanying national mourning was the symbolic end of an 
era, heralding a new style of politics. The success of the ANC in election campaigns is 
usually accredited to voter loyalty and identification with the party’s Struggle history, as 
well as the weakness of the opposition. An often-overlooked reason for the ANC’s 
success, Butler (2014: 43) observes, is their organisational strength and adaptability. The 
2014 manifesto centred on the idea that life was better in 2014 than it was in 1994, 
thanks to the ANC (ibid.: 54). The party also targeted groups in key constituencies, 
including religious leaders, black professionals, traditional leaders, and young people. 
Zuma proved an asset here as he could easily court both traditional leaders as well as 
young black businessmen. Ultimately, the party’s ability to overcome the tumultuous 
years before the election was testament to its ability to adapt to its challenges by 
successful organisational innovations, Butler (2014: 56) remarks. 
	
In many respects, the ANC has done a fair job governing the country in the last two 
decades, most pronounced is the reduction of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The infection 
rate and AIDS deaths have dropped steadily since 2012 (Du Preez, 2013: 44), while the 
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number of patients receiving anti-retroviral drugs increased by 16% between 2012 and 
2015 (HIV and AIDS in South Africa, 2017). The media is also diverse, freer from legal 
restriction than most societies, and protected by policies and NGOs that act as 
watchdogs. The IEC is efficient, reliable, and reputable worldwide. However, as Mattes 
(2014: 186) observes, the ANC has all too often tolerated incompetence, corruption, and 
ineffective policies, and had not been sufficiently punished at the ballot box. In the run-
up to the 2014 election, the coalition of forces that thrust Zuma to the presidency had all 
but imploded, and the president himself had become, as Southall (2014: 1) puts it, an 
“election liability”. The Economist places South Africa’s “black hole in the economy” 
(Rainbow stagnation, 2016) squarely at the feet of Jacob Zuma, as business confidence and 
currency have both plummeted since the start of his presidency. South African Market 
Indicators presents a chilling graph that shows just how turbulent Zuma’s presidency has 




77 Source: http://www.southafricanmi.com/blog-31mar2017.html 
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At this tumultuous centre was Zuma’s chequered past that hung over him as a sword of 
Damocles (Calland, 2013: 50). No matter what Zuma did, how he governed, or the 
decisions he made, he could not shake off the corruption charges and rape trial that 
haunted and informed his every move. Calland (ibid.: 51) argues that it is despite Jacob 
Zuma, rather than because of him, that the Presidency still exerts significant power in the 
country. Zuma has little decisive leadership; instead he employs fear, patronage, and 
control of the security establishment to exert his power (ibid.: 49). 
 
 1.2 Zuma’s Damoclean issues 
The litany of complaints against Zuma is seemingly endless. He is blamed for weakening 
of the National Prosecuting Agency after a string of directors known to be loyal to the 
Zuma camp and/or faced multiple corruption charges were employed in quick 
succession. Yet by far the greatest damage to Zuma’s popularity was the exposure of the 
“security” upgrades made at his palatial homestead in Nkandla, KwaZulu-Natal. In 
November 2009, Mail & Guardian journalists accidentally stumbled on the Nkandla 
homestead building work and broke the story in December (Roussouw, 2009; Roper, 
2013). At least R200mil of the taxpayers’ money (Du Preez, 2013: 124; Grootes, 2013: 
227; Butler, 2014: 47) was spent on an underground bunker, two Astroturf soccer 
pitches, a “firepool”, hospital facilities, a cattle enclosure that cost R1mil, and a 
tuckshop.78 In a country with crippling poverty, a failing basic education system, and an 
exceptionally high unemployment rate, the Nkandla issue highlighted the inequality in 
South Africa and how little the majority of South Africans had benefitted from the 
ANC’s rule. Du Preez (2013: 272) remarks that Zuma is often 
																																																								
78	In 2016 the Constitutional Court found Zuma guilty of violating the constitution for ignoring the Public 
Protector’s remedial action to pay back some of the money.	
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caught between his instincts as a Zulu traditionalist, an MK soldier, a security and 
intelligence operative, and a political street fighter on the one hand, and the 
restrictions and challenges of heading a modern constitutional state, a 
sophisticated market economy and an open, diverse society on the other. 
To find a middle ground on the President is difficult because on one side his 
administration has delivered workable policies and maintained a functioning democracy, 
but on the other his presidency will be remembered for one of the biggest scandals in 
two decades: Marikana.  
  1.2.1 Marikana 
On a late winter’s day in 2012 in Rustenburg, the platinum mining belt in northern South 
Africa, a tragedy was about to unfold. Tensions between the ANC-aligned National 
Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the relatively new Association of Mineworkers and 
Construction Union (AMCU) had been brewing for weeks. In numerous wildcat, 
thousands of mineworkers downed tools to demand a better living wage from Lonmin, 
the mine owners, and protest terrible working conditions. Mineworkers were not local to 
Rustenburg: most were from the Eastern Cape where they sent their minimal wages back 
every month to their rural families. Workers were tired of living in apartheid-style 
conditions under the ANC government that had promised so much (Du Preez, 2013: 
58). In the days leading up to the tragic massacre, 10 police officers and miners were 
killed in clashes (Marinovich, 2016; Malala, 2015: 99). Then, on August 16th 2012, the 
watershed event occurred. It was Zuma’s “9/11 moment” (Calland, 2014: 25) and the 
South African Police Services’ (SACP) first post-apartheid massacre (Malala, 2015: 100). 
Journalists descended on Wonderkop hill and streamed worldwide the brutal images that 
harked back to pre-democracy in South Africa. Disorganised, petrified, aggressive, and 
predominantly black policemen mowed down advancing mineworkers on live television. 
	 263 
It was later revealed that 34 protesters were killed, some in the gunfire, some at point-
blank range, some in the back, some crushed by police vehicles, and some in a second 
“kill site”, which was apparently revenge motivated for the police killings earlier in the 
week (Marinovich, 2012).  
 
The ANC’s reaction to the Marikana strike and the resultant massacre has been called 
cold and half-hearted (Du Preez, 2013: 77), gutless (Malala, 2015: 102) and “appalling” 
(Naidoo, 2015: 2). Raymond Suttner (2015: 19) was startled by the lack of empathy the 
former liberation movement showed the families of the Marikana victims. The ANC was 
“slow” (Smith, 2012) to respond to the massacre, with Zuma concluding his business in 
Mozambique before returning to the site. “How a president responds to a crisis not only 
shapes both public and media attitudes, but also tells us about his presidency as a whole” 
(Calland, 2013: 26-27). The Marikana massacre was a symptom of the failure of 
governance: the ANC, Lonmin management, police and the police commissioner, the 
government in controlling and listening to people. The depths of the Marikana tragedy 
are still being felt years later, but in 2012 and 2013, the massacre became synonymous 
with “the willingness of the state to use brutal force against workers in protecting the 
interests of capital – and of an uncompromising spirit of resistance (or refusal to 
concede) to the impositions of such power” (Naidoo, 2015: 2). Duncan (2014b), 
Lancaster (2014), and Demian (2015) suggest that protest action in South Africa has 
increased rapidly since 2004, with the majority of these protests classified as frustration 
against the perceived lack of “service delivery” or disapproval of the incumbent 
government, and Marikana was seemingly the zenith of frustration against a government 
that ignored its citizens. 
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The first political representative on the scene at Marikana was not even a politician – it 
was the ousted, banned, former ANC youth league president Julius Malema, who had 
been involved with the striking mineworkers on the platinum belt for some time prior to 
the massacre (Robinson, 2014: 74). Marikana represented the catalyst for Malema’s 
instigation of his new political party, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). To view 
Malema’s presence at Marikana as “opportunistic” is too simplistic – he may have used 
the tragedy as a stepping-stone for his own political manifesto, but those people were 
crying out for leadership that they lacked from government and indicative of the 
increasingly frustrated citizenry in the country. 
 
 1.3 Protest action 
Marais (2011: 457) speaks extensively about the increase in protests and their control 
under the ANC government. From 2004 onwards, there have been at least 6 000 protests 
each year, mostly about the lack of service delivery and directed at local government 
officials. These protests, Marais continues, are highly complex and disparate. “Common 
to most is indignation at the distant manner and scornful conduct of some local officials 
and the failure to involve residents meaningfully in decisions that shape their 
neighbourhoods and lives” (ibid.: 458).79 These protests are seemingly in direct 
opposition to the ANC’s “good story to tell” and “better life for all” narratives, but as 
Marais (ibid.: 460) and others (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2014: 36; Mattes, 2014: 184) state, 
even outright anger at the government, symbolised through destructive protests, does 
not necessarily translate to disenchantment with the ANC or a vote against it in the 
elections.  
																																																								
79 Marais elaborates that the local councils are often fiscally hamstrung and have little experience in 
appropriate management. Residents often protest for public service, rather than just delivery. He also notes 
that these protests are often romanticised as a rolling rebellion against the ANC and that reading them in 
this way, as some kind of index of opposition, misses inherent nuances and contradictions (2011: 459). 
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Duncan (2014a, 2014c) writes extensively about the lack of protester perspectives in the 
Marikana journalism, which resulted in a skewed understanding about the strikers’ and 
the authorities’ actions. The ‘top down’ organisation of media that focuses on voices of 
authorities yet neglects protesters “has serious implications, as it fosters a society that is 
unable to see itself, and respond to its most pressing problems” (Duncan, 2014a: 92). 
South African media is often angled “top down” (Wasserman, 2014), and the voices of 
the poor are often missing from mainstream media coverage about community protests 
(Wasserman, Bosch, & Chuma, 2016) where the razzmatazz of visually rich protest 
imagery is prioritised over context (Maserumule, 2016). Marinovich’s (2012) Marikana 
investigation changed the way many news agencies viewed the tragedy, and Duncan 
(2014a) argues that community media create spaces that allow for the free flow of 
information and ideas. Sadly, the underfunded and pressure-filled mainstream 
newsrooms mean journalists rarely get the time or have the space to investigate protests 
adequately (Duncan, 2009: 222-223; Duncan, 2014: 153; Wasserman, 2014; Wasserman, 
Bosch, & Chuma, 2016). 
 
 1.4 Changing electorate 
A further challenge the ANC faced going into the 2014 election was the rapidly changing 
electorate, which was larger, younger, and more urbanised than ever before, impacting 
the ANC’s traditional hold over the rural populace that remembered the party’s Struggle 
credentials. The decline in ANC rural support bases and the disillusionment with politics 
in general meant that many voters simply stayed away from the ballot. Although the 
voting age population had increased to 31.4 million people, and while the registration 
figures are contested, Southall (2014: 6) and Schulz-Herzenberg (2014: 23) argue that 7 
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million people were left unregistered, the majority from the 18 – 19-year-old, or “Born 
Free”, category.  
 
The term “Born Free” refers those South Africans born after the end of apartheid, in 
1994 or later, and eligible to vote in the 2014 and subsequent general elections. The 
“Born Free theory” suggests that those born after apartheid hold no, or very little, party 
allegiance because they were not subject to the apartheid regime and have had free access 
to information, rather than rely on the party’s Struggle credentials when voting (Du 
Preez, 2013: 14). In 2013, Stephen Friedman argued that the Born Free theory had 
already been proven false in 2009 because those born after apartheid rarely vote 
differently to their elders. People who were newly eligible to vote in 2009 did not change 
voting patterns significantly. To suggest that a few years’ difference in age would 
suddenly wipe away the long-lasting effects of apartheid is “thinly-disguised prejudice, 
not voting analysis” (Friedman, 2013).  
 
For all the speculation and hype surrounding the Born Free vote, only a third of 18 – 19-
year-olds registered in the 2014 elections. Young people abstained from participating in 
the 2014 election, Schulz-Herzenberg (2014: 32) points out, because firstly the habit had 
not yet been formed and secondly the youth have less embedded traditional networks 
that enforce voter participation. She remarks that the reason for such significance placed 
upon the youth is primarily their unpredictability and responsiveness to short-term 
political events. It is also unfair and inaccurate to discuss the group as any kind of 
homogeneous mass as their experiences reflect the diversity of post-apartheid South 
Africa: Malema’s “young supporters” and the DA’s “youth” are, for example, 
incomparable (ibid.).  
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 1.5 Changing face of the opposition 
“Politics in South Africa is really not for the faint-hearted, especially when opposing the ANC” 
(Calland, 2013: 222) 
 
Malala (2015: 154) remarks that there was never a better time for the opposition to thrive 
and grow in South Africa, and the 2014 election saw the birth of two new black-led 
parties: AGANG and the EFF. Calland notes “the media, ever-hungry for a black-led 
alternative to the ANC” (2015: 242) created a storm in a teacup over COPE in 2009. 
Despite the high hopes for COPE, the party fizzled. Leadership struggles between 
Lekota and Shilowa were disastrous and the party’s ideology so closely mirrored the 
ANC’s that the two parties blurred. The ANC eventually welcomed the defected COPE 
members back one by one. Other opposition parties, such as the once-contentious IFP, 
were nowhere to be seen. With its KwaZulu-Natal support base decimated by the ANC’s 
“Zulufication”80 process, the IFP was but a shadow of its former self. The DA was the 
only party to grow every year and, Southall (2014: 13) thinks, will be the only party 
capable of unseating the ANC in 2019. 
 
The DA’s ventures into uncharted (black) territories in 2009 unsettled the old guard of 
the ANC, yet the party still struggled with the ANC’s dismissal of the party as a “party 
for whites” (Jolobe, 2014: 59). Seemingly to counter this stigma, the DA appointed two 
new young black members to its ranks: Lindiwe Mazibuko, the “upper middle class, 
Johnny-come-lately” (Calland, 2013: 224) yet astute and passionate DA parliamentary 
leader, became the DA’s parliamentary spokesperson, while Soweto-born Mmusi 
Maimane became the DA’s Gauteng chairperson. The party’s 2014 election campaign 
centred on three strategic changes: the new narrative focused on the impact Helen 
																																																								
80 Calland (2014: 59-62) sets out the ANC’s programme of placing Zulu cabinet ministers inside the party 
structures, particularly in the main security cluster. In 2013, 28% of Zuma’s cabinet was Zulu. 
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Suzman contributed to the struggle, ergo increasing the party’s Struggle credentials; the 
DA’s commitment to service delivery in the Western Cape was highlighted; and 
aggressive social media and television campaigns considerably raised Maimane’s profile 
(Jolobe, 2014: 53-65). The DA finally had multi-racial leadership, but at the same time 
had to manage the competing interests of its core group of supporters as well as its new 
racially diverse group. 
 
Launched in February 2014, AGANG SA, or simply AGANG, roughly translated from 
the Nguni as “Build South Africa”, drew black professionals to its ranks including 
Vanessa Hani, daughter of slain ANC activist leader Chris Hani. AGANG was supposed 
to be, essentially, the DA for black people: “it was designed to appeal to black 
constituencies reluctant to vote for the DA with its reputation of representing the 
interests of whites” (Jolobe, 2014: 61). AGANG was led by former partner of Steve 
Biko, Black Consciousness activist, and businesswoman Dr Ramphele Mamphele. A 
botched attempt at a coalition between AGANG and the DA prior to the 2014 election 
meant that both parties suffered greatly. Zille and Ramphele attempted to coalesce yet 
never received the backing of their respective parties, and Ramphele withdrew from the 
merger within hours of the public announcement (Zille, 2016). Calland (2013) and Jolobe 
(2014) were left scratching their heads at the whole scenario, while Grootes’ (2013: 199) 
predicted AGANG would struggle to compete, due in part to a significant lack of 
structure, and was ultimately proved correct. 
 
The second major new black-led party in 2014 was the EFF, headed by the 
“commander-in-chief”, former ANC Youth League president Julius Malema. Malema 
was ejected from the ANC ranks in 2012, but this did not end his political career. He was 
heavily involved with the platinum miners before, during, and after the Marikana 
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massacre and, as Robinson (2014: 74) observes, used the event as a lightning rod for the 
ANC’s moral degeneration. Then, in 2013, Malema and an assortment of political figures 
met in Soweto to form the EFF. The party was officially launched in September and has 
been a vocal thorn in the ANC’s side ever since. Their manifesto promotes radical 
nationalism, land nationalising with no compensation, 60% government ownership, 
nationalised banks, and aggressive BEE policies, which Robinson finds “grandiose” 
(2014: 77). The party draws members from diverse backgrounds including COPE, the 
ANCYL, Black Consciousness movements, unionists, and student activists. It appeals 
mostly, Robinson (2014: 84) remarks, to young black men who haven’t benefitted from 
BEE or more general ANC policies. 
 
Duncan (2014b: 137) also suggests that Malema’s awareness of the mass-mediated 
politics and use of visually stunning material drove the pre-election news agenda pre-
election in 2014. For all the EFF’s bluster, the red berets, so evocative of socialist 
Thomas Sankara, acquired only a small percentage of the vote nationally. Even so, 
Prishani Naidoo (2014: 14 – 15) remarks that Marikana had opened up the potential for 
new political configurations on the left, and the EFF’s “people assembly” tactic was a 
sign of the dissatisfaction with and a critique of existing forms of democracy in South 
Africa. 
 
The reduced participation in 2014 was probably due to the inactive youth, a lack of 
opposition campaigning and strategy, and limited choices on the ballot paper, Schulz-
Herzenberg (2014a: 20) suggests. The enormous stay-away in Limpopo, the worst treated 
province with the most disillusioned rural ANC voters, did not result in any votes for the 
opposition. The research often remarks that disillusionment with the ANC or with 
politics in general does not always mean a growing opposition. Instead, disaffected voters 
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simply move into the non-participatory electorate, staying away from the polls. Table 7.1 
reveals the number of votes given to each major party in the 2014 election ballot. 
 ANC DA EFF IFP COPE AGANG TOTAL 
Percentage 62.2 22.2 6.4 2.4 0.7 0.2 18.4mil 




The increased digitisation of news channels meant that the 2014 sample was far larger 
than any other election year. I was also able to live record some of the channels available 
on South Africa’s satellite television service.82 Graph 7.2 represents the spread of 
broadcasts per channel, while Graph 7.3 shows the spread of channels across the five 
geographic regions. 
																																																								
81 Statistics gathered from Schulz-Herzenberg and Southall (2014). 
82 The BBC World, Sky News, eNCA, SABC, and CNN channels were available on the DSTV service. 
Other channels had dedicated news websites where the broadcasts were uploaded in real time as well as 
chronologically (SABC and eNCA for example have excellent digital archives on YouTube stretching back 
to 2011, while AJE’s website has a “live stream” of their current broadcast. This proliferation meant the 
sample had to be strictly delineated to broadcasts with mediation, rather than talk shows, studio interviews, 
or political analysis. Although each of the previous election samples had similar rules in place, occasionally 
packages that included studio interviews and talking head inserts were included because of the lack of data 






The following sections follow previous chapters: the quantitative findings for frequency 
of event, political party, and issue coverage, lead to thematic analysis of the broadcasts. 
As in previous chapters, the sections below cover the frequency of coverage of events 
and political parties as well as the themes of the election coverage to discover how the 
different regions frame the 2014 general election. 
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 2.1 Frequency analysis 
  2.1.1 Events 
Graph 7.4 represents the total number of events covered across all channels and regions. 
Some broadcasts reported on multiple events at a time. Only five events were observed 
in 2014, with the act of voting was most frequently depicted, including with the set-up of 
voting stations, citizens queuing outside, and casting their votes. Protests also took up a 
large chunk of the reporting, as journalists covered the municipality protests at 
Bekkersdal in Gauteng, Sterkspruit in the Eastern Cape, and Malamulele in Limpopo. 
Footage of the De Doorns farmworker strike and various COSATU, DA, and EFF 
marches was also included. Campaigns and rallies were the next most frequently covered 
events at 22%, and leaders were shown voting in 19% of the broadcasts. Finally, the 
tragic Marikana massacre was singled out as an event because it was not only mentioned 
as a protest, but also as a catalyst for the EFF’s political beginnings and as a symptom of 




  2.1.2 Political parties 
Congruent with previous election years, the ANC received the most coverage across all 
channels, as in Graph 7.5.83 Fewer political parties were covered with any kind of 
significance during the 2014 election, with only the DA, EFF, AGANG, and COPE 
gaining more than one mention on broadcasts. The once contentious IFP was relegated 




83 This was the highest percentage of coverage in any election year. The ANC was mentioned in 74% of 
broadcasts in 2009, 55% in 2004, 71% in 1999, and 68% in 1994. Caution should be noted, however, 
because the 1999 and 2004 election samples were very small. Comparison is more reliable between 1994, 
2009, and 2014. 
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Graph 7.6  
As seen in Graph 7.6, the ANC was represented most frequently on European and 
Middle Eastern channels, while the DA had a similar spread across all channels. The 
EFF, however, received the most coverage on European channels.  
  2.1.3 Who speaks 
There were 128 vox pops in the 2014 election broadcasts, 66% from Knowns and 34% 
from Unknowns (including the Born Frees), as seen in Graph 7.7. The predominant 






Known sources in the 2009 election coverage can be split into three groups: experts, 
leaders, and spokespeople. Experts included political analysts, or “pundits” (Cross, 2010: 
425), economic analysts, and journalists as experts. Leaders included President Jacob 
Zuma, DA leader Helen Zille, DA deputy chairperson Mmusi Maimane, former 
president FW De Klerk, AGANG leader Mamphele Ramphele, Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu, deputy president Cyril Ramaphosa, traditional leaders such as King Buyelekhaya 
Dalindyebo, and IEC president Pansy Tlakula. Spokespeople included voices from the 
political parties ANC, EFF, DA, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as 
Seskhona People’s Movement or Social Justice Movement, police captains, and the IEC.  
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Pundits were first used significantly in 2009 to explain the ANC’s policy and Zuma’s 
effect on South Africa. In 2014, political analysts overtook all other sources including the 
President in frequency of voice, and again explained policy issues (such as Zuma’s 
foreign policy and New Development Plan). Punditry created context that political 
leaders and journalists84 seemingly could not, which somewhat coincides with Cross’s 
(2010: 425) findings. Pundits in this sample were far more analytical than in Cross’s study 
but similarly prophesised the election outcome and the implementation of policies that 
Zuma might make in the future. 
 
Graph 7.9 
Born Frees also dominated the coverage as they spoke in 53% of all Unknown vox pops, 
or 18% of the total speakers in the sample (Graph 7.9). They spoke about their 
enthusiasm for voting and that casting a ballot not only honours those who fought for 
the right but is also part of being a “responsible adult” (South Africans wait in hour long 
queues, ABC). Journalists voiced Born Free vox pops more than any other citizen in this 
sample, but asked them fairly inane questions about how they “felt” on the voting day, 
																																																								
84	When journalists were used as experts (on Sky News and PressTV), they commented on the campaign 
rather than policies. For example, Sky News used multiple Skype interviews with South African journalist 
Khadija Patel to comment on the election seemingly because Sky News did not have embedded journalists 
in South Africa to cover the election, and so resorted to “journalists interviewing journalists” rather than 
finding political analysts or vox pops to explain the event.	
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rather than their attitude towards politics or policies. Interestingly, despite the protests 
making up 35% of all events, there were very few protester vox pops, concurring with 
Duncan’s research. Duncan warns that neglecting grassroots voices, especially when 
covering conflict (2014c) and elections (2014b), results in a community that cannot see 
itself (2014a: 92).  
 
This next section groups the major themes together and, using the triadic multimodal 
analysis method set out in the methodology chapter, attempts to extract the narratives 
about the 2009 election. Ultimately, global broadcasts presented homogenising 
mythologies of the election, including political parties and the electorate, with a few 
notable exceptions that explored contradictions. Local coverage was narrow and ignorant 
of important and controversial issues, again with a few examples that suggested an 
attempt at profound, critical coverage. A similar narrative presented on both local and 
global broadcasts was the military’s control of protest action. The top-down organisation 
of the media that tended to focus on authorities over citizens excluded grassroots voices 
and issues, and this was a common thread on both South African and international 
broadcasts. 
 
 2.2 Global myths of democracy 
International broadcasts portrayed the 2014 election in South Africa through a series of 
visualised myths – that is, the tale of Mandela as a protective father figure and the ANC 
as sole liberator and saviour of the country, the EFF framed almost entirely as an 
intimidating sea of red berets, and finally journalists presenting 1994 as a kind of 
benchmark for progress in the country. These stories tended to avoid discussing the 
voting day or the process of the election (such as ballot papers, voting stations, queues, 
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and so forth). In only broadcast to significantly explore the actual “process” of voting, 
the BBC’s Milton Nkosi (South Africa in post-Nelson Mandela election, BBC) walks through a 
voting station in Soweto and explains how the voters queue, receive the ballot paper, 
have their fingers marked, what the paper looks like, and what happens after voting has 
occurred. Nkosi’s brief broadcast is a good insight into South Africa’s electoral system, 
and is the only one of its type in a sea of myths about the election. The broadcast, 
however, is misnamed,85 as Nkosi does not mention Mandela in his walkthrough, but this 
plays into global media’s mythologisation of Mandela throughout the 2014 coverage. 
2.2.1 Mandela as the father figure   
Mandela appeared frequently in this sample as a smiling ghost of a political party, whose 
death signified a new cycle of politics in South Africa (Curnow, CNN NewsCentre SA 
Spot, CNN). VOA’s Paul Cisco (Polls indicate ANC leads) and CBC’s Margaret Evans 
(South Africa votes – ANC favoured to win) both remark that Mandela was the “father of the 
nation”. CNN’s Robyn Curnow says that Mandela “led South Africa out of apartheid” 
but whose “presence is now just a part of the Born Free history” (First SA vote since 
Mandela died). Mandela is therefore the guardian of the Struggle; the founding father of 
democracy who watches over his seemingly disillusioned “children”. As in previous years 
and themes, the South African broadcasts did not frame Mandela in this way – the SABC 
was the only channel to visit the topic, following Mandela’s grandson to his voting 
station in Qunu. The broadcast was more to do with the young Born Free voting, rather 
than any story about his famous grandfather. 
 
The BBC’s Nomsa Masego, F24’s Ayesha Ismail, and VOA’s Emily Jaab call the ANC 
“Mandela’s party”. These statements seemingly unwittingly play into the ANC’s election 
																																																								
85 Most broadcast names were taken from the site from which they were downloaded. For example, the 
BBC broadcasts were downloaded from individual bbc.co.uk pages, and hence the names were self-
assigned. I named others, such as the SABC packages, as descriptive of the broadcast as possible. 
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campaign strategy of employing Mandela’s image to urge voters to “do it for Mandela” 
(Bedawi, World News 2, BBC). Martha Evans writes extensively about the mythologisation 
of Mandela and describes “the gradual iconization of his image, which became a kind of 
logo for the Struggle movement, and later for post-apartheid South Africa” (2014: 83). In 
the 2014 sample, Mandela gazed down at queues of Born Free voters and elderly loyal 
ANC supporters from tee-shirts and posters (see Images 7.1 – 7.4).  
 
Image 7.1: First SA vote since Mandela died, CNN, 2014. “Mandela shirt on voter” 
 
Image 7.2: First SA vote since Mandela died, CNN, 2014. “Mandela smiles down on queue” 
 
Image 7.3: SA Elections, VOA, 2014. “Do it for Madiba” 
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Image 7.4: First SA vote since Mandela died, CNN, 2014. “Mandela tee-shirt” 
Symbolising Mandela in this way continues the 2009 narrative where Zuma’s meteoric 
rise to the presidency was a “threat” to Mandela’s legacy. What the “memory” and 
“spirit” of Mandela actually meant for the South African populace was unclear as citizens 
were silent on the matter, but journalists suggested he was synonymous with both the 
Struggle and the ANC. Mandela’s image vied for pride of place in the ANC’s lexicon of 
campaign slogans in 2014 and CBC’s journalist Margaret Evans writes elsewhere (2014): 
‘Do it for Mandela’ has been one of the ANC’s rallying cries this election, a not-
so-subtle attempt to exploit the Mandela memory, and to remind voters that the 
great man himself never broke with the party, unlike some other former 
liberation leaders who have left in disgust… Playing the Mandela card in these 
elections is sometimes a misguided strategy. 
Journalists attempted some kind of scrutiny of this symbolism, referring to Mandela’s 
image perpetuated by the ANC in this election, but instead played into the ANC’s 
controversial slogan by not only calling the ANC “Mandela’s party” but also suggesting 
that Mandela and the ANC are synonymous with the struggle for liberation. 
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  2.2.2 The myth of the liberation party 
Almost all broadcasts referred to the ANC as the sole liberator of South Africa.86 The 
BBC’s Zeinab Badawi notes repeatedly that the ANC was “the party that delivered 
liberation to the majority” (South Africa’s economic challenges, BBC; World News Today with 
Zeinab Bedawi, BBC; World News Today, BBC), while Andrew Harding states, “many 
[voters are] loyal to the party that liberated them” (World News Today, BBC). CNN’s 
Robyn Curnow finds the same: “Loyalty to the liberation party remains strong, with a 
strong connection to its political past” (Millions head to polls in SA, CNN). Sky News’s 
Julie Hyde Mew repeats this sentiment: “The party that conquered apartheid still attracts 
voters, young and old” (Sunrise Sky). Reuters suggests the ANC “remains popular with 
the black majority after dismantling the apartheid system in 1994” (SA police arrest 59, 
Reuters). For the majority of broadcasts, then, the ANC is synonymous with the 
emancipation of South Africa and its sole liberator.  
 
Associating the ANC as the sole liberation party swallows up the rest of the liberation 
movement, such as the PAC, UDM, and the Black Sash, who all played considerable 
roles in the struggle against Apartheid. This kind of framing from the journalists 
imagines the ANC as liberator, saviour, and the provider of a “better life for all”, playing 
into the ANC’s own mythology. 
2.2.3 Visualisation of the EFF 
If the ANC was “widely expected to win” at the 2014 election, as almost all global 
journalists remarked, two parties competed for second place. Yet few features 
distinguished the DA and the EFF’s depiction on broadcasts, a marked departure from 
																																																								
86 AJE and VOA acknowledged that the ANC is only perceived as being the liberation party: AJE’s Mutasa 
notes, “For many black South Africans, it’s the party that ended apartheid” (SA opposition taps into discontent), 
and is “seen by many here as the party that liberated the black majority” (Jacob Zuma wins landslide victory). 
VOA’s Emily Jaab remarks the ANC only “contributed to ending white minority rule” (SA elections protest 
vote). 
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the style of framing in the 2009 election coverage. COPE, for example, was given 
extended airtime in 2009 to discuss their policies and stance on electoral issues. Even the 
smallest parties such as KISS were interviewed, although the tone of the broadcast was 
slightly mocking. In 2014, however, the DA and the EFF competed for simplistic 
narratives – both were seen only as a threat to the ANC. If any frame distinguished these 
two parties, it was that the EFF supporters were menacing and the DA’s relatively 
subdued. Unlike 2009, the policies of the parties were not given nearly the same 
consideration. For example, even though the EFF represented a extraordinary change in 
the type of politics in South Africa, hardly any coverage was dedicated to the party 
specifically. If any frame distinguished the EFF from the rest of the opposition, it was 
their visualisation on broadcasts across the regions. 
 
The EFF appeared an intimidating sea of redness led by the “firebrand bad boy” 
(Masego, Focus on Africa, BBC) Julius Malema (see Images 7.5 – 7.7). As four grimacing 
black women with red berets grip hands to hold back the tide of red supporters behind 
them (Image 7.8), journalist Haru Mutasa narrates: “They want to seize land from whites 
without compensation, and nationalise the mines and banks” (SA opposition taps into 
discontent, AJE). The group then advance steadily towards a low-angled camera. eNCA 
documented the loudness of the EFF rallies too, as Malema arrives in a packed stadium 
to the piercing ululations of devoted followers, having “capitalised on the ANC 
weaknesses” (Hlubi, Opposition parties eye out troubled North West, eNCA). Supporters of the 
EFF often grimace, rather than smile (see Images 7.9 – 7.11), which is a different 
positioning to both the “singing and dancing” frame and also how the DA supporters are 
depicted (see Images 7.12 and 7.13).87  
																																																								
87 One reason for the difference in facial expression is that the EFF were often depicted singing Struggle 
songs, inherently emotive. 
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Image 7.5: South Africa protest vote, VOA, 2014. “Sea of EFF red” 
 
Image 7.6: Sunrise, Sky, 2014. “Malema and the sea of EFF red stadium” 
 
Image 7.7: South Africa’ economic challenges, BBC, 2014. “Malema in a sea of EFF red” 
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Image 7.8: SA opposition taps into discontent, AJE, 2014. “Black women hold back a tide” 
 
Image 7.9: SA opposition taps into discontent, AJE, 2014. “Grimacing EFF” 
 
Image 7.10: Sunrise, Sky, 2014. “Grimacing EFF” 
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Image 7.11: SA poverty 20 years later, CCTV, 2014. “Grimacing EFF” 
 
Image 7.12: SA opposition taps into discontent, AJE, 2014. “Smiling DA support” 
 
Image 7.13: South Africa elections promo, AJE, 2014. “Smiling DA support”  
 
These EFF supporters don’t seem to show “fealty”, as Mbembe (2015: 129) suggests, so 
much as a show of strength. Instead of contextualising how the EFF changed the 
political landscape of South Africa, the party are signified as caricatures of intimidation. 
In a stark contrast to how COPE, the 2009 ‘new’ party, was allocated one-on-one 
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interviews, policy discussions, and direct voicing from journalists, the EFF were simply 
shown through the number of supporters and grimacing faces. Journalists symbolised 
rather than explained the new black-led party. One hypothesis of this type of framing 
might be to do with the EFF’s symbolic similarity to socialist movements around the 
world (communist iconography usually relies on the colour red and yellow highlights, of 
which the EFF makes use), and the international broadcasters’ hesitation to endorse 
radical left-leaning parties (see Norris, 1995: 359; Windrich, 1994), but this is merely 
conjecture due to the lack of EFF representation on this sample (21% of coverage, as 
seen in Graph 7.5 and 7.6). 
  2.2.3 1994 
The 2014 election year was heavily symbolic of 1994 – the auspicious 20-year anniversary 
date was emblazoned on flags in major cities, celebrations on Freedom Day (27 April) 
included lavish concerts and events, while the death of Mandela only five months earlier 
added further impact to the election. Global, Western channels frequently referred to 
1994, and presented the election year as a synecdoche for the ANC’s failure to deliver. 
AJE notes, “Despite this [anniversary], people still live in tin shacks” (Page, OB 2) and 
questions “why do they still live like this” (Mutasa, OB 3), as the tin township zooms into 
focus on screen. The BBC concurs – “the optimism of 20 years ago has now evaporated, 
replaced by cynicism, frustration and, increasingly, violence” (Bedawi, World News Today). 
Other global journalists highlighted the emotional connection of the election: CBC’s 
Margaret Evans noted that voters approached the election with “a lot of resonance” and 
the event “pulled at the heart strings” (SA votes, CBC). 
 
Overall, the 1994 anniversary for global journalists appeared two-fold: the two decades 
had offered the ANC ample time to rectify basic living conditions for the poorest 
	 287 
citizens but the government had not fulfilled their promises, and the resonance of the 
date was auspicious for an emotional populace. International journalists determined that 
20 years of democracy was seemingly enough time for the ANC to deliver on the 
promises of 1994, and the very existence of poverty in the townships was evidence that 
the party had failed on this promise. Of course, the reality is far more complex than these 
stories present: the ANC’s RDP and GEAR policies attempted to redress the 
inequalities, and have significantly improved the lives of millions, but the neoliberal focus 
of these policies, coupled with the global economic downturn, has resulted in the 
inequality gap widening over the years (see StatsSA, 2002, 2008; Marais, 2011: 210). 
These global stories mention none of this background, but instead present the 20-year 
benchmark as somehow “time enough” to redress the ills of apartheid, including racially 
divisive living conditions such as townships. Strangely, South African channels did not 
mention the anniversary of 1994 in this way, the only references coming from two vox 
pops on eNCA and the SABC reminiscing about the voting queues. Local channels 
seemed more interested in keeping the focus on the present election, rather than looking 
to the past. 
 
2.3 Global myths of the electorate 
Along with mythologizing democracy, international journalists also tended to present a 
homogeneous story of the Born Frees, despite a few profound examples. Poverty is 
highly visualised but kept at a distance through camera proxemics, while the protests are 




  2.3.1 Born Frees 
Stephen Friedman writes that the Born Free theory is “either hopelessly naïve or based 
on a very strong desire to avoid unpleasant realities. It is not an explanation of voting 
behaviour” (2013). His concerns resonated in global broadcasts, but South African 
channels did not frame the Born Frees in this way.88 Predominant frames of this group 
suggest they have no memory of apartheid and offer no allegiance to any party but 
particularly not the ANC, both of which tend to homogenise the diverse group of young 
South Africans into an electorate that acts and votes the same way. 
 
Margaret Evans from CBC suggests, “The generation born after the end of apartheid 
[has] no living memory of it” (South Africa votes – ANC favoured to win, CBC) and CNN’s 
Robyn Curnow concurs, “First time voters who never knew apartheid [have] no memory 
of living under it. This is the generation that could have had an impact with ANC 
majority” (NewsCentre South Africa spot, CNN). Having “no memory of apartheid” seems 
to equal a lack of loyalty to any party, but particularly the “liberation” party. These 
broadcasters generally position the youth as potential swing voters, away from the ANC 
and perhaps to the opposition. Some channels tripped over their framing, however: the 
BBC and CNN in particular portray the Born Frees as a homogeneous, apathetic group 
that was not loyal to the ANC, yet packages on the same channel contradicted this 
majority narrative. For example, the BBC’s Zeinab Bedawi insists, “[The Born Frees are] 
not encumbered with loyalty to the ANC and the liberation: they don’t remember they 
years of apartheid” (World News Today with Zeinab Bedawi) and the they “never experienced 
apartheid and have no attachment to the ANC as the liberation party” (World News 
																																																								
88 The Born Frees were described only once in South African broadcasts: the SABC reported that the 
“speculation that many of the Born Free generation would stay away from the polls today because of 
apathy proved to be unfounded” (SABC 3 Prime Time 3). Of course, this comment misses the point – the 
turnout of the youth might have been high, but the registration numbers were still very low: 30% of 18-to-
19-year-olds registered to vote in 2014 (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2014: 32; Tracey, 2014: 21). 
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Today). Bedawi also admits that the Born Frees “haven’t turned up” (ibid.) to vote, 
suggesting a kind of apathy to the voting process. Yet on the same channel, Nomsa 
Masego’s Security tight ahead of SA poll shows a young black Born Free woman dressed in 
the ANC colours (see Image 7.14) at an ANC campaign rally.  
Born Free 1: “I think we’ve come a long way since 1994, and I believe in the 
leadership core. I believe in what it stands for, I’m very familiar with the policies 
and I like the agenda. So for me personally, and for the majority, I think it speaks 
to us. And therefore I will be voting ANC.” 
Her support of the ANC was surprising, given the previous narratives positioning the 
Born Frees as potential “swing voters” in 2009 and Bedawi’s statements on other 
broadcasts. These two narratives do not interact with each other: the Born Frees are either 
homogeneous, disenchanted with the ANC, and apathetic in Bedawi’s pieces, or astute, 
loyal to the ANC, and enthusiastic as in Masego’s package, and yet this Born Free vox 
pop contradicts the majority narrative on the BBC. Instead of exploring this, however, 
the framing is confusing and seemingly contradictory. 
 
Image 7.14: Security tight ahead of SA poll, BBC, 2014. “Born Free at ANC rally” 
 
Schulz-Herzenberg (2014a: 33) finds that the youth seem less likely to vote but are still 
interested in politics. CNN’s Robyn Curnow is the only journalist to touch on this point 
in the sample: she notes in CNN NewsCentre South Africa spot that the small percentage of 
	 290 
Born Free voter registration is in fact proof of the “normalisation of South African 
politics because 18 to 19 year olds are disenchanted with politics no matter where in the 
world you are”. Curnow determines that the low youth turnout might be an indication of 
a shift and new cycle of politics in South Africa, where the young generation have fewer 
reasons to automatically vote for the ANC. In another example that shows how channels 
tended to trip over their framing of the Born Frees, Curnow contradicts this statement 
almost entirely.  
 
In Millions head to the polls in South Africa she explains, “In the rural hills of Nkandla, the 
political allegations and denials matter very little”, especially to young Nonkululeko 
Zuma (who is “unrelated” to Nkandla’s famous resident). Nonkululeko, dressed in ANC 
regalia emblazoned with Jacob Zuma’s face (see Image 7.15), is a Born Free who was 
apparently unable to vote in the 2014 election because of a lack of documentation – a 
common problem in South Africa, Curnow explains. Despite living in the shadow of the 
sprawling, controversial Nkandla homestead in rural poverty, and without a birth 
certificate or any identification documents, Nonkululeko campaigned tirelessly for Jacob 
Zuma and is typical of the youth, Curnow says, as “loyalty to the liberation party and its 
leader remains strong” (Millions head to the polls in South Africa, CNN).  
 
Image 7.15: Millions head to the polls in South Africa, CNN, 2014. “Dressed in ANC flags” 
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As with the BBC, these two narratives of a “swing vote” generation and the “loyal 
youth” co-exist awkwardly and contradict each other. Instead of exploring the inherent 
inconsistencies in South Africa’s new democracy, admitting that some youth are loyal 
and some are disenchanted for a variety of reasons, global channels, and the BBC and 
CNN in particular, seem insistent on framing the Born Frees as a binary – they are either 
homogeneously disaffected, or fervently loyal to the ANC. Journalists may juxtapose two 
competing or contradicting frames in order to give the illusion of depth, but the resultant 
narrative here comes across as confusing and contradictory rather than enlightening. 
 
The only broadcasts to explore and admit these contradictions came from AJE and 
VOA. In South Africa heads to the polls, AJE’s Haru Mutasa explains, “young people don’t 
like the term [Born Free] because it implies they are a cohesive group, when they have 
different experiences in a divided South Africa”. A young white man seated in his 
middle-class kitchen complains about the lack of jobs, and a young black man complains 
about the lack of privacy in his tiny room that he shares with his sister and parents. Both 
are disenchanted with the ANC and democracy in general and apathetic about the 
outcome of the election, yet have very different complaints and backgrounds. Mutasa 
takes care to show the differences between Born Frees, and AJE in general avoids using 
the term “Born Free” as a catchall term. Similarly, on VOA’s South Africa Elections Emily 
Jaab presents three Born Frees from different walks of life: a black university student is 
disenchanted with the process of democracy and is tired of ANC scandals; a young 
township resident doesn’t hesitate to pronounce her loyalty to Jacob Zuma and believes 
that 20 years is simply not enough time to fix all problems; while her neighbour, also a 
Born Free, will not vote in the elections as a “way of protesting” his parent’s insistence 
that the ANC still stands for liberation. Jaab explores the contradictions inherent in the 
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young South African electorate, and this broadcast is a good example of comprehensive, 
contextual, and investigative journalism. 
 
Despite these two examples, the majority narrative about the Born Frees on international 
broadcasts relied on repeated clichéd phrases: “Born after the end of white rule”, “with 
no memory of apartheid”, and “didn’t turn up”. Global journalists, both Western and 
non-Western, seemingly did not summarise the stories for a better understanding of the 
electorate in a shorter period of time, but rather blended the Born Frees into one 
indistinguishable group without context and thus mirror the concerns Friedman (2013) 
raises about the Born Free theory. Binarising the youth vote and reducing the group to a 
simple stereotype is unhelpful in understanding voting patterns and the process of 
democracy in South Africa. 
  2.3.2 Poverty 
The confusing binaries that tended to flatten the Born Free group and visuals that 
mythologise the political parties also oversimplify the poverty in South Africa. Nicholson 
(2015) states that 59% of South Africans live in poverty, and international journalists 
portray poverty by visiting the townships dotted around South Africa. Similar to the 
myth of 1994, journalists tended to use the depiction of poverty as a synecdoche for the 
ANC’s failure to deliver on their promises, and do not take into account the history of 
apartheid Land Acts, for example, or the post-apartheid neoliberal policies that have 
widened the inequality gap over the past two decades. In visiting the townships and 
discussing the poverty and inequality that exists in South Africa, camera movements were 
used to delineate distance between audience and the township residents. 
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AJE, the BBC, CCTV, and VOA employed similar camera techniques to show poverty in 
South Africa in a peculiar visual convention – an establishing shot across the vast tin 
shack township, sun glaring off the roofs, followed by a zoom into the township roads 
(see Images 7.16 – 7.21). The wide shot creeping into a closer angle shows firstly the 
intangible quality of township life to outsiders, and secondly the scale of the township. 
The audience is positioned on the outside of the township, while the journalist takes us 
on a journey inside it. As journalists walk along the streets narrating the scenes, the 
discussion is usually that ANC’s failure to deliver basic services is to blame for the 
poverty experienced by the residents. For example, the BBC’s Adrienne Murray says, 
“recent protests demand better basic services such as housing, schools, water, and 
electricity” (South Africa’s economic challenges, BBC) while the camera pans across an 
expansive tin-roofed township. CCTV’s reporter Emily Jaab suggests, “ANC support is 
based on historical legacy” (SA Elections, CCTV), as a wide shot over the tops of an 
expansive township moves to a street lined with litter (Image 7.21). This juxtaposition 
implies the ANC has failed to provide services but instead relies on its history as 
liberators to garner support.  
 




Image 7.17: South Africa’ economic challenges, BBC, 2014. “Wide on rooftops” 
 
Image 7.18: SA poverty 20 years later, CCTV, 2014. “Wide on rooftops” 
 
Image 7.19: SA Elections, VOA, 2014. “Wide on rooftops” 
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Image 7.20: SA poverty 20 years later, CCTV, 2014. “Zoom into township roads” 
 
Image 7.21: SA elections, VOA, 2014. “Zoom into township roads” 
 
The majority of broadcasts from international journalists effectively Othered the poor 
black township residents through camera techniques. The wide shots over tin roofs 
emphasised the expansiveness of the township and the scale of the poverty, calling 
attention to the ANC’s failure to provide for the many residents, but also highlighted the 
distance and mysteriousness of the township itself. As wide shots moved closer through 
telephoto lenses or zooms into the streets, the journalist takes the viewer on a ‘tour’ 
through the township, allowing a brief, fleeting glimpse into this strange, other world. 
These kinds of proxemics, without discourse to contextualise the visuals, do not 
adequately explore the depths of South Africa’s complex democracy, but mythologise 
and simplify, rather than explain and explore. A good example of how journalists explore 
poverty and inequality exists on two local broadcasts, detailed later in this section. 
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 2.3.3 The blindly loyal followers 
These scenes of expansive townships signifying deepening poverty in South Africa clash 
with the support the ANC garners from these areas. Journalists often question how rural 
and poor black people could still vote for the ANC despite the perceived failures in basic 
service delivery. The enthusiastic support for the ruling party was less rambunctious and 
intimidating, as in 2009, but visualised fealty to the ANC was still widespread on 
international broadcasts.  
 
In 2009, global broadcasters juxtaposed intimidating, vehement support for the ANC 
with discourse about Zuma’s corruption and rape trials, suggesting that supporters 
“don’t care about any of that” (see Chapter 7). In 2014 this narrative was less frequent 
but more blunt, employing direct discourse to suggest this confusing loyalty rather than 
editing and visuals. Journalists repeated that “despite” failures from the ANC 
government and Zuma’s corruption scandals, supporters “still” vote for the ruling party. 
The BBC’s Andrew Harding claims that Jacob Zuma “will almost certainly keep his job, 
despite being accused of corruption” (World News Today with Zeinab Badawi, BBC); while 
CBC’s Margaret Evans suggests that the ANC “is favoured to win despite being mired in 
corruption and a struggling economy” (SA Votes, CBC). In Robyn Curnow’s Millions head 
to the polls in South Africa on CNN, young Nonkululeko’s support for Jacob Zuma 
“despite” a lack of identification documents seems that the ANC’s rural support base 
ignores problems, “plays Pollyanna” Mattes (2005: 52) says, and votes for the ANC 
regardless how badly the government treats them. Of course, the reality of the ANC’s 
support, in rural and urban enclaves, is complex and cannot be spoken of in any kind of 
monolithic way, but Western journalists still flatten the perplexing ANC support into 
binaries: the electorate are either young, apathetic, and potential swing voters, or blindly 
loyal to the ANC regardless of how poorly they are treated.  
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Part of the problem here is the lack of context afforded to political parties in South 
Africa – the on-going confusion as to why the ANC keeps its loyal support is because 
journalists fail to dig deep enough into the intricacy of South African politics during 
elections. Proportionate Representation clashes with identity politics: because South 
Africans do not vote for a leader, but rather a party, under the PR structure, ANC 
supporters can still be loyal to the party yet protest against the president, or be faithful to 
the liberation credentials of the ANC yet disagree with the current leadership (Schulz-
Herzenberg, 2014: 25; Mattes, 2005: 53, 2014: 186). The journalists who tend to focus on 
the shocking and the bizarre cannot see the wood for the trees. 
 
Past depictions of the “singing and dancing” frame pointed to a vehement loyalty, akin 
to Mbembe’s (2015: 133) aesthetics of burlesque to show fealty. The 2014 electorate 
were yet again depicted as jovial, rambunctious, and loud but with a difference in 
framing. On AJE, Jacob Zuma leads an off-key rendition of “Umshini Wami” on stage, 
lumbering stiffly as ANC members follow his lead (South Africa elections promo, AJE). On 
AJE’s SA opposition taps into discontent, Zuma’s face emblazoned on a tee-shirt ripples 
absurdly across a large-breasted woman’s chest as she sways to unheard music. CNN’s 
Millions head to the polls in South Africa depicts Nonkululeko and her family dancing 
flamboyantly while dressed in flags bearing Zuma’s face, and his image is stretched 
across a woman’s expansive buttocks as she climbs in low angle the hill to the village. 
These images are framed with unnecessary absurdity – there are plenty of other shots to 
choose from, and yet the journalists continuously choose shots where Zuma’s face 
stretches over the body parts of supporters. 
 
Mbembe’s (2015) concept of showing fealty through song and dance was apparent in the 
2004 and 2009 election coverage, but less so 2014. Instead, participants were framed to 
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seem ridiculous in both their movements and attire. There seemed little of Mbembe’s 
dramatization of subordination and fealty here and more a depiction of mimicry, 
burlesque, and vulgarity, which suggests a change in the journalists’ perceptions. We look 
upon these subjects as “funny” rather than showing “fealty”, and this narrative shows 
how the journalists treat ANC support – citizens follow the ANC regardless of how they 
are treated, and their movements and attire are equally as strange and puzzling to the 
gaze. 
  2.3.4 Protests 
Despite this joyful support of the ANC, protests against the ANC were also widespread. 
Journalists covered the protests mutually exclusively to the ANC support, in that the two 
topics were rarely discussed in conjunction with one other. In a recurring narrative of 
entangled framing in international journalism, black South African citizens were 
simultaneously passionately supportive of the ANC and violently disapproving of the 
party. Journalists rarely made any attempt to explore these two contradictions, but 
instead presented the myths of the blindly loyal followers and the protests almost in the 
same breath. The result was confusing, but possibly close to the truth: Schulz-
Herzenberg (2014a: 20) remarks that disillusionment with the ANC or with politics in 
general does not always mean a vote for the opposition. Instead, disaffected voters 
simply move into the non-participatory electorate, staying away from the polls. However, 
journalists did not explore these inconsistencies any further than simply presenting both 
narratives at the same time: the passionate support and violent dissidence co-exist 
awkwardly, similar to the Born Free framing earlier in this chapter. 
 
When depicting the protest action, Western and non-Western journalists tended to 
sensationalise the views of violence, focusing on fires, rubble, and other visually rich 
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images, showing the impact of the protests not through citizen experiences but through 
the destruction of property. This signifying practice reduces the context of the protests 
to concerns of property ownership and individual rights, which Mutua (2002: 12), Norris 
(1997: 14) and Hawk (2002: 168) suggest is a neoliberal frame. In CCTV’s SA poverty 20 
years later, a protester throws a burning trashcan around while dancing in the smoke 
(Image 7.22) as Akuffo says, “Soweto, home to some of the most violent political 
clashes…. people try to get the government’s attention, sometimes through violence” 
(SA poverty 20 years later, CCTV). On a different CCTV broadcast, Guy Hendersen 
narrates over close-up shots of burnt rubble blocking a street: “By dawn, only the debris 
remained. To be heard here, many still prefer other means” (Ruling SA party wins its fifth 
successive election, CCTV). As we see a burning EFF poster in close-up, the Reuters’ 
journalist says “Fires burn in a South African township…” (SA police arrest 59, Reuters) 
(Image 7.23). The journalist continues, “… As post-election protests turn violent”, while 
brightly burning buildings blaze in the night sky from a distance. The fire is bright orange 
against the dark of the night, and debris closely scrutinised in shallow depth of focus 
(Image 7.24). 
 
Image 7.22: SA poverty 20 years later, CCTV, 2014. “Man throwing trashcan in protest” 
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Image 7.23: SA police arrest 59, Reuters, 2014. “Burning EFF poster” 
 
Image 7.24: SA police arrest 59, Reuters, 2014. “Bright orange fire against black” 
 
Focusing on rubble instead of contextualising the protests through vox pops was a 
recurring theme in this sample (see Images 7.25 – 7.28). As Maserumule (2016) noted 
during community protests covered by mainstream media in 2016, “the razzmatazz is 
deafening”. Visuals of burning tyres, a mass of black people scattering under stun 
grenades, and close-up, floor-level angles of rubble blocking roads reduced the protests 
to one element. Wasserman (2014) suggests that it is unworkable to talk about protests in 
any kind of monolithic way because of the myriad communities, histories, and reasons 
contained within the events; focusing only on the visualisation of protests thus further 
excludes context. Researchers (Duncan, 2014a; Wasserman, 2014; Wasserman, Bosch, & 
Chuma, 2016) have already acknowledged that the voices of the poor are missing from 
mainstream South African media representations of protests, and this sample echoes 
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their findings but includes global mainstream media too. Only 17% of all 128 speakers in 
the sample were Unknowns (not including the Born Free group), and only two were 
directly involved in the protests (on CCTV’s SA poverty 20 years later and AJE’s OB2). 
 
Image 7.25: South Africans vote in general election, AJE, 2014. “Destruction of property” 
 
Image 7.26: OB 3, AJE, 2014. “Destruction of property” 
 




Image 7.28: SA police arrest 59, Reuters, 2014. “Destruction of property” 
 
As an exception to this narrative, AJE’s Haru Mutasa attempts to contextualise the 
protests through the use of vox pops of those affected and by investigating the 
background to these protests. These citizens complain that the only way to get the 
government’s attention is through “violence” and say they are “tired of waiting” (SA votes 
in general election, AJE). They bemoan the lack of electricity, water, and commonplace 
crime and rape (ibid.). Tania Page found the same in De Doorns in the Western Cape – 
as one of the only direct protester voices in the entire sample, a farmworker 
representative states that if the government does not listen, “we are going to close the 
N189” (OB 2, AJE). Despite this contextualisation, however, the channel still observed 
the protests through the rubble, burnt remnants, and destruction of property. In South 
Africans vote in general election and OB 3, Haru Mutasa points to the rubble of the IEC’s 
voting station, and the camera zooms in on a ruined, burnt building behind her.  
 
																																																								
89 The N1 and N2 are the major trunk roads that link Cape Town to the rest of the country, and run 
through the Cape Winelands. A common protest tactic by farmworkers and township dwellers is to block 
these roads with concrete barriers, burning tyres, and pelt cars with stones in order to make their 
grievances known. 
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 2.4 Narrow South African perspectives 
While global coverage appeared to mythologise certain aspects of the election, local 
South African coverage was generally uncritical and ignored important or controversial 
frames. As seen above, global coverage was generally shallow – that is, a diversity of 
narratives but that were superficial or simplistic without adequate depth or context. 
South African narratives, conversely, were narrow – that is, exploring depth but 
restricted in the broadness of frames. The importance was rather what was omitted from 
the coverage, rather than what was manifestly discussed. Duncan (2014b: 151) also 
suggests that South African media framing of the 2014 election was banal and boring, 
leaving little space for a creative retelling of the election. However, this study shows that 
the South African news narratives were more nuanced than simply banal – the local 
broadcasts were hesitant and omitted important frames and issues.  
  2.4.1 Nkandla 
The Nkandla corruption trial discoloured the ANC’s campaign significantly, yet South 
African channels disregarded this issue. Global broadcasts frequently zoomed into or out 
of the sprawling homestead as journalists narrated with congruent pejorative statements 
to outline the scandal, mentioning the corruption trial, the findings from the Public 
Protector, or that Zuma spent millions of taxpayers’ rands on upgrades. Yet, no South 
African channels mentioned this issue except for one blundering SABC broadcast.  
 
SABC 3 Prime Time 1 began in much the same way as global broadcasts that mention 
Nkandla, with a wide sweeping shot across the green rolling hills of KwaZulu-Natal. The 
zoom from the Nkandla homestead to the voting location foregrounds a school and a 
queue of elderly black people outside the local voting station. The journalist then 
conducts euphemistic acrobatics in order to avoid the elephant in the room: “In a remote 
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area with breath-taking scenery, rolling green hills and villages, it was here that the 
president arrived to cast his ballot. Residents here live simple lives, but their most 
famous resident has thrust them into the international spotlight”. This was the only 
allusion to the controversial issue on any of the South African channels, and the 
avoidance of the issue was palpable. 
  2.4.2 Contextualising poverty 
Although a frequent criticism of local journalism during this overall sample is that the 
frames are too narrow to get an adequate picture of the elections, a few notable examples 
from the 2014 election show the depth of coverage that South African broadcasters can 
accomplish. While the topic of poverty was not controversial on the same level as, say, 
Zuma’s rape trial or the Nkandla scandal, two South African broadcasts present a 
detailed view of the electorate’s experience with poverty, which remains a growing and 
concerning topic for all South Africans. 
 
eNCA’s Phakamile Hlubi (Opposition parties eye out troubled North West) visits the town of 
Marikana on the Platinum Belt in the North West and depicts the grinding poverty that 
many miners and their families experience. Hlubi interviews multiple residents, from 
Born Frees to entrepreneurs and miners, and attempts to comprehensively cover the 
experience of poverty through the eyes of the poor. As with the other broadcasts, 
poverty is framed as a symptom of the ANC’s failure to provide services, but unlike the 
above visual convention on global broadcasts, Hlubi’s piece is investigative and 
extensive. Similarly, Bulelani Philip’s SABC broadcast Khayelitsha vox pops offers a broad 
overview of the portable toilet fiasco in the township, which led to multiple “poo 
protests” (Mkhize, 2015) during 2013 and 2014. Philip interviews leaders of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) as well as citizens who lived with the “pota-pota” 
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system without flushable toilets, while giving subjective camera angles (du Plooy, 2009: 
121) to draw the audience into the scene. 
 
These contextualising broadcasts are good examples of how depth can be acquired to 
explain a difficult and contradictory topic, while still using narrative journalistic frames 
such as camera proxemics. Although neither local broadcast explores the relationship 
between poverty and the ruling party, shying away from any kind of controversial topic 
of frame, these broadcasts still present a view from the ground, through the eyes of 
citizens directly affected by the issues, which was rare profundity in a sea of mediatised, 
shallow, and narrow broadcasts. 
 
 2.5 The military in control 
While local and global broadcasts tended to differ in the type of myths and narratives 
about the 2014 election, a similarity in narratives across regions was the depiction of the 
military involvement in the protest action. Despite a few notable examples where 
journalists attempted a view from the ground (such as AJE’s OBs from Bekkersdal and 
De Doorns, and the SABC’s investigation into the Pota Pota system in the Western 
Cape), the portrayal of protest action was predominantly framed through the military’s 
presence in the various “hotspots”. Compared to the proliferation of post-protest visuals 
on global broadcasts, South African broadcasts hardly mentioned these events, and 
instead focused on how the “security was tight” at the various voting stations pre-
election. This section explores how the military were portrayed as being in control of the 
protests, either as “bringers of law and order” (Fair & Astroff, 1991: 58) or, more 
controversially, to intimidate protesters into behaving and even to vote for the ANC. 
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  2.5.1 eNCA 
eNCA followed protests in three different areas of the country: Bekkersdal in Gauteng, 
Sterkspruit in the Eastern Cape, and Malamulele in Limpopo. In every broadcast where 
the protests occur, we see the police and military “out in force, keeping the peace” 
(Hlubi, SA turned out in their droves). Journalist Sibongile Mkani-Mpolweni reports the 
military and police maintain “peace and order in a town marred by violence” (Heavy 
security in Sterkspruit) while Thabang Masanabo suggests no trouble was reported on 
voting day because of “heavy security” (News Day 6am). eNCA even offered police 
officer Miranda Mills an opportunity to explain: “In Sterkspruit in particular, we’ve got 
reaction forces in place, we have deployed additional SAPS members, and we have the 
support of the South African National Defence Force” (Heavy security in Sterkspruit). 
Meanwhile, brown army tanks stand stationary, relaxed soldiers lean against vehicles, and 
police cars drive up the roads in all eNCA’s protest broadcasts (see Images 7.29 – 7.31). 
It seems the military and police were in “maintenance mode” rather than actively 
defending the 2014 election against a threat of violence.  
 
Image 7.29: News night 3, eNCA, 2014. “Relaxed military” 
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Image 7.30: Heavy security in Sterkspruit, eNCA, 2014. “Cops playing around” 
 
Image 7.31: News night 3, eNCA, 2014. “Relaxed mounted police” 
 
Foregrounding the police and military illustrates Fair and Astroff’s (1991: 58) argument 
that the authorities in South Africa are often viewed as unequivocal “bringers of law and 
order”; it also resonates with Wasserman’s (2014) interrogation of voices of the poor in 
mainstream media. We only know about the protests through the elite, Known voices of 
police officers, government officials, or journalists, or the pro-vote Unknown vox pops. 
eNCA does not allow protesters to speak during this sample. 
  2.5.2 AJE 
By attempting to interview people affected by the protests, AJE goes further than the 
South African channels but, as with eNCA, the military were present to “instil a sense of 
calm” (Page, OB 2). Police act against violence only once on the channel – ANC 
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members hijack a DA march in Johannesburg and the clash turns violent. Police cars, 
lights flashing and sirens blaring, chase down ANC supporters in narrow streets, the 
action occurring in the distance. “Then the chase began,” Haru Mutasa narrates. “Police 
managed to out-manoeuvre the ANC members who were chasing the DA march” (SA 
rally ends in violence).  
 
Similar to the eNCA signification, the military, in “maintenance mode”, were always 
present when protests were mentioned: mounted police officers walk horses down the 
road, soldiers lean against tanks in the sun, and police stroll down dust roads (see Image 
7.32). AJE emphasises not only their presence but also their relaxed control of the areas. 
In Bekkersdal, Mutasa paraphrases the military message: “keep calm, vote, and go home. 
Be careful” (OB 3). As with eNCA’s depiction of these authorities, the presence of the 
military is never questioned on AJE and is ultimately judged as an appropriate response 
to seemingly destructive, violent protests. Fair and Astroff’s (1991) argument rings true: 
AJE and eNCA maintain the neoliberal hegemony and protect the status quo through 
narratives that endorse the authorities as unquestioned “bringers of law and order”. 
 
Image 7.32: South Africans vote in general election, AJE, 2014. “Relaxed army” 
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  2.5.3 BBC 
In contrast to eNCA and AJE’s “bringers of law and order” narrative, the BBC held a 
different view of the authorities. In three broadcasts, BBC journalists imply the military 
and police were overly brutal in their control, and were present in township “hotspots” 
to intimidate residents to vote for the ANC.  
 
The BBC was one of the only channels to show footage of the tragic Marikana 
massacre,90 and the juxtaposition of this footage with the previous audio creates a 
damning narrative of the police and the government. In What issues face the ANC after SA 
elections journalist Andrew Harding investigates South Africa’s struggling economy, 
focusing on the mining sector. At the NROC, Home Affairs Minister Naledi Pandor 
touts the ANC’s neoliberal economic plans: “There’s gonna be I think quite an exciting 
and robust development of the economy of South Africa as long as we stick to the plans 
that we have, that are very good plans.” After a brief pause, booming guns signal a brutal 
scene: police officers fire live ammunition into Marikana miners, a dust cloud masks the 
protesters (Image 7.33). A large contingent of police officers shoot into the advancing 
group until finally the commanders give the signal to cease. Because of the juxtaposition 
between scenes, Pandor’s “plans” seem to mean the police brutally controlling strikers. 
This footage was eerily reminiscent of apartheid imagery: a large show of police force 
using live ammunition to control a group of black protesters. The juxtaposition between 
discourse and visuals here appears to be another attempt to create the illusion of depth 
through editing, and the broadcast is one of the few from 2014 that attempt to 
understand the context of the fifth election.  
																																																								
90 VOA showed the barrage of Marikana miners pushing against a line of struggling police officers while 
eNCA depicted a low angle of police running from strikers. 
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 Image 7.33: What issue face the ANC after SA elections, BBC, 2014. “Guns of Marikana” 
 
In another broadcast, the BBC presents the military and police as a signifier for 
apartheid-era violence and control. In Security tight ahead of SA poll, five large brown army 
trucks roll down a dusty street as soldiers gaze impassively at bemused black schoolboys 
walking alongside. Nomsa Masego observes, “a sign of force not seen since apartheid 
days, with the government sending a strong message to the youth: Behave, or face the 
consequences” (Security tight ahead of SA poll, BBC) (Image 7.34). Masego then interviews 
two vox pops: “Stop intimidating us with these police cars, telling us to vote for the 
ANC”, one says, while another claims, “Today [the ANC] want the very same dirty votes 
with a barrel of a gun with a number of police to intimidate us to vote for them. We 
won’t!” In a third broadcast, as the camera pulls up from a close up of army truck tyres 
to the driver’s impassive face, Andrew Harding (World News Today with Zeinab Bedawi) 
narrates, “the ANC is starting to lose ground. The army was brought into this 
impoverished township after riots yesterday”.  
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Image 7.34: Security tight ahead of SA poll, BBC, 2014. “Behave, or face the consequences” 
 
Each time the BBC mentioned the protests or riots, journalists linked the military to the 
ANC’s desire to “control” and “intimidate”. Thus, for the BBC, the military was 
antithetical to Fair and Astroff’s (1991) idea of “law or order”, instead representing 
brutality, government control, and oppression of the masses by the ruling ANC. Achille 
Mbembe (2015: 111) that 
one should not underestimate the violence that can be set in motion to protect 
the vocabulary used to denote or speak of the commandement, and to safeguard the 
official fictions that underwrite the apparatus of domination, since these are 
essential to keeping people under the commandement’s spell, within an enchanted 
forest of adulation. 
It might not be possible to see this “enchanted forest” through the vistas of brown army 
tanks, but the BBC may have had a point. Although these broadcasts seem 
conspiratorial, David Bruce argues in some areas of South Africa the police are perceived 
to operate directly as instruments of the ANC, while the ANC are widely acknowledged 
as the main perpetrator of this intimidation (2014: 61, 82). Strangely, and despite Bruce’s 
corroboration of the BBC’s suggestion, no other broadcasts report on this topic. Where 
the military intervened in controlling the population, this action was always deemed right, 
just, and appropriate, except on the BBC.  
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Overall, then, the difference between the local and global media coverage of the 2014 
election was mostly between the narrowness and shallowness of narratives. Global news 
frames tended to flatten experiences of democracy and depictions of the electorate into 
contradicting and confusing stereotypes, and neglected citizen voices that would have 
enabled a proper view from the ground. Local news, conversely, avoided controversy 
and offered particularly narrow news frames that supported the status quo narrative of a 
consolidated, efficient democracy. This mainstream local media perspective seemed 
biased towards a “view from the suburbs” (Friedman, 2011: 109). A crucial exception 
was the non-mainstream local broadcasts that attempted to voice citizens and explore 
controversial topics. Both local and global news offered a “top down” view of the 
election and surrounding topics, foregrounding voices of authorities, pundits, and 
government over citizens. 
 
3 DISCUSSION OF 2014 
 
Three main narratives characterised the media coverage of the 2014 election. Firstly, 
mediatised coverage left little room for exploring context, particularly about how the 
ANC won the election despite routinely disappointing the electorate. Secondly, the 
omission of important topics supported the status quo, especially on South African 
broadcasts. Finally, the top-down organisation of the news coverage tended to ignore 
grassroots voices, which could have added meaningful context and remedied the 
confusing and contradictory frames. 
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 3.1 Desperately seeking depth in the ANC’s win 
In 2009, Jane Duncan suggested topics that required investigation received inadequate 
attention on local media, a trend that had continued from 1999 (2009: 219). The high 
degree of personalisation resulted in coverage that focused only on superficial issues, 
without seeking depth required for the media to play an adequate role in democratisation. 
Duncan blames the ANC’s long-running battle with the media and political pressure on 
the SABC in particular for this hesitant approach to covering controversial topics (2009: 
229). Duncan labels the 2009 media coverage “desperately seeking depth” because of the 
focus on “‘who’, ‘what’ and ‘where’, at the expense of ‘why’” (ibid.: 231). In my analysis 
of the 2014 elections, on global channels at least, there seemed to be a push for 
understanding why ANC supporters continually voted in the party that frequently failed 
them. For the first time in five election years, the liberation narrative featured in most 
global channels and went some way to explain the seemingly hypnotic ANC embrace. 
  3.1.1 Liberation narrative91 
Butler (2013: 67) controversially argues that, although the ANC was a genuine and 
significant force in opposing apartheid, the party tended to swallow up and delegitimise 
many opposing movements (such as the PAC, the United Democratic Force, and the 
SACP) during the late 1980s. Holmes and Shoup (2013: 57) and Graham (2014: 177) also 
observe that the ANC continues to present itself as the only legitimate “liberation 
movement” in South Africa post-apartheid. Graham suggests that discrediting other anti-
apartheid activist groups and movements resulted in “a self-centred heroic narrative” that 
“distorted the historical picture and created a distinct sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’, which has 
since been ingrained into the modern political process” (ibid.). Melber notes that the 
ANC promotes the “equation that the party is the government and the government is 
																																																								
91 I am indebted to Dr. Chris Paterson from Leeds University for the several conversations that helped 
focus this section. 
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the state. Any political alternative that does not emerge from within will not be 
acceptable” (2016). Graham suggests this “myth” is “not necessarily a falsehood, but 
based instead on an ‘acceptable’ version of past events” (2014: 180). He further argues 
that the slow pace of change, poor levels of service delivery, and a continued socio-
economic inequality in the country, means “the ANC is forced to turn to history as a 
justification for its retention of power, rather than its record in office” (2014: 180). 
 
Global journalists attempted to explain the seemingly unshakeable loyalty through this 
so-called liberation narrative. Supporters seemed to follow the ANC not just because of 
policies (as in 1999), or Zuma’s personality (as in 2009), but because the party is 
imagined as liberator, saviour, and provider of a “better life for all”. The narrative is 
apparently so strong that voters could seemingly ignore the numerous scandals and 
shortcomings because, as one vox pop said, the vote would be for “the old man” (World 
News Today with Zeinab Bedawi, BBC), meaning Mandela. For the majority of broadcasts, 
the ANC is synonymous with the emancipation of South Africa and its sole liberator. 
Journalists often unwittingly ratified the ANC’s liberation narrative by repeating slogans 
and imagery that depict the ANC as liberator, saviour, and bringer of a better life for all, 
as well as discourse stating. The neutralisation of controversial frames on South African 
broadcasts created the same effect: by ignoring controversy (such as Marikana and 
exploring protester voices), the status quo of the ANC as sole liberator is thus supported.  
3.1.2 Dissidence 
Both local and global broadcasters did not adequately explore the citizens’ experience of 
the protest action in 2014, despite a few notable examples across the regions. Instead, 
protest was often seen from a distance, through the remnants of burnt property, and 
through the frame of “security” in control of dissidence. Achille Mbembe describes 
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postcolonial conflict in Togo, wherein the president and the country’s sole party 
symbolised liberty, democracy, and statehood rolled into one. The party thus proclaimed 
“the unity of the people, among whom no divisions could be allowed to exist” (2015: 
105). Mbembe argues that in this context, all resistance was denied though verbal control 
or violence from the commandement. Other scholars (Butler, 2013: 62; De Vos, 2012; Du 
Preez, 2013: 214 – 215), writers (Essop, 2016; Grootes, 2013: 29; Munusamy, 2013), and 
even the ANC itself (Mantashe, 2015), suggest the government insists on a type of 
unification of South Africans, a “Rainbow Nation”, of which the ANC is the sole 
liberator and saviour. The protests among the South African poor directly contradict this 
“liberation narrative”: the ANC is no longer saviour from suffering, deliverer of dignity, 
or representatives of the poor. While journalists rarely connect this argument outright, 
the attempt is there to obtain some kind of understanding in the seemingly contradictory 
and perplexing South African democracy. Of course, Marais argues that this type of 
“rolling rebellion” (2011: 459) narrative is inaccurate because of the myriad reasons 
constituting the protests, but broadcasters tended to lump “protest action” together in 
much the same way as they amalgamated “Born Frees” and “ANC support”. 
 
Despite some notable broadcasts in this sample and an attempt to dig a little deeper, the 
majority offered a simplistic re-telling of this “liberation narrative” wherein the ANC is 
in danger of becoming a synecdoche for the entire anti-apartheid and anti-colonisation 
struggle, essentially squashing the many facets of opposition during the three hundred 
years of white rule. Jacobs and Calland (2002: 15) argue South Africa’s identity is often 
seen as an amalgamation of difference, yet the ANC’s appropriation of their own 
struggle history narrative is not an amalgamation but rather a devouring of opposing 
identities.  
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 3.2 Omission of important frames supports the status quo 
If the global channels in 2014 sought the “why” in the ANC’s win despite all failures and 
disappointments, then local channels did not even consider the “why”. Duncan (2014b: 
151) notes that South African framing of the 2014 election was banal and boring, leaving 
little space for a creative retelling of the election. However, this study shows that the 
South African narratives are more nuanced than simply banal – the local broadcasts seem 
hesitant to explore any narratives other than the experience of poverty, the process of 
democracy, and the military in control of the protest action. The SABC actively avoids 
any mention of the Nkandla scandal, even when the journalist stood in the Nkandla 
voting station and zoomed out of the controversial homestead. Waldahl (2005a) suggests 
that pro-government local media in Zimbabwe were generally uncritical of the 2000 
election, and this study reflects some of her conclusions, in that the SABC avoided any 
controversial frames or narratives during the election. However, Waldahl suggests pro-
opposition or independent media offered both technical and substantive information, yet 
I found that other South African channels (eNCA and EWN are presumably 
independent) followed the same banal, uncritical coverage as the SABC. 
 
Analysing both imagery and audio, and the resulting juxtaposition between both, showed 
a cautious approach to representing the 2014 election on local broadcasts. This finding is 
not represented in many of the most prevalent pieces of research about the 2014 media 
coverage (such as Duncan 2014b), but I assume this is because of the difference in 
method employed. Previous research employed basic content analysis that looked at 
discourse and tone of broadcasts, a method that Bucy and Grabe (2009: 70, 77) suggest 
ignores the single most distinguishing feature of television, the stream of images, and is 
therefore insufficient. The method employed here puts specific emphasis on the image 
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rhetoric and notes key juxtapositions between audio and visual, and so the study has 
found additional layers to Duncan’s statement that local media coverage was “banal”. 
 
 3.3 Top down organization of the media excludes grassroots voices 
The protest action that surrounded the 2014 election was framed as a “horse race” 
between narratives: who would win, the chaotic protesters, or the military employed to 
restore law and order? In a similar but less urgent way as 1994, journalists framed peace 
and war in a “neck and neck” race to the election. Wasserman, Bosch, and Chuma (2016) 
explain that the voices of the poor are missing from mainstream media: protestors were 
either not heard, or not taken seriously, and “are reported only inasmuch as they 
inconvenience a middle-class audience, for instance to inform them where traffic may be 
disrupted” (2016). Indeed, very few citizen voices were heard in this sample, with 66% 
Known voices compared to 34% Unknown. Of that 34%, the majority were excited 
Born Free voters, themselves a homogeneous group, rather than protesters or township 
residents. The grinding poverty that most black South Africans face almost always 
happens away from us, in the background, at a safe distance. We hear very little from the 
grassroots communities who are actively involved in the protests, although a few 
broadcasts do attempt some kind of complex and investigative journalism. 
 
Even though journalists in this sample seem to grasp at elements of depth – 
acknowledging this liberation narrative, for example, and distinguishing disillusionment 
in divergent groups of the voting populace – the lack of space and time allowed to 
develop these ideas leaves entangled narratives and perplexing stories, as well as a 
flattened and insubstantial depiction of democracy in South Africa. By using Iyengar’s 
(1991: 18) episodic or event-driven reporting, journalists focus too heavily on binaries 
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(such as the myth of the Born Frees) and drama (as in the visualisation of the protests), 
rather than exploring context that might enlighten and explain the complexities of South 
African democracy and society. These findings coincide with Duncan’s (2014b: 152) 
conclusions and the MMA (2014: 3) research: the shallow portrayal of the election with a 
few repeated narratives meant that style was allowed to triumph over substance. 
Ultimately, the local and global perspective of the 2014 election, despite a few profound 
broadcasts that explored depth, was a “view from the suburbs” (Friedman, 2011: 109) 




The difference between the local and global news coverage appeared in the visualisation 
of the election. Local broadcasters opted for a seemingly “safe” option of giving a 
narrow overview of the election, showing the normality of democracy through leaders 
and citizens voting. This pedestrian news coverage shied away from important or 
controversial news issues and frames such as the Nkandla scandal, Zuma’s corruption, 
the liberation narrative, or the concerns of youth participation. Global broadcasters went 
too far the other way, offering mediatised coverage that was often organised top down 
with a focus on authorities, elite voices, and power. In favouring visually rich events over 
grassroots issues, global journalists presented entangled framing due to lack of context 
afforded to South Africa’s complex democracy. 
 
International journalists in 2014 attempted to engage with the liberation narrative as well 
as dissidence. However, their ultimate failure to contextualise the frustrated rebellion and 
adequately interrogate voting patterns resulted in a mediatised, event-based coverage and 
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reduces the protests to “disengagement” with democracy. Mbembe warns against this: 
“The practices of ordinary citizens cannot always be read in terms of “opposition to the 
state”, “deconstructing power”, and “disengagement”. In the postcolony, an intimate 
tyranny links the rulers with the ruled” (2015: 128), and the journalists, even those from 
AJE, the only channel that attempted any kind of complexity of coverage, failed to 

































1 SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS 
 
This thesis investigated the narratives about South African democratic elections on both 
local and global television news, using a dedicated multimodal analysis method. Three 
overarching themes in the representation of the elections appeared. The first principal 
outcome suggests news coverage was predominantly driven by increased mediatisation. 
The second main discovery centres on the differences between South African and global 
news coverage: local narratives were frequently hesitant, presumably in an attempt to 
normalise democracy in South Africa, and often highlighted stability at the expense of 
controversial frames. Conversely, dramatic global narratives emphasised visually rich 
events, but at times ended up becoming entangled and contradictory because of the lack 
of context afforded to the stories. Finally, journalists disengage with political leaders and 
citizen voices over time and increasingly rely on pundits, which increases the distance 
between the audience and politics. 
 
This chapter outlines the overarching narratives on both local and global channels over 
the years, and moves to a discussion of journalism practice and the factors driving the 
shift in narratives. It ends with contributions to political communication theory, 
including important discussions around the drop-off in voicing political leaders, the 
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different set of binaries through which the South African elections were framed, and 
finally the effect mediatised news coverage has on understanding elections. 
 
2 UNDERSTANDING SOUTH AFRICAN ELECTIONS 
2.1 Local narratives 
Most South African channels attempted to normalise the experience of democracy 
during the sample years; the SABC in particular focused on the stability of the elections 
and effectiveness of the IEC. Local broadcasters showed an enthusiastic electorate that 
queued for hours to make their mark and, while some polling stations opened late, the 
mood never dampened.  
 
As the only South African broadcaster in 1994, the SABC presented a careful and 
optimistic overview of the first all-race voting day and avoided any mention whatsoever 
of the pre-election violence. At the time, the broadcaster was under a harsh international 
spotlight from media watchdogs, which may have contributed to the scant and optimistic 
narratives. In 1999, the narratives were surprisingly critical of the ruling party, with vox 
pops openly stating the ANC had not delivered on promises. This was one of the only 
times that overtly critical voices were heard, although the ANC received overall 
favourable coverage from local broadcasters. In 2004, both the SABC and eTV shifted to 
narratives that glamorised authorities and the government, presenting President Mbeki as 
a man of the people, popular with the youth, and personally delivering on promises. This 
frame contradicted accounts about South Africa’s second president, who was frequently 
accused of being aloof (Gevisser, 2007; Russell, 2009) and out of touch with the 
electorate (Jacobs & Calland, 2002: 5). Most conspicuous in 2004 was the lack of 
representation of the stark inequalities in South Africa and the HIV/AIDS pandemic. In 
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2009, South African broadcasters ignored controversial issues such as the corruption trial 
and the Mbeki ousting. Non-mainstream news channels AfricaNews and AmandlaTV 
attempted in-depth coverage, however. The final election year exhibited even more 
hesitancy from South African news broadcasts as eNCA and the SABC ignored the 
Nkandla scandal, the protest action (save for repetitions of how the military enforced 
order), and increasing citizen disillusionment with the democratic process.  
 
Prominent narratives across all election years presented the view of a stable, 
consolidated, efficient democracy, where authorities controlled small incidents of 
violence and unrest, and where the enthusiastic electorate mostly supported the ruling 
party. Normalising this democracy came at the expense of representing more 
controversial frames and issues. The South African broadcasts were notable in the 
absence of seminal issues that affected the country at the time. Local journalists rarely 
depicted the overt gap between the rich and the poor in the country, and even fewer 
explored the ANC’s failure to deliver services. Having said that, the process of 
normalising democracy contrasted with the focus on the military’s control protests in 
2014, which makes the maintenance of democracy anything but normal. 
 2.1.1 A note on the methodology 
Despite the overwhelming neglect of prominent and controversial frames over the years, 
the SABC was more critical of the government than expected than suggested by the 
literature of the time (Jacobs, 1999; Jones & Lodge, 1999; Davis, 2005; Duncan, 2009). 
Part of the reason for the discrepancy between my findings and those of the literature 
has to do with the analysis method employed in this study. The nuances of television 
news narratives were only made manifest with the dedicated multimodal methodology 
	 323 
described in Chapter 2 and in Jones (2016), rather than the usual content analysis for 
discourse and tone.  
 
While the literature (Jones & Lodge, 1999; MMA, 1999; Berger, 2002) about the 1999 
election accused the SABC of biased and uncritical coverage, my own findings present a 
slightly different view. The SABC was hesitant to overtly criticise the ANC but 
unexpectedly, perhaps inadvertently, represented some overtly critical voices. Moreover, 
literature about the 2014 election suggests that South African broadcasters were often 
banal, boring, and lacked substantive information, with “shallow and narrow” (MMA, 
2014: 3) narratives, but I push this further: local coverage was more than simply boring. 
The conservative approach to the 2014 elections extended to a hesitancy to investigate 
controversial frames and narratives, and the SABC in particular employed conspicuous 
journalistic acrobatics to avoid speaking about Nkandla, protests, and corruption. The 
factors driving this hesitancy are explored later in this chapter. 
 
2.2 Global narratives 
International broadcasts, particularly those from Western news channels, highlighted 
events that were dramatic, visually rich, and pitted one side against another in a form of a 
“horse race”: violence and protest action dominated the coverage in 1994 and in 2014, 
Jacob Zuma’s cult-like status and the diverse opposition consumed journalists in 2009, 
while the shocking inequality between the poor and the rich black populace was the 
leading focus in 2004. Creative camera techniques and juxtaposition between visuals and 
audio explored these events.  
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In 1994, the push towards post-Cold War frames meant that neoliberal concerns were 
foregrounded at the expense of an adequate explanation of the South African reality. 
White fears of loss of civil liberties were highlighted and black hopes of egalitarianism 
were pushed to the background and kept ambiguous. Between 1999 and 2004, global 
broadcasters avoided covering the election comprehensively, preferring instead to focus 
on long, exasperated queues (ITN, 1999) and the stark contrast between the “black 
diamond” Haves and the poor urban Have Nots (AP, 2004). Moving to 2009, Jacob 
Zuma’s controversies and the symbolism of his followers ensured that the context of 
Zuma’s campaign, exploring the vehement loyalty that the ANC commanded, and voting 
patterns were skimmed over. Any kind of substantive analysis was lost in the sea of 
swaying black bodies and piercing singing that drowned out the journalists. In 2014, the 
fixation on visually rich events continued as journalists portrayed the protest action 
through neoliberal frames of property destruction, keeping poverty and protest at a safe 
distance and overlooking adequate grassroots voices to explore these issues. Journalists 
also relied on binaries to represent the Born Free group and ANC supporters, but 
eventually present entangled and simplistic framing. Journalists repeatedly contradicted 
themselves when confronted with a complex, inconsistent electorate. 
 
In 1994, 2009, and 2014, Western news channels tended to report on the captivating 
crises of the elections with little exploration of context or consequences. As was the case 
in the coverage of Burundi’s post-election violence in 2015, international journalists 
became, as Hall (2015) terms, a “mayfly”, reporting on big stories with “they type of 
breathless excitement of a boxing match shorn of context and personality” (ibid.). 
Depicting the complicated South African democracy as an either-or concept (Nyamnjoh, 
2005; Nay, 2013: 7-8; Grinker, et al., 2010: 587; Spurr, 1994: 19) trivialises issues and 
flattens experiences into a single story. 
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2.2.1 Western and non-Western channels 
There is a difference between Western and non-Western international broadcasters, 
however. The most simplistic, binarised narratives came from Anglo-American channels 
like the BBC, Sky, and CNN. Non-Western global channels like AJE, at least in 2014, 
attempted more in-depth reporting of issues on the ground with dedicated live OBs from 
“hotspots” and citizen interviews. Anglo-American channels appeared to have a more 
mediatised type of journalism than non-Western channels, although this was not always 
the case. VOA, especially in 2014, explored the inherent contradictions of South African 
society and avoided using the binary, “horse race” frame of other North American 
channels. This reliance on already-known frames illustrates the point that Norris (1997), 
Turkington (1997), Reta (2000), Hawk (2002) and Ndlela (2005) argue: Anglo-American 
channels are more frequently binarised in their reporting about African elections in their 
attempt to create the illusion of depth, but do not tackle the underlying causes. 
2.2.2 Wiping out Mbeki 
An intriguing example of the shallowness of global frames was the transition between 
Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, virtually wiped out from the 2009 coverage. Journalists 
implied that Zuma was the successor to Mandela, rather than to Mbeki, and this remains 
a mystifying conclusion: did global journalists ignore Mbeki’s leadership because he was 
difficult to approach, as Gevisser (2007) suggests, or that he loathed the mediatised 
political journalism style and refused to submit to “sound bites” (Louw, 2005: 181)? 
Zuma’s populist leadership style drew more of the spotlight and naturally overshadowed 
Mbeki’s more austere and reserved personality. The avoidance of narratives about Mbeki 
and the scandalous transition between the two presidents is again symptomatic of 
mediatisation. South Africa’s biggest political scandal in the first two decades of 
democracy was effectively erased on the news because, presumably, Zuma’s cult-like 
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personality was a far greater draw card. The tussle between Zuma and Mbeki was hardly 
mentioned in literature about the 2009 election media coverage, and this sample shows 
why – broadcasters themselves did not mention it. 
2.2.3 Offer and demand 
The global spotlight shifted away from the country in the 1999 and 2004 polls, but 
returned with an added luminosity in 2009 with the visualisation of Jacob Zuma’s cult-
like status. The lack of context of Zuma’s personality was surprising as literature of the 
time noted the media’s focus on his polygamous lifestyle and populist, charismatic 
campaign (Hamill, 2005; Geersema-Sligh, 2015), yet none of these elements were 
observed in the sample, perhaps because of this study’s sample dates. Instead, the global 
broadcasts presented a “Jacob Zuma Show” that was loud and intimidating, yet without 
any direct discourse between the presidential candidate and the journalists.  
 
When analysing images and participants therein, Kress and Van Leeuwen (2005: 126) 
remark that two forms of contact with the audience, offer and demand, are 
commonplace. Framing an individual in this manner assists somewhat in the narrative 
reading of the image. The authors suggest that the person presented in an “offer” stance 
appears as if they do not know they are being looked at (by the camera and the viewers). 
Conversely, then, “demand” images show the subject as directly addressing the viewer, 
aware of the camera and of being in the shot. In Zuma’s representation, the viewer’s gaze 
was on an abstract, passive participant in “offer” stance rather than an active leader 
engaged with the television audience. This passive participation continued to the 2014 
election where political leaders were hardly heard speaking and hardly seen, sharply 
different to the representation of 1994 where Constand Viljoen, Mandela, and Buthelezi 
had dedicated broadcasts and in-depth interviews with journalists. The “offer” 
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positioning here may be due to either the journalist’s framing or the politician’s 
reluctance to engage with the media, or both. 
 
As viewers, we were also kept apart from the populace both in their experience of 
poverty and in their protest action. Long shots of the protests and townships, close-ups 
of burning rubble, and a lack of citizen voices kept the experience of ordinary South 
Africans at arm’s length in the global broadcasts. Overall, the later election years 
positioned participants far more often in passive, “offer” stances than in “demand” 
stances. The notable exception was AJE in 2014, where embedded journalists attempted 
to garner citizen voices and contextualise poverty, protests, and the liberation narrative 
that strengthened the ANC’s support.  
2.2.4 Liberation narrative 
Even though this sample was awash with contradictory and confusing narratives, at least 
global journalists attempted to explore controversial topics about the elections. In 2009, 
and especially in 2014, international broadcasters touched on the ANC’s liberation 
narrative and voting patterns of South Africans as an attempt to address the “why” 
(Duncan, 2014b) in the elections.  
 
The ANC has a tendency to control the type of narratives and histories spoken of, about, 
and through the party lines. Alec Russell suggests that the history of the ANC’s exile 
from South Africa has had a significant impact on the way the party organises this 
hierarchy: once in power, the movement was determined to maintain this control 
through militancy, an obsession that was rooted in its long years underground. Often 
convinced that its enemies were constantly trying to undermine it by peeling off potential 
defectors (Russell 2009: 62) while in exile, loyalty to the party line was therefore 
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paramount. Post-apartheid, criticism of the government (by the media, by opposition 
parties, and by citizens) is often called “counter-revolutionary thinking” (Butler, 2012: 62, 
Munusamy, 2013; Sapa, 2014a; Mantashe, 2015; Essop, 2016), while opposition parties 
are “anti-majoritarian” (Nzimande, 2012) or “racist and fascist” (Isaacs, Whittles, & 
Grootes, 2014). De Vos (2012b), Du Preez (2013: 214 – 215), and Grootes (2013: 29) 
argue that the ANC’s communication department often quashes contradicting views by 
using these particular terms. As Russell remarks (2009: 65), and previous chapters have 
explored, loyalty under Mbeki’s rule was prized above all else, while Zuma employed 
authority force (through military and police) to “behave, or face the consequences” 
(Masego, Security tight ahead of SA poll, BBC, 2014). Mbembe’s (2015: 128) notion of the 
commandement controlling societal structures through force or enchantment appears to be 
at play here. 
 
The re-telling of this “liberation narrative” tends to obliterate smaller opposition 
movements in the ANC’s history (Holmes & Shoup, 2013: 57), and both local and global 
broadcasts across the years seem to be guilty of doing just that. Reducing the complexity 
of the Struggle to a single-facet liberation narrative squashes interpretation into a few 
easily grasped stereotypes. In this study, even though journalists grasp at elements of 
depth in later years, the lack of space and time to develop these ideas and explain context 
generates entangled narratives and perplexed journalists, as well as a flattened and 
superficial depiction of democracy in South Africa. 
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3 JOURNALISM PRACTICE  
3.1 South African journalism 
As noted, one discovery of the election analysis was that South African broadcasters 
were ultimately cautious to explore controversial frames and narratives – despite the 
SABC’s subtle criticism in 1999. This peculiar avoidance was a surprise – a hypothesis of 
this research was that local narratives would closely follow those on international 
channels, albeit less pessimistic, and this discovery also contradicts much of the 
assumptions about South African broadcasters in the literature of the time (Jacobs, 1999; 
Davis, 2005; Duncan, 2009, 2014b).  
 
This hesitancy was rooted in the local broadcasters’ desire to present democracy in South 
Africa as normal, stable, and uncontested, following with Wasserman’s (2010, 2013, 
2014; Wasserman & Rao, 2008) African media ethics and Ogdan’s (1980) developmental 
journalism principle. Another reason for this avoidance was born out of a presumed 
chilling effect amongst local media. Davis (2005: 234) noticed that journalists in the 2004 
election shied away from criticising any political party, but particularly the government, 
which is also revealed in this study. The ANC’s need for total control (Makhanya, 2008: 
18) over the press means that the government often accuses journalists of racism and 
right-wing politics. In 2003, SABC board member Thami Mazwai commented that “old 
clichés such as objectivity or right of the editor” (Davis, 2005: 233) had little place in the 
Africanist aspirations of the national broadcaster. Wasserman (2003: 219) agrees that 
rethinking normative journalistic ethics, media ownership, freedom of speech, and 
transformation of the media is important, especially in post-apartheid South Africa, but 
argues that Mazwai “seems to be confusing issues” (ibid.: 222) in that objectivity is a 
cornerstone of democracy, rather than an attack on media freedom.  
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Although the ANC’s control of the SABC has never been overt, the broadcaster’s 
hesitancy to investigate critical narratives or present controversial stories during elections 
suggests the ANC’s sensitivity to negative frames has influenced the news agenda. Yet 
the SABC is not the only South African broadcaster to show such hesitancy – 
eTV/eNCA was equally as cautious, which was unexpected given the channel’s slogan 
proclaiming “independence” and “investigative journalism”. The sample size for 
eTV/eNCA broadcasts pre-2014 was very small due to costs, so perhaps given more 
time and money, a wider range of narratives might be discovered. 
3.1.1 Mainstream and grassroots 
While most South African channels were mainstream news (SABC, eNCA, and EWN), 
some independent news channels were included in later years (AfricaNews and 
AmandlaTV). These non-mainstream broadcasts were far more investigative with a 
greater focus on citizen issues and voices, indicating an increase in pluralism and 
enhanced democracy. With increased independent news broadcasters exploring 
grassroots issues and acknowledging a diverse range of voices, democracy is strengthened 
because there is more choice for substantive and deliberative information (Berger in 2002 
accorded much importance on media pluralism and diversity in a well-functioning 
democracy). One chief caveat to this encouraging statistic is viewing access – both 
AmandlaTV and AfricaNews are online-only channels, where subscribers require a 
computer or smart phone and a data package. South African data costs are one of the 
highest in the world, second only to Brazil (Van Zyl, 2016), and the Internet remains 
unaffordable for most. 
 
	 331 
3.2 Global journalism 
Bennett suggests that newsworthiness and immediacy often trumps fact-checking in the 
digitised era, and economic pressures drive this deficiency in “accountability journalism” 
(2012: 3). A brutal reliance on advertising revenue, newsroom cutbacks, closure of 
investigative bureaux, and staffing cuts (ibid.) combined with news frames that mostly 
confirm and conform to discourses of liberal capitalism (Louw, 2005: 82) result in both 
narrow and shallow frames of elections. “When news is consumed with public relations, 
the messages become a mix of absurd sensationalism… and formula slogans” (Bennett, 
2012: 9). As Nyamnjoh notes, these thrusts towards a PR-ised form of journalism result 
in too many cases of “talking without listening” (2005: 57), and prevents the media on 
performing their role adequately in the democratisation process. 
 
Louw (2005: 66) suggests that the “racy” style of modern political journalism 
comfortably confirms liberal hegemonies: narratives lack substance and deal in the 
spectacular only; news avoids the discussion of solutions and prefers to confront the 
viewer with shocking or outraging scenarios, leaving them entertained but no wiser; and 
entertainment is favoured over substance. Louw (2005: 66), Hawk (2002: 158), and 
Norris (1995: 359, 1997: 14) agree that post-Cold War news frames during the Clinton 
presidency led to an increased commercialisation of journalism, resulting in “empty 
stories” (Louw, 2005: 67). While Louw’s cynicism is rooted in Westernised celebrity 
politics, this kind of “racy” journalism is seen throughout this study too. Producing these 
types of stories does not require great expense or embedded journalists. With the 
increased digitisation and convergence of journalism and the reliance on social and swift 
media over long-form and investigative stories, journalists are no longer encouraged to 
get ‘down on the ground’.  
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In 2014, the visualisation of protest action centred on the destruction of property and 
disruption of the election. Even though AJE’s embedded journalists Tania Page and 
Haru Mutasa attempted a view-from-the-ground analysis of the protests and election, 
these few broadcasts were again lost in the sea of visually rich protests, burning tyres, 
intimidating marches, and ruined buildings on other channels. AJE was one of the only 
channels that interviewed citizens and protesters directly and thus avoided “racy” 
journalism that turns politics into spectacle, but only through the use of embedded 
journalists that occasionally listened to grassroots voices. 
  3.2.1 The lack of listening  
An important finding of this thesis is this lack of listening to citizens, and was evident on 
both South African and global broadcasts. The decrease in citizen (Unknown) voices 
post-1994 indicates a focus on authorities and, later, pundits at the expense of grassroots 
voices. Despite some profound coverage on AJE, VOA, CBS, and the SABC, these were 
lost over the years in mediatised, top-down, and polarised coverage. This study reiterates 
Duncan’s warnings in 2014: the top down organisation of a media that promotes 
authority sources yet neglects citizens “has serious implications, as it fosters a society that 
is unable to see itself, and respond to its most pressing problems” (2014a: 92). The media 
should provide substantive information necessary to enable democracy but, “in order for 
them to play this role, they need to constitute an inclusive public sphere that provides 
equality of opportunity to receive information, to listen and to speak” (ibid.: 76).  
 
Thus, the importance of “listening” to the view from the ground cannot be overstated, 
especially during volatile situations, when presenting controversial issues, and during 
rising unrest. When the populace no longer feel they are taken seriously or, worse, no 
longer trust the representation they are given by an unsympathetic and uncaring media, 
citizens tend to distrust journalists. Duncan (2014b), Cross (2010), Bennett (2012: 2), and 
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Louw (2005: 81) suggest that recent political journalism prefers drama to depth, pundits 
over people, and personalities over policies. This “hype-ocracy” (Louw, 2005: 50) tends 
to value the “priestly caste” (Nimmo & Combs, 1992: 24) of experts, celebrities, and 
smooth talkers over politicians and citizens, and devolves thoughtful viewpoints into an 
echo chamber of sound bites. 
 
4 CONTRIBUTIONS TO POLITICAL COMMUNICATION THEORY 
4.1 Political engagement drop-off 
The reliance on political leaders as sources dropped off significantly in the 2014 election. 
As Graph 8.1 shows, speakers across the years favoured the Unknowns or vox pops until 
2004, where Knowns suddenly became preferred sources. The 2004 sample size was very 
small, and so conclusions should not be based solely on this year, but as seen in Graph 




Further, the difference between political leaders speaking and other Knowns speaking 
was significant in the 2014 election. Graph 8.2 shows the abrupt decrease in political 
leaders and spokespeople speaking in relation to other Knowns (such as political analysts 




Only 31% of Known speakers were political leaders in 2014, compared to 75% in 1999, 
71% in 1994, 67% in 2009, and 64% in 2004. The lack of broadcasts available in 1999 
and 2004 make it difficult to draw conclusions from these two years, but broadcasts were 
more accessible in 1994, 2009, and 2014. 
 
Journalists disengaged with political leaders in later years, selecting political analysts, 
celebrities, and thought leaders rather than political party sources. Cross (2010) found 
that the type of source focus has shifted from political leader voices to punditry instead, 
echoing Louw’s earlier discussion on “punditocracy” (2005: 80), and this thesis agrees, at 
least towards the latter years of analysis. The preference for punditry creates yet more 
distance between the viewer and the politicians, with more layers of interpretation 
between participant and audience. Political leaders are interpreted, rather than voiced, 
and this increases the “offer” stance that Kress and Van Leeuwen describe as an 
“invisible barrier … erected between the represented participants and the viewers, a 
sense of disengagement” (2005: 126). While the authors describe offer and demand poses 
strictly through static images, I posit that the political leaders in this study have been 
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frequently positioned, through indirect means such as visual framing and the drop-off in 
voicing, as passive participants, which weakens the information and instead increases 
distance between viewer and policy discussion.  
 
4.2 Binaries 
Spurr (1994: 19), Hawk (2002: 170), West (2008), and Grinker et al. (2010: 587) suggest 
that global journalists often position African stories through a frame of “development” 
towards a Western ideal state, or the “failure” of that development. These binaries were 
not as prevalent in this study as the literature suggested. Global and local journalists 
occasionally positioned the South African elections as synonymous with dignity and 
development (CBS in 1994 and the SABC in 1999), but the references were far more 
nuanced and sporadic than assumed. Another surprise was that global narratives did not 
equate South African democracy to that in other African countries. In my study on the 
FIFA 2010 World Cup (Jones, 2012), I found that global journalists tended to conflate 
South Africa with the rest of the continent, but I found very few instances of this 
practise across the election samples.  
 
Instead of these binaries, an adjusted horse race frame was employed throughout the 
coverage, but because of South Africa’s single party-dominated democracy the “game 
frame” was not between two parties (as in Broh, 1980; Patterson, 1980; Hallin, 1992; 
Aalberg, et al., 2011), but between two narratives. Journalists binarised coverage by 
presenting two competing sides, reminiscent of Nyamnjoh’s (2005: 235) observation of 
the polarised media and Rassool and Witz’s (1996: 339) morality play: peace ran neck and 
neck with war in 1994; the rural competed with urban in 1999 and 2004; traditional 
rituals and modern policies collided in 1994 and 2009 while the chaos of protesters and 
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control of the police clashed in 2014. The “race” that involved the ANC was not 
whether the party would win, but whether the much-feared two-thirds majority would be 
reached. 
 
The reimagining of this horse race frame indicates the strength of post-Cold War news 
values, including mediatisation, in the narratives about elections, particularly on global 
news. These framing devices flatten the experience of democracy and the elections to a 
few already-known narratives and stereotypes of the threat of a failed state, a prized 
negotiated settlement, the intimidating tribalist movement, a moral military controlling 
chaotic protests, and the unknowable rural and poor existence. Global journalists played 
prophet in judging which side would win, particularly in the 1994, 2009, and 2014 
elections where violence, protest, and populism vied for the spotlight against peace, 
control, and policies. 
 
4.3 Mediatised coverage on global channels 
Global research about the media’s role in covering elections shows that mediatisation 
drives global journalism practice (Louw, 2005: 66, 271; Strömbäck, 2008: 230), and this 
study is broadly consistent with established research. Context and comprehension was 
often obliterated when journalists emphasised strong visuals of scandalous events, and 
little substantive information about the elections was therefore forthcoming.  
 
Mediatised political communication relies on dramatic visuals (Louw, 2005: 179, Bennett, 
2012: 44), personality-driven coverage (Strömbäck, 2008: 230), media-centric sources, 
and the emphasis on the role of these authorities at the expense of citizen voices (Cross, 
2010). Two consequences tend to arise because of mediatised election coverage: firstly, 
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democracy is weakened as the media offer fewer opportunities for deliberative 
information, while feeding the electorate on a poor diet of bright colours and flashing 
lights. Secondly, these mediatised narratives flatten the complexities of elections; remove 
explanations; and supress substantive information. Journalists thus urgently grasp for 
some kind of explanation when faced with a complicated democracy but ultimately resort 
to already-known stereotypes and juxtapositions to create the illusion of depth.  
 
This study has determined that most global journalists present entangled narratives 
because mediatisation and episodic reporting seemed to steer their coverage of the 
elections, from the violent-turned-miracle 1994 election to the perplexing 2014 ANC 
win. With fewer political leaders voiced as sources and less citizen vox pops in the 
broadcasts, these journalists could not hope to get the full picture of the election. 
 
4.4 The liberation narrative and media freedom 
As reflected in the literature about South African journalism, local journalists in this 
study tended to avoid important yet controversial narratives throughout the years, 
suggesting a chilling effect (echoing Davis, 2005; Wasserman & De Beer, 2009; and 
Malila, 2014), increased government involvement in news agendas (as per Gouws & De 
Beer, 2008; Sparks, 2009; and Malila, 2014), or the lack of training and access to 
resources (suggested by Jones & Lodge, 1999 and Duncan, 2009). South African 
channels were progressively more hesitant to cover controversial topics or criticise the 
ruling party as an increasingly paranoid government policed South Africa’s primary 
broadcaster, demanding loyalty to the party narrative at all costs.  
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The SABC’s avoidance of controversy in the later years of the sample showed a swing 
towards Kuper and Kuper’s definition of “Sunshine Journalism” that “amplifies the 
extent of social cohesion and development” (2001: 357). While some (Versfeld, Kruger 
& Smith, 1996; Saidykhan, 2011) suggest that favouring positive aspects in reporting 
South Africa may balance the previously negative representations of Africa in Western 
public opinion, Sunshine Journalism is essentially a ‘false positive’ and not without faults. 
Kuper and Kuper argue that if journalists focus on positive news at the expense of the 
negative, “people are presented with a perspective that falsifies their daily realities and 
wider experiences” (2001: 358). Just as Afropessimism damages narratives about the 
continent (Nothias, 2012; Jones, 2014), so Sunshine Journalism flattens experiences and 
reduces complex issues to easily grasped stereotypes. In South Africa, if news is censored 
or manipulated at election time to present a “Sunshine” view of the incumbent 
government, the voting populace is less likely to get a full and critical perspective of the 
political landscape. Throughout the five election periods, the SABC tended to focus on 
the “Good News” narrative – ignoring the violence in 1994, neatly skipping over Mbeki’s 
AIDS denialism in 1999 and 2004, avoiding any mention of the controversy surrounding 
Jacob Zuma, and highlighting the process of democracy rather than any negative aspects 
(of which there were many) in 2014. Whatever light was shed on representing the 













1 SUMMARY OF THE THESIS 
 
This thesis chronicled how South African elections were represented on global and local 
television news. To do so, it developed a dedicated multimodal methodology that joined 
semiotics and discourse analysis. This thesis found that a nuanced form of mediatisation 
framed the elections on global channels, even though journalists sought narrative depth 
to explain the complex South African voting patterns and democracy. Locally, the 
liberation narrative restricted news narratives about the elections, resulting in avoidance 
of important and controversial stories information that could have developed a broader 
picture of the elections. This framing style was in direct contrast to the personality-driven 
coverage of global journalists. Citizen voices and political leaders as sources were missing 
from the later election years on all channels in favour of pundits, a symptom of the swing 
towards media logic. Overall, the representation of the elections kept the electorate and 
the viewers apart, inserting levels of detachment via camera proxemics, evaluative voices, 




The above generalisations are possible, with caveats. First among them is the sample size 
of the interim years. 1999 and 2004 were very small samples and so generalisation is not 
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recommended from these years. However, narratives gathered from these years were still 
interesting and important. A second caveat entails sample dates. Generalisation of these 
findings should not extend to campaign coverage or political party representation overall, 
as the sample focused only on the voting week with some outlier broadcasts for context. 
Finally, elections are but one example of how a nation experiences democracy – elections 
are highly organised, employing specialised party rhetoric. Ergo, this study does not make 
any presumptions about news narratives about parties outside of the elections, nor how 
the society experiences democracy as a whole.92  
 
3 IMPLICATIONS AND APPLICATIONS 
 
This study has three major implications and applications. Firstly, the innovative method 
in this thesis can provide a basis for future studies of elections in particular and television 
broadcasts in general. Secondly, this study adds empirical data to the overall study of 
media coverage of South African elections. It combines an analysis of previous studies of 
each election with new data about the broadcast media coverage of the elections, so 
often neglected in favour of print media. Finally, this study provides a theoretical 
indication for the symptoms of mediatised coverage during elections in South Africa – 
the lack of listening and context gives rise to entangled, contradictory narratives that in 
turn flatten the experience of democracy.  
 
																																																								




4.1 Analysis methodology 
This study primarily recommends that future political communication analysts employ 
this or a similar method to analyse broadcast news. Television news is so often 
overlooked in favour of print media or, worse, lumped together with radio and print 
media under the heading “media coverage”. Such a complex and shifting medium 
deserves a better method of analysis, especially in the age of Post-Truth (Beckett, 2016; 
Glasser, 2016) and convergence, digital media. With mediatised coverage of political 
events and elections, a dedicated methodology designed specifically for the visual nature 
of television and convergence media should be employed as far as possible. This study 
therefore recommends a more nuanced investigation of broadcast news coverage during 
elections in order to discover the role of the media in a democracy. The methodology 
employed here has scope to be developed, modified, and repurposed for different fields 
of study. The combined elements of discourse, visual analysis, and production context is 
an appropriate and recommended method of exploration for media scholars interested in 
political journalism analysis. Additional studies that employ this type of method include 
Teer-Tomaselli (1993), Dueck (1995), and Orgeret (2006). 
 
4.2 Archival techniques 
A second recommendation of this study is an urgent request to the SABC and eNCA 
archivists. Access to these archives is extremely difficult, despite on-going digitisation 
processes. The SABC has competent and helpful employees doing their best with a 
chaotically organised archive, and for future researchers to analyse broadcast data this 
archive should be properly classified. Suggestions include correct usage of keywords, 
accurate and detailed transcriptions of the broadcasts, and a properly categorised 
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broadcast system. These implementations will probably be time consuming, but the 
importance of accurate archives for the national broadcaster cannot be overstated. The 
eNCA archive is much more systematic but is prohibitively expensive for scholarly 
analysis – perhaps a pro-rata system of costs could be negotiated for scholars, without 
having to download and keep the broadcasts but as a watch-and-return system, similar to 
the system employed at Getty Images. Low resolution and watermarked copies of the 
broadcasts are kept online and can be watched for free, provided the scholar logs into 
the webpage. Adequate but incomplete transcripts of the broadcasts exist below the 
video. A digital ordering system is then implemented if the scholar requires the full 
broadcast. Again, setting up a system like this would be time consuming and costly, but 
would save time and increase access to broadcast data in the long run. 
 
Additionally, when SABC and eTV provided transcripts of the broadcasts so I could gain 
an overview of what was available, these documents varied so greatly in style and 
substance that in some cases I had no idea as to what the broadcast entailed. For 
example, an SABC transcript of a 1999 election broadcast continued thus: 
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This transcript is woefully inadequate and slightly incorrect. There is no differentiation 
between the quoted words from the broadcast and those used to describe the action, and 
the description swings from visual to discourse, giving little idea as to the nature of the 
content. It was impossible to gauge whether or not this broadcast would be useful to 
analyse, and so I had to order a large amount of data that ended up being useless to this 
research project. 
 
A second recommendation is therefore to standardise the transcription process 
broadcasts to systematically organise these archives. A systematic transcription method 
such as the one used in this study and in Jones (2016) should be employed for detailed 
and accurate keyword searching. While time consuming, the accuracy of transcripts will 
- ws press with cameras , outside and bodyguards 
- ws arrival of Nelson Mandela ; greeting staff inside hall  , with Graca inside hall  
- 16:41:20 mcu ivd Nelson Mandela about how he feels 
- ws moving to next counter ;  given a ballot papers  ; going to the voting booth ; 
16:41:31 c/a casting his vote , being shown how to cast ; , casting both ballots ;  
16:41:38 mcu ivd Mandela saying its a wonderful occasion , doing this for the second 
time , the feeling  is not as intense as it was in 1994 , because then I was exercising for 
the first time , I am very happy ; laughed when asked whom did he vote for , saying 
no that is the secret he might be charged ;  
 
KEYWORDS := XYZ saelect99 vote voting cast line democracy citizen population 
polls ballot voting party politics  ELECTIONS ELECTION  LEADER 
PRESIDENT ANC    democratic party  
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pay dividends to the broadcasters in the long run. It will mean easier, more accurate 
search and retrieval. 
4.3 Voicing citizens, and engaging with journalists 
The final recommendation concerns the worrying trend of significant drop-off of quotes 
from sources, particularly from political leaders. In order to create and maintain a 
functioning democracy, substantive information between communities and governments 
should be adequately mediated through the news media. The final recommendation is 
thus to include, where possible, more voices direct from sources – citizens, protesters, 
political leaders, and community leaders. As seen in the 2009 and 2014 election years, 
ANC voices were substantially missing from the broadcasts, leading most journalists to 
rely on simplistic juxtaposition and lip flaps to present a shallow overview of a complex 
society. The ANC’s representation on these broadcasts was mostly negative, too. The 
deteriorating relationship between the ANC and journalists is a further concern, and this 
study recommends that government spokespeople engage with the media more 
frequently with more transparency to repair this relationship. 
 
Understandably, voicing political leaders and citizens comes with limitations: time, 
resources, training, and funding are all barriers to including more grassroots voices, while 
adding political sources depends on the relationship between politicians and the media. 
In order to effect change, journalists should take the lead in investigating citizen and 
political voices, as evidenced in Al Jazeera’s embedded journalists during the 2014 
election, or CNN’s Mike Hanna in 1994 or Robyn Curnow in 2009. Embedding 
journalism is a costly exercise, and in an era where newsrooms are routinely 
underfunded, bureaux across Africa closed, and long form journalism pushed to the side 
in favour of quick acting social media, this may seem like a tall order. As Beckett (2016) 
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asserts, news media should not merely listen and represent voices, but rather create the 
space for the relationship that allows us to hear each other better. Listening to the 
community and presenting these voices on broadcast media is a key tenet of journalism, 
and the art of listening is slowly being subjugated in the blizzard of fast news and 
mediatised razzmatazz. It is thus up to the journalists and editors themselves to regard 
community, citizen, and grassroots voices as powerful sources, rather than rely on the 
easily accessible elite voices of punditry and journalists-as-experts. Getting more 
journalists on the ground, up close and personal with the everyday sources will help halt 
the stampede in political journalism to mediatised Post-Truth information. This study 
thus recommends that the broadcasters named in this analysis, as well as other 
mainstream news networks, make a concerted effort to widen their group of political 
sources to include citizen vox pops, political party members, and grassroots sources. 
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CNN: An international 24-hour rolling news channel based in New York City, CNN has 
bureaux across the world including Atlanta, America; London, UK; Mumbai, India; and 
Hong Kong. Launched in 1985, it is owned by the Turner Broadcasting System, a 
division of Time Warner. 
CBS: The initialism of the Columbia Broadcasting System, CBS is an American 
commercial television network broadcast from New York and Los Angeles. It was 
launched in 1941 and is owned by Viacom. 
ABC: The initialism of the American Broadcasting Company, ABC was launched in 
1943. It owned by Disney-ABC Television Group, a division of the Walt Disney 
Company, and broadcasts out of New York City and Los Angeles. 
AP: The Associated Press is a respected American non-profit newswire headquartered in 
New York City. It is a co-operative and unincorporated group and staff journalists who 
are also union members write all material. It has 243 bureaux in 120 countries. It employs 
the inverted pyramid method of journalism in its stories to enable various news agencies 
to tailor the stories. AP is the US’ primary news service and was formed in 1846. 
VOA: The Voice of America is a government-funded American multimedia news source 
and international public broadcaster. It was launched in 1942 and is broadcast out of 
Washington, D.C. 
CBC: The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation is a state-owned Canadian Federal Crown 
Corporation and public broadcaster. It is broadcast out of Ottawa and was launched in 
1952. CBC operates autonomously from the Canadian government and is funded 
through advertising. 
WSJ: The online version of the Wall Street Journal newspaper was launched in 2011 and 
completes its paper-based news with short broadcasts in a television news format. It is 




BBC: BBC World News is a 24-hour rolling news channel from London, UK, launched 
in 1995 and broadcast online in 2007. Global News Ltd, a commercial group of 
companies, owns it. BBC World News is funded through advertising and not the British 
Broadcasting Corporation or the government. It has 41 bureaux across the globe. BBC 
World News is not carried in the UK because of licencing laws, but the news broadcasts 
are identical on both the UK and international versions.  
SKY NEWS: The 24-hour international rolling news channel Sky News was launched in 
1989 and is owned by SkyPLC, a division of Fox Networks Group. It has 12 bureaux in 
10 countries and has a British-based focus for news.  
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ITN: Independent Television News is a British-based newswire with bureaux in 
Brussels, Jerusalem, Johannesburg, New York, Paris, Sydney, and Washington, D.C. It 
was launched in 1955 and affected by the British change in ownership laws in the 1990s, 
which pushed broadcasters towards acquiring funding from advertising. ITN Source is 
the archive of all ITN broadcasts and also hosts Fox News, Reuters, and ITV. 
EURONEWS: The pan-European and international news network is based in France 
and was launched in 1993. NBC-Universal and Media Globe Networks own it. It has 
bureaux in 9 cities. 
F24: France24 is a 24-hour international news and current affairs channel based in Paris, 
France. It was launched in 2006 and is owned by France Medías Monde, a government-
owned group. It is available via satellite and cable but increasingly online. It has 260 
journalists in various bureaux but mostly centred in France. 
REUTERS: The international newswire is based in London and has headquarters in 
New York City too. It is a division of Thompson Reuters and was launched in 1851. 
Almost every major news outlet subscribed to Reuters in 2014, and the newswire has 
2500 journalists and 600 photojournalists in over 200 locations worldwide. Journalists for 
Reuters use the “Reuters Handbook” which ascribes consistency across the stories 
produced. 
AFP: The Agence France-Presse is the third largest newswire after AP and Reuters. It 
was founded in 1944 and has 150 bureaux and offices worldwide. It is government-




SABC: The South African Broadcasting Corporation is a South African-based public 
service and commercial broadcasting company that provides television and radio news. It 
was launched in 1976 and is funded through government grants and advertising. The 
government of South Africa owns the SABC. 
eTV/eNCA: eTV is free-to-air an entertainment and news channel broadcast out of 
Johannesburg and Cape Town, and launched in 1998. Since 2013 the channel has 
streamed content online. eNCA is South Africa’s flagship 24-hour rolling news channel, 
launched in 2008 as eNews and managed by black economic empowerment company 
HCI Holdings. Since 2013 eNCA has archived news reports online, especially on 
YouTube. 
NTV: Nation Television is broadcast out of Kenya and is an entertainment and current 
affairs channel. It is owned by Nation Media Group and has broadcast on YouTube 
since 2007. 
EWN: Eye Witness News is a South African-based multiplatform news publisher and 
owned by Primedia Broadcasting. It has streamed online since 2008. 
AFRICANEWS: The first incarnation of the new-look AfricaNews channel launched in 
2013. The pan-African channel is broadcast out of the Congo and is a subsidiary of 
EuroNews. Its tagline in 2009 was “The largest network of African reporters”. 
AMANDLATV: Broadcast briefly in 2009 by the left wing South African media project 
Amandla, the AmandlaTV broadcasts are available on YouTube. Amandla was initiated 




ASIA AND MIDDLE EAST 
 
AJE: Al Jazeera English is the Westernised version of the Arabic station and is Qatari 
state owned. The English channel is broadcast mainly from Doha, Qatar, but has over 60 
bureaux in major cities all over the world, including London and Washington DC. 
CCTV: The China Central Television, now known as China Global Television Network 
since 2016, is broadcast out of Beijing, China and is state-owned. It has 24 bureaux 
worldwide.  
NZ3: New Zealand TV 3 is a regional television station from New Zealand. 
PRESSTV: The rolling news channel is Tehran-based but also has offices in London, 
Beirut, Damascus, Kabul, and the Gaza Strip. It is affiliated to the Islamic Republic of 
Iran Broadcasting but is independent. It was launched in 2007. 
	
	
	
	
	
